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There is a paradox about moral principles like ‘You ought to keep your promises.’  They seem to 
express universal truths that tell us what to do, but exceptional situations arise in which it seems 
we should not do what they tell us.  Generalists like R. M. Hare resolve this paradox by arguing 
that accurately specified moral principles do not have exceptions, and we can use them to 
syllogistically derive correct judgments about actions.  Particularists like Jonathan Dancy resolve 
the paradox by arguing that, because there can be exceptions to any moral principle, moral 
principles actually are false.  At best they are “reminders” or “dispensable crutches.” 
I argue that although Dancy’s particularism undermines generalism, it fails to capture the 
true normative status of moral principles.  Consequently, there is a lacuna in particularism:  it 
does not provide an adequate understanding of how moral values are related or how moral 
principles are action-guiding.  I trace the failures of particularism, as well as generalism, to an 
assumption both share about generality—an assumption that tethers them to an unduly narrow 
conception of moral principles. 
After rejecting this assumption, I draw on Iris Murdoch’s notion of vision and its 
perfection to develop an ideal-based account of generality.  According to this account, moral 
thought includes reflection on substantive ideals, the content of which is partly expressed in 
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ordinary moral principles.  I argue there are two forms of generality moral principles can exhibit, 
which generalists and particularists alike should embrace.  The first is characteristic of 
fundamental principles like those in Murdoch’s and Aristotle’s views.  The second is exhibited in 
principles that help give content to moral ideals.  My account (unlike particularism) allows that 
principles have a normative, action-guiding role, but (unlike generalism) it does not construe 
principles as bases for syllogistic derivations about what to do.  I discuss examples of both moral 
exemplars and rehabilitated criminal offenders to demonstrate that principled reflection is crucial 
to perfecting agency.  In doing this, I show how the paradox about moral principles can give way 
to an understanding of moral principles that captures the role they play in ordinary moral 
reflection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation arises from curiosity about a routine bit of reasoning.  We believe certain 
behaviors are wrong, like breaking promises or telling lies, and yet there are occasions when we 
conclude that it is perfectly okay to break our word or fudge the truth.  In fact, there are enough 
of these occasions to make our appeal to moral principles like ‘do not break a promise’ or ‘do not 
tell a lie’ look puzzling.  Why do we continue to affirm familiar moral principles, even when we 
find that often they do not actually tell us what we should do?  
Philosophers, too, have asked what moral principles mean and how they should figure in 
our moral reasoning.  Traditional responses to these questions revolve around the distinction 
between deontological and consequentialist moral theories and place Kant in opposition to Mill;  
but in recent debates about how to answer these questions, philosophers have focused attention 
on a distinction that can be traced to the ancients and which presents possibilities for thinking 
about moral theory in a quite different way.  These philosophers, often under the influence of 
Aristotle, have introduced two broad positions that supersede the conventional divide between 
deontology and consequentialism.1 
1 For examples of particularist views influenced by Aristotle, see John McDowell’s 
“Deliberation and Moral Development,” “Virtue and Reason,” and “Some Issues in Aristotle’s 
Moral Psychology” and Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge.  For an example of 
particularism not directly reliant on Aristotle, see Jonathan Dancy’s work, especially Moral 
Reasons and Ethics without Principles. 
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The first is generalism, which maintains that moral principles play a necessary role in 
arriving at correct moral judgments.  The strongest form of generalism maintains that all correct 
moral judgment can be derived from an adequate system of moral principles.  From the 
generalist perspective, Kant and Mill do not represent two extremes for moral theory.  On the 
contrary, they simply offer two different ways to elaborate a generalist position.  Aristotle, on the 
other hand, points the way to a true alternative:  the second position, known as particularism, 
which maintains that generalism’s moral principles are not necessary for arriving at correct 
moral judgments.  Indeed, particularism in its strongest form maintains that moral principles are 
false.2 
Particularism, which originates in a critique of generalism, is convincing in its argument 
that because situations are infinitely variable, it is impossible to codify correct moral judgments 
in a set of principles.  Sometimes there are complicated cases, to which the rigid application of 
principles yields morally unacceptable judgments;  sometimes there are novel cases for which 
there is no obviously applicable principle.  Generalists respond to the particularists’ point about 
the infinite variability of situations by seeking ways to retain the definitive normativity of 
principles and guarantee that they yield absolute moral verdicts.  They fine-tune principles so 
that exceptions are “built-in” or they limit the number of principles that count as truly definitive 
or they treat principles as definitive propositions about normative presumptions. 
2 See, for example, Margaret Little’s essay, “Moral Generalities Revisited” in Moral 
Particularism, in which she argues that moral particularism “is a more radical doctrine than 
many give it credit for” because its lesson is that we should doubt the existence of any codifiable 
generalities linking moral and nonmoral properties, including “less ambitious” generalities, such 
as those accompanied by ceteris paribus or pro tanto clauses and not just generalities that would 
function algorithmically, say, as part of a codifiable system (292). 
  2 
                                                 
 I agree with the particularists’ basic critique of generalism.  It wrongly portrays moral 
reasoning as a matter of identifying moral principles and then applying them in an algorithmic 
manner, a portrayal which our experience of moral reflection belies.  It is obvious that good 
moral judges must be sensitive to the particulars of situations and that turning our power of 
moral judging over to a body of rigid rules would make us obtuse moralists.  However, the 
particularists’ contention that moral principles are false is not so convincing.  Such a view goes 
against the way we think of moral principles in our work-a-day thoughts and reflections about 
what we should do, or should have done, and why.  In fact, when we act against the grain of a 
typical moral principle our practice often is not to reject or revise the principle;  rather, we use 
expressions that reaffirm our commitment (“it’s wrong to break a promise”), while noting the 
exception (“but I had an emergency”).  Our practice tends to pronounce, rather than renounce, 
the truth of the principle.  
The debate about the status of moral principles proceeds with each party seesawing 
between two theoretical tasks:  generalists work to craft a conception of principles according to 
which they yield definitive verdicts, and particularists respond with examples that show how the 
generalists’ principles have fallen short.  My main focus in this dissertation, however, is on 
particularists’ efforts to get off the seesaw.  Their fundamental suggestion is that we abandon the 
generalists’ idea that there is anything definitively normative in moral principles and 
reconceptualize them as “reminders,”3 “rules of thumb,”4 or “summaries”5 of past correct 
3 Dancy develops this idea in Moral Reasons (67). 
 
4 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (68).   
 
5 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (73).  
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decisions.  Principles are “dispensable crutches.”6   They are for hobbling along and can be 
discarded if our moral faculties are able.   
I argue that none of the particularists’ suggestions truly capture the normative status of 
moral principles.  Particularists are mistaken about the role of moral principles—and more 
broadly the role of generality—in our moral reasoning, and consequently they are often led to 
view our moral knowledge as inadequate, tentative, and forever needing to be revised, 
supplemented, or even discarded in light of moral determinations made in particular cases.  
Sometimes such modifications are called for, but this portrayal is so unacceptably broad that it 
opens particularism to charges of collapsing into an “empty situation ethics”7 that leaves no 
place for genuine moral commitment.  I seek to harmonize the particularists’ insight about the 
variability of situations with the generalists’ belief that principles express general moral truths.  I 
do so by carving out an alternate conception of generality, which I call the ideal-based account of 
generality.  This account suggests a different way of understanding moral principles that is 
compatible with and in fact embraces much of the particularist critique of generalism, but it 
retains a sense of the definitive normativity of principles on which critics of particularism insist.   
I develop my account of the role of moral principles in large part through a critique of 
Jonathan Dancy’s version of particularism in Moral Reasons and Ethics without Principles.  I 
focus on Dancy as the spokesperson for particularism because he makes an especially clear and 
direct case for it, and his books and articles serve as a primary reference point for defenders and 
opponents of particularism alike.  Because Dancy’s defense of particularism is intimately tied to 
his critique of generalism, I embark in chapter one on a critical examination of his account of 
6 This is Dancy’s characterization in Ethics without Principles (142). 
 
7 This is Hilary Putnam’s characterization in Taking Rules Seriously (193). 
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generalism and the arguments he gives against it.  For Dancy, generalism is the view that a 
general moral principle is a statement that a given property will have the same role in moral 
judgment on each and every occasion on which it is present.  It is the view that “what matters 
somewhere must matter in the same way on every occurrence” (Ethics 93).  Dancy argues that no 
property can invariably matter in the same way on every occurrence and concludes that true 
general moral principles are impossible.  He develops this argument through a sustained attack 
against what he regards as the two basic types of generalism:  absolutist or subsumptive 
generalism in the manner of R. M. Hare and what I will call ‘presumptive generalism’ in the 
manner of W. D. Ross. 
While I agree with the essence of Dancy’s critique, I argue in chapter two that it does not 
imply (as he thinks it does) that there are no general moral principles.  Dancy believes that 
generalism comes in precisely two distinct versions and that principles, if they function in our 
moral reasoning at all, can do so only as envisioned by these two versions.  His attempt to 
reformulate principles as reminders leads to what I call Dancy’s lacuna.  In its practical aspect, 
Dancy’s view cannot account for our appeal to moral principles in ordinary moral discourse and 
reflection;  in its theoretical, aspect it leaves our ability for moral judgment mysterious, for 
Dancy believes that what we know that equips us to make moral judgments is inarticulable.  I 
argue that what is lacking in Dancy’s view is an account of our moral outlook or general values.  
The moral agents of Dancy’s particularism are perfectly sensitive moral judges, and yet they 
have no general understanding of how their moral values are related.  There is no place for an 
understanding of how our values hang together.   
In chapter three, I turn to the work of Iris Murdoch, especially The Sovereignty of Good, 
to show there is a need to fill the lacuna in particularism.  I put special focus on Murdoch’s 
  5 
notion of vision and its perfection to develop a way of talking about the moral data that is left out 
of the particularists’ account of moral judgment.  The gist of Murdoch’s idea of vision, which 
roughly refers to something like character, is that to be good moral judges, we must not only 
have clear perception of the relevant features of situations, but we must also clear away 
distortions in our vision.  To achieve clarity, we must follow what I refer to as ‘Murdoch’s 
injunction,’ her command that we look with “a just and loving gaze” (33).  We can take up this 
stance of love and justice and direct it outwardly toward particular people and situations, or we 
can through reflection direct it inwardly on what I call ‘total vision.’  Murdoch characterizes this 
process of perfecting vision in various ways, including as focusing on or aiming at the Good or 
looking in the light of love and justice.  For Murdoch, it is through this process that we come to 
see things aright.  After the discussion of vision, I draw a contrast between the Murdochian 
picture of moral judgment and Dancy’s picture, which brings out the limitations of Dancy’s 
view.  Dancy’s limited view of the range of possibilities for understanding moral principles cuts 
off an opportunity to find a place for general moral relations of the sort we can locate in vision;  
he cuts off an opportunity for an alternate conception of generality in moral thought.  
My point of departure from Murdoch is that I do not think we get a full picture of the 
actual moral work involved in reflection if we limit our account of it to an appeal to love and 
justice and their neutralizing effects on the ego.  I agree with Murdoch that reflection on total 
vision is a process of clearing away distortions and looking in the light of the Good, but 
reflection will also involve reflection on substantive ideals as they bear on specific situations.  In 
chapter four, I offer an example of moral reflection that demonstrates the connection between 
ideals and principles and the role that both play in moral reflection.  I also consider examples of 
reflection in the criminal rehabilitation process, which lend credibility to my idea that reflection 
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is a vital part of moral judgment making, and not an out-of-touch philosophical construct.  I 
argue that, when understood in terms of ideals, principles are not universal rules for action, but 
are nevertheless action-guiding.  They are propositions that express general moral relations, but 
as I demonstrate in sections 4.7 and 4.8, they are not susceptible to the particularists’ critique that 
they are false.  As part of this demonstration I show that particularists and generalists share a 
common assumption about moral principles that tethers them to an unduly narrow conception of 
generality.  Once we see how ideals and principles play an indelible role in our moral reflections, 
as objects, spurs, and on-going ends for reflection—once we see how reflection on ideals and 
principles can play a vital role in cultivating our moral commitments—we can see how principles 
play a role in guiding our actions. 
In chapter four, I also examine an Aristotelian conception of generality, found in 
Aristotelian categoricals, and offer an analysis of how it has been misunderstood by Dancy-style 
particularists.  Once we clear up the misunderstanding of the sort of generality these categoricals 
articulate, we see the plausibility of alternate conceptions of generality, including the type of 
generality the ideal-based account identifies in ideals and principles.  According to the ideal-
based account, principles possess an unvarying connection or relation to ideals.  As such, they 
have a definitive normativity:  they are unvarying and definitive articulations of (at least part of) 
the substantive content of ideals.   
The dissertation concludes with an argument that there are at least two kinds of 
generality, which both particularists and generalists can accept.  The first kind is characteristic of 
fundamental principles of the sort that form the foundation of the Murdochian and Aristotelian 
views:  ‘look with a just and loving gaze’ and ‘do as the phronimos does.’  These have the 
unconditional, universal characteristics that particularists require to establish the truth of a 
  7 
general principle.  The second sort of generality they should accept is the alternative 
interpretation of principles like ‘adultery is wrong’ developed by the ideal-based account of 
generality, according to which principles express general truths about the ideals to which we are 
committed.  According to this account, Murdoch’s injunction to look with a just and loving gaze 
is inextricably tied to reflection on ideals and their attendant principles, which give content to the 
overarching ideal of the Good.  As such, they play a necessary role in the perfection of vision.  
And so, just like vision itself, they have a guiding role in preparing us for right action when the 
time comes.  The lesson learned is that principled reflection is crucial to the on-going effort of 
perfection in vision and to the process of perfecting agency.  It is through this reflection that 
principles guide actions.  They guide us in the cultivation of our commitment to the Good, so 
that we act well when the moment for action comes. 
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1.0  GENERALISM AND DANCY’S CRITIQUE  
In this dissertation we will investigate the kinds of reasons we have for moral judgments, and 
how we use those reasons in particular cases to arrive at moral judgments.  The debate we will 
enter is centered on the question ‘What is the logical relation between moral reasons and moral 
judgments?’  The moral reasons we are asked to consider in this question are drawn from 
features of actions and their circumstances.  The moral judgments we will begin reflecting on are 
assessments of particular (actual or possible) actions done (or capable of being done) by 
particular agents in particular circumstances;  these assessments may invoke either thin moral 
concepts (e.g., ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘virtuous,’ ‘vicious’) or thick moral concepts (e.g., ‘generous,’ 
‘stingy,’ ‘kind,’ ‘cruel’).  But as the scope of our investigation grows to encompass the ideas of 
Iris Murdoch, we will find it necessary to broaden the range of moral judgments under 
consideration to include the moral evaluation of character and of what Murdoch calls ‘vision.’ 
Our investigation presupposes that moral judgments rest on reasons.  Many philosophers 
have thought that this presupposition is false, that at bottom moral judgments are not the sort of 
things that can be reasonable or unreasonable.  This view, often called ‘non-cognitivism,’ holds 
that moral judgments are something like an expression of a groundless preference or an emotion.  
We will assume that moral judgments can be justified or unjustified by reasons.  Although we 
will not tackle the non-cognitivist position directly in this work—doing so would distract from 
my main line of argument—the conception of moral reasoning we will develop should diminish 
the appeal of non-cognitivism.  
  9 
Accounts of the relation between moral reasons and moral judgments may be divided into 
two broad categories.  One kind of account holds that a feature (or set of features) that counts as 
a reason for a moral judgment in one case must count in the same way in any other case in which 
it appears;  we will call this view ‘generalism.’  The other sort of account holds that the fact that 
a feature (or set of features) counts as a reason for a moral judgment in one case is no guarantee 
that it will count the same way (or at all) in a different case;  we will call this view 
‘particularism.’1  Particularism’s most thorough-going advocate is arguably Jonathan Dancy, and 
it is on his work, especially Moral Reasons and the later Ethics without Principles, that we will 
rely in our examination of the particularists’ position.2   
To introduce the debate between generalism and particularism, we will begin with 
Dancy’s portrayal of generalism in Moral Reasons.  He finds that generalism comes in two 
varieties.  The first is discussed in a chapter called “Against Generalism (1).”  We will refer to 
this variety as ‘subsumptivism.’  The second variety, which is discussed in a subsequent chapter 
called “Against Generalism (2),” we will refer to as ‘presumptivism.’  The next two sections will 
examine Dancy’s account of each of these varieties of generalism. 
1 This characterization of particularism is my gloss on Dancy’s statement in Moral 
Reasons, that “[t]he leading thought behind particularism is the thought that the behaviour of a 
reason (or of a consideration that serves as a reason) in a new case cannot be predicted from its 
behaviour elsewhere” (60).  I find it odd to speak of a reason behaving in one way rather than 
another, and it does not seem that our task is exactly that of coming up with predictions, and so I 
have reformulated his leading thought in terms he uses elsewhere about there being no guarantee 
that a reason will have the same significance wherever it appears. 
 
2 For background I also draw on Dancy’s “Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant 
Properties.”  
 
  10 
                                                 
1.1 SUBSUMPTIVE  GENERALISM 
To fully grasp the first sort of generalism identified by Dancy—subsumptive generalism—we 
have to distinguish it from another position, which we might call the ‘universalizability 
principle’ or ‘universalism.’  A classic expression of the universalizability principle can be found 
in R. M. Hare’s Freedom and Reason.  Hare claims that the universalizability principle applies to 
any judgment that uses terms that have descriptive meaning.  He explains that: 
 
any singular descriptive judgement is universalizable … in the sense that it commits the 
speaker to the further proposition that anything exactly like the subject of the first 
judgement, or like it in the relevant respects, possesses the property attributed to it in the 
first judgment.  (12)  
 
When we turn our attention from singular descriptive judgements to moral judgments (the focus 
of particularism), we can reformulate the universalizability principle as follows:  anyone who 
makes a moral judgment regarding one action is committed to making the same judgment of any 
relevantly similar action.  This thesis, it is important to note, says nothing about how we arrive at 
a judgment;  it takes no stance on what can provide a reason for a moral (or any other) judgment, 
nor on the relationship between reasons and judgments.   
Subsumptive generalism, by contrast, is precisely a thesis about what is required in order 
for a feature of an action to provide a reason for a moral judgment about the action.  
Subsumptivism holds that a feature of an action is a reason for a moral judgment of the action 
just in case that feature falls under a universal moral rule.  To arrive at a judgment about a 
particular action is to subsume features of that action under a rule of the following form:  all 
  11 
actions with features F have moral property M.  According to subsumptivism, for our judgments 
to be rational and consistent they must be based on an underlying set of unchanging rules.  
Hence, whenever we make a moral judgment we are committed to a universal generalization of 
the form ‘∀x (Fx   Mx),’ where x ranges over actions, F is the name of a set of grounding 
properties, and M is a moral property, and to be consistent, we must reach the same conclusion 
about any other action that exhibits the set of properties F.3  
The universalizability principle seems to me simply to express a minimal condition of 
rational consistency.4   It says that if we give different judgments regarding similar cases, we 
should be able to point to some relevant difference between them.  Indeed, it is more truism than 
thesis.5  Hare carefully refrains from tying the universalizability principle to any particular 
3 In “Moral Rules” Russ Shafer-Landau writes, in an exposition that closely follows 
Dancy’s, that the subsumptivist (or absolutist) view can be more or less comprehensive 
depending on the domain of ethical verdicts to which it purports to apply.  According to Shafer-
Landau, the strongest form of subsumptivism claims that “every determinate ethical verdict can 
be deduced from an absolute rule. Weaker theories would allow for a range of conclusory ethical 
judgments that are not deducible from absolute rules” (586-8).  I do not see how subsumptivism 
could be weakened in this way and still count as subsumptivism given what the view requires for 
rationality and consistency.  
 
4 Other philosophers share my interpretation of what is expressed by universalizability 
principle.  For example, in Ethics J. L. Mackie argues that a version of universalism is in some 
sense “beyond dispute” (83).  Even Peter Winch, in “Universalizability of Moral Judgment,” 
who challenges another form of the principle of universalizability, believes that “if a man were to 
make different spectator’s judgments of his own about the moral conduct of agents in situations 
which he agreed contained no relevant moral differences, there would, I think be serious 
difficulty in understanding what he was saying” (154).  (See also the next footnote.) 
 
5 Perhaps the most influential challenge to the claim that universalizability is a criterion 
of rationality comes from Peter Winch. Although his formulation is essentially equivalent to 
Hare’s, namely, ‘if I judge that an action is right for A1, then I must also judge that action to be 
right for A2, as long as there are no relevant moral differences in their natures and 
circumstances,’ what he actually rejects is a closely allied formulation, namely, ‘if we judge that 
an action is right for agent A1 in circumstances C1, then if agent A2 is in circumstances C2, and if 
C1 and C2 are relevantly similar, then we must judge that the same action is right for A2, so long 
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account of what ‘relevant similarity’ comes to.  Moreover, the principle says nothing about how 
we arrive at moral judgments, or about what justifies a moral judgment.   
Subsumptivism, as we have seen, is precisely a theory about how we justify moral 
judgments, and it holds that two cases are relevantly similar when there is a universal rule under 
which both fall.  This is enough to show that subsumptivism and the universalizability thesis are 
quite distinct.6  Subsumptivism, in fact, goes beyond the universalizability principle because, as 
Dancy tells us, it requires “us to be driven from case to case on pain of contradiction.  Only hard-
edged, codified principles with no fudge clauses or room for manoeuvre in them could drive us 
in that way” (Moral Reasons 82).  As we will see in more detail in section five, there are good 
reasons to reject subsumptivism because any universal rule of the sort the theory posits is either 
as there is no good reason for judging A2 differently from A1.’  (Compare Sidgwick 384-5.)  As 
far as I can see now, Winch’s acceptance of the former principle is incompatible with Winch’s 
claim that there are some cases in which I can correctly say ‘I ought to do x, but another person 
in relevantly similar circumstances ought to do y instead.’  Winch seems to think that the shift 
from a third-person perspective (I judge what other agents ought to do) to a first-person 
perspective (I judge what I ought to do) changes the applicability of the universalizability 
principle.  I do not see this, for if I judge A1 and A2 and their circumstances as relevantly similar 
and at the same time recognize Winch’s point that A1 can rightly judge that x is the right thing to 
do, while A2 can rightly judge that y is the right thing to do, then I should recognize this 
possibility when I judge their actions.  If I do recognize it, then I must reject the minimal 
principle of universalizability that I formulate in the text.  But Winch is quite emphatic that 
individual agents should conform their judgments to that principle.  (See previous footnote.) 
 
6 In Moral Reasons, Dancy runs the two theses together when he characterizes Hare’s 
position as saying that:  
 
Rationality requires consistency in judgement and practice;  this we can all agree [sic].  
But what is contentious is the specific form that Hare imposes on the abstract requirement 
of consistency.  For him, to be consistent just is to subsume particular cases under general 
principles in the same way.  (82)   
 
Here Dancy recognizes that requiring consistency is different from requiring that we subsume 
cases under rules;  his mistake is thinking that all a philosopher can mean by ‘moral judgments 
are universalizable’ is ‘moral judgments require subsuming cases under rules.’  
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(i) too rigid to yield correct judgments in many possible scenarios, or (ii) so heavily qualified 
that it has no applicability to scenarios beyond the initial case that generated it.  The rejection of 
subsumptivism, however, leaves the universalizability principle intact. 
1.2 PRESUMPTIVE GENERALISM  
Dancy identifies a second version of generalism, which he claims to find in W. D. Ross’s 
account of prima facie duties, especially as Ross presents it in chapter two of The Right and the 
Good.  I set aside the interpretative question of whether this second version of generalism 
actually should be attributed to Ross.  Instead, I use the term ‘presumptive generalism’ or 
‘presumptivism’ to refer only to Dancy’s reading of Ross and to distinguish it from subsumptive 
generalism. 
Presumptivist generalism shares with subsumptivism the idea that our moral judgments 
must be derived from general moral truths, but it softens the subsumptivist’s demand for hard-
edged rules that determine a moral judgment for every action.  The presumptivist identifies 
features of actions that make an invariable contribution to an action’s moral rightness or 
wrongness.  Moral judgment therefore is a matter of registering how the various features of an 
act contribute to its rightness or wrongness, and then of determining which way the scale tips.  A 
moral principle is not a universal rule the application of which yields a determinate judgment 
about which particular action is right, as subsumptivism would have it;  instead, construed along 
these softer lines, principles do no more than specify a property as being one which counts in 
  14 
favor of (or against) any action that has it.7  According to the presumptivist, prima facie duties 
can be cast as universal moral principles of the form ∀x (Fx   Mx), but they mean something 
different from subsumptive universals.  Contra the subsumptivist reading, according to which 
universals tell us that a property (or set of properties) F is determinately M, presumptivist moral 
principles tell us that ‘for all actions x, if x has property F, then x is presumptively M.8  In 
Dancy’s words, prima facie duties articulated in presumptivist moral principles tell us that “the 
property which [makes an] action prima facie right must have the same effect wherever it 
occurs” ( Moral Reasons 94).  Thus, for example, ‘stealing is wrong’, amounts to the claim that 
7 Dancy writes in Moral Reasons that “principles do no more than specify a property as 
being one which counts generally in favour of (or against) any action that has it” (95).  By 
reading further, we learn that by ‘generally’ Dancy doesn’t mean ‘usually’ or ‘for the most part.’  
He means a moral principle makes the general claim that “the property which made this action 
prima facie right must have the same effect wherever it occurs” (94, emphasis added). 
 
8 Shafer-Landau offers a reading of Ross in “Moral Rules” that is similar to Dancy’s.  In 
the following passage (in which ‘G’ is equivalent to ‘F’ as I use ‘F’ in the main text), we have 
Shafer-Landau’s formulation:   
 
The prima facie nature of a moral rule does not undermine its universality.  Rather, we 
should read such rules as follows:  for every x, if Gx, then presumptively Mx.  This is 
surely true to the spirit of Ross’s work, since he thought that, for example, every promise 
carried with it some to-be-doneness;  every act of maleficence generated some 
presumption against its performance.  (585)   
 
For a grounding property G to be presumptively M means, for Shafer-Landau, that G is 
“invariably morally relevant” (586).  He, like Dancy, holds that a property is invariably morally 
relevant “if and only if its instantiation always makes the same kind of concrete contribution 
toward the instantiation of some moral property” (586).  It is this inference that I disagree with.  
To be a morally relevant property need not entail that the kind of contribution the property makes 
is invariable.  I believe this is too narrow a conception of moral relevance.  A property can be 
morally relevant without, as Dancy claims, its having “the same effect wherever it occurs” 
(Moral Reasons 94).  I see no reason why Ross cannot maintain that the morally relevant 
property expressed in a prima facie duty can retain its presumption of, e.g., “to-be-doneness,” 
even if in a particular case, the morally relevant property does not bring with it any “to-be-
doneness.” 
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when an action is (or involves) stealing, it is to that extent wrong, even though on balance it may 
be the right action to perform in virtue of some other features it has.  The fact that an action can 
be described as stealing is a vector pointing in the direction of judging the action wrong;  if the 
action can also be described as obtaining medicine for a seriously ill neighbor it is a vector 
pointing in the direction of judging the action right.  When we take the sum of these vectors, we 
might conclude that the action is on balance right—although, because it is theft, it necessarily is 
worse than it would have been had it not been theft.9 
For Dancy, the essence of presumptivism is the idea that the property (or set of 
properties) F, when understood as a prima facie duty, makes the same contribution to the 
rightness or wrongness of the act on every occasion in which F appears, although its contribution 
can be overridden or outweighed by other features of the action.10  While in many respects the 
9 In Moral Reasons, Dancy offers an alternative interpretation of how a property could 
“have the same effect wherever it occurs” or (to borrow Schafer-Landau’s words) make “the 
same kind of concrete contribution toward” the rightness or wrongness of an action (Moral 
Reasons 94;  “Moral Rules” 586).  Dancy suggests understanding the contribution a property can 
make on analogy with the propensity theory of probability.  On this view a property has the same 
propensity in all cases wherever it appears. Dancy rejects the analogy because he believes that, 
unlike in the physical world, (1) properties can lack propensities that they acquire only in 
conjunction with the presence of other properties in a concrete situation, and (2) cases can occur 
in which “the eventual overall property (rightness, say) is identical with the property which the 
strongest party [sic] tends to give the action” (101).  I agree with Dancy that the analogy is 
unpromising. 
 
10Shafer-Landau says that a generalist theory involving prima facie duties can be more or 
less comprehensive depending on the domain of prima facie duties or grounding properties it 
purports to identify.  “One prima facie theory covers more than another just in case it identifies a 
greater number of grounding properties . . . Weaker theories allow for the possibility of 
grounding properties that cannot be captured by prima facie rules. These are properties that 
sometimes, but not always, create some particular moral presumption” (587).  What Shafer-
Landau regards as a weaker theory of prima facie duties seems no longer to accord with Dancy’s 
understanding of the term.  See also footnote three for a similar problem with Shafer-Landau’s 
version of weak subsumptivism. 
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presumptivist description of moral judgment-making is consonant with Dancy’s own theory, it 
nevertheless is unacceptable to Dancy—for it is committed to the essential proposition that 
underlies any form of generalism, viz., “the view that a reason functions everywhere as it 
functions anywhere”  (62).   
1.3 DANCY’S ACCOUNT OF GENERALISM 
In Moral Reasons Dancy gives an overarching definition of generalism, which is meant to 
encompass both subsumptivism and presumptivism;  generalism is the view that “what matters 
somewhere must matter in the same way on every recurrence” (93).  By ‘mattering somewhere’ 
Dancy means ‘providing a reason for (or against) an action or a moral judgment about an 
action.’11  His notion of ‘a reason’ is that of a property (or set of properties) of an action whose 
presence entails the presence of a moral property.  Hence we may recast Dancy’s formulation of 
generalism as follows:  if a property (or set of properties) F is a reason for (or against) an action 
or judgment in one case, then the property (or set of properties) F must be a reason for (or 
against) an action or judgment wherever it occurs, or in logical notation ∀x (Fx   Mx), where x 
ranges over actions calling for moral deliberation.  Sample F-properties will include that the 
action is a lie, or that it is aiding the poor, or that it is killing;  sample M-properties will be that 
the action is wrong, or that it is praiseworthy, or that it is vicious.  These universally quantified 
11 Dancy’s primary focus is on judgments about actions. (In chapter three, I will discuss 
the possibility of whether Dancy’s view could be extended to cover evaluations of what Murdoch 
calls ‘vision.’ 
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propositions are moral principles,12 as the generalist construes them:  they capture what it means 
to say that reasons (F-properties) justify the judgment that an action has certain moral properties.  
According to Dancy both varieties of generalism are committed to this thesis about moral 
principles, but they differ in precisely how they construe the F- and M-properties that moral 
principles employ.  Subsumptivism holds that for any action we might deliberate about there are 
rules with the form ∀x (Fx   Mx) that prescribe which action we ought to perform or which 
judgment we ought to reach.  The situation or action will have some array of F-properties.  That 
array of properties will be subsumed under a universal moral principle, which will entail a 
conclusion of the form ‘the action is wrong’ or ‘judge the action blameworthy.’  The conclusion 
will be the M-property of that action or judgment.  Subsumptivism is thus committed to the truth 
of moral principles that definitively determine what our moral judgments should be.  
Presumptivism, on the other hand, rejects the possibility of moral principles that fully 
determine our moral judgments.  Instead, the presumptivist believes that for any action we might 
deliberate about there is a set of prima facie duties (such as the duty of non-maleficence, the duty 
of beneficence, etc.) that bears on the determination of which action or judgment is correct.  For 
presumptivism, the F-properties of an action x will be features that invoke prima facie duties 
(such as that x is stealing, or that x is providing help to the needy), and the M-properties will be 
of the form ‘x is wrong to the extent that it is F’ or ‘x is presumptively wrong’ (although x may 
be right overall).  Each of the morally relevant features of an action (i.e., the F-properties that 
invoke the prima facie duties which are in play) makes an invariable contribution to the rightness 
12 Moral principles, as we typically think of them, take the form of commands like ‘do 
not lie.’  Propositions of the form ∀x (Fx   Mx) can be reformulated to exhibit the familiar 
imperative form of moral principles.  For example, if M is ‘wrong’ or ‘vicious’ or 
‘blameworthy,’ then ∀x (Fx   Mx) is equivalent to ‘do not F.’  If M is, e.g., ‘right’ or 
‘virtuous’ or ‘praiseworthy,’ then it is equivalent to ‘do F’ or ‘it is permissible to F.’ 
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or wrongness of the action.  Stealing food to give to the needy is good to the extent that it fulfills 
the duty of beneficence, but wrong to the extent that the aid was stolen in violation of the duty of 
non-maleficence.  When conflicting prima facie duties are in play, the final moral judgment is a 
matter of “considered opinion.”13  But whatever the final judgment, the action is invariably (i.e., 
necessarily) the worse for being maleficent.  Thus, unlike subsumptivism, presumptivism is not 
committed to the truth of principles that fully determine moral judgment in the particular case at 
hand;  what a presumptivist moral principle tells us is that, if the action is F, then it is definitively 
made right (or wrong) to some indefinite extent.  The final outcome of moral deliberation is not 
fully determined by (even a complete set of) moral principles.   
With this overview of both varieties of generalism in place, we can make explicit a 
commonality between subsumptivism and presumptivism.  Both forms of generalism are 
committed to the view that moral principles are expressed in propositions of the form ∀x (Fx   
Mx), and both portray our moral reasoning as in large measure a matter of appealing to such 
claims and applying them to the cases we deliberate about.  
 
13 This is Ross’s term (19).  I believe that Ross’s notion of considered opinion need not 
be understood in a way that commits him to the view that for all x, if x is lying, then x invariably 
is wrong to the extent it is lying.  See footnote eight in this chapter and footnote six in chapter 
two. 
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1.4 DANCY’S CRITIQUE OF GENERALISM  
Now that we have given Dancy’s account of how each variety of generalism understands moral 
principles and the way principles figure in our moral reasoning, we can turn to his argument that 
neither version is acceptable.  Dancy tackles generalism from many difference vantage points, 
but I will focus here on what I think is Dancy’s strongest and most interesting argument.  No 
matter from which vantage point Dancy strikes, he find the same underlying weakness in both 
varieties of generalism:  the general moral principles they appeal to are either false or incapable 
of guiding our deliberation.  
1.4.1 Dancy’s argument against subsumptivism   
Dancy’s argument against subsumptive generalism proceeds according to the following 
schematic form.14  Dancy starts from the observation that generalism is committed to the truth of 
universal propositions of the form ∀x (Fx   Mx), where x ranges over actions, F is a set of one 
or more grounding properties, and M represents a moral property.  Next he considers a 
14 Here is an especially helpful passage for understanding Dancy’s argumentative 
strategy: 
 
Instead of telling one that all actions of a certain sort are wrong, as Hare’s 
[subsumptivist] principles do, lending themselves to refutation by complex cases which 
despite being of that sort are not wrong, Ross’s [presumptivist] principles do no more 
than specify a property as being one which counts generally in favour of (or against) any 
action that has it.… [Presumptivism] gives a quite different picture of what a counter-
example to a moral principle would look like.  Instead of being an example where the 
principle tells us to do one thing and we think we ought to do the opposite (‘Do not 
steal’), it would be an example where, though the principle tells us that some feature 
counts in favour of any action that has it, we think it either makes no difference at all here 
or else that it does make a difference, but counts in the opposite direction.  (95-6) 
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representative moral principle expressed in that form (e.g., ‘if an action is theft, I should not do 
it,’ ‘if an action causes pain, then it is to that extent bad’).  Finally, he produces an example in 
which the principle yields a result clearly contrary to our best judgment.  When generalists 
respond by adjusting their principle to accommodate the counterexample, Dancy finds another 
counterexample.   
Dancy deploys several rounds of this strategy to convince us that for any principle of the 
form ∀x (Fx   Mx) we can imagine a counterexample for it.  In response, generalists can then 
either admit that the principle is false, or they can continue modifying it, until they wind up 
adding so many qualifiers and conditions that the principle, though logically a universal 
proposition, actually applies to just one action.  Such a principle, Dancy argues, is clearly far 
removed from anything we take ourselves to appeal to in actual moral reasoning and is useless 
for the kinds of justifications of moral judgments that generalists initially sought.  Particularists 
therefore conclude that generalism is either false (because it is committed to universals that are 
false) or useless (because to salvage the truth of their universals generalists have to construe 
them so narrowly that they cannot do the job of providing justifications for the judgments they 
entail). 
This is a valid argument scheme.  But for it to persuade us that generalism is false, 
particularists would have to flesh it out by starting with a concrete principle that generalists are 
truly committed to and then produce convincing counterexamples to that.  Dancy’s more detailed 
examples do not, I think, satisfy these further requirements. 
Let us consider one of Dancy’s main examples targeting the subsumptive form of 
generalism.  He ask us to: 
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suppose a man knocks a woman down with his car and puts her into hospital.  When he 
pays for special care for her, visits her and so on, we approve of his (subsequent) actions.  
They are expressions of regret and an attempt to make amends so far as possible, and 
these facts are our reasons for approval.  (80-1) 
 
Dancy then sets out to show us that, contrary to what subsumptivism supposes, even though 
these facts are reasons for us to approve of the man’s actions, we: 
 
are not therefore committed to approving of another person who behaves in exactly the 
same way, but whose ultimate purpose is to seduce the woman away from her husband.  
(81) 
 
To develop this argument against subsumptivism, Dancy attributes to generalists a commitment 
to the following principle:  ‘If an action is the provision of special care, in the form of visits and 
financial assistance, to a person the agent has injured, then it is morally praiseworthy.’  Dancy 
explains that the principle applies to both the first and second scenarios insofar as the antecedent 
conditions are satisfied, and, yet, in the second scenario the principle clearly yields the wrong 
judgment because the actions of the man who intends seduction are not praiseworthy. Dancy 
argues that this sort of problem is recurrent and intractable for the subsumptivist.  He further 
argues that the only way out is to expand the universalizability base (i.e., the set of antecedent 
conditions or F-properties), but that that project is ultimately fruitless because the 
universalizability base would have to expand to include “not only all respects that were either in 
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favour of or against the original judgement, but also all respects whose presence or absence 
would have affected that judgement to any degree” (81).   
Dancy rightly points out the impossibility of crafting principles that anticipate all the 
features whose presence or absence is necessary to make them subsumptively true.  He also 
rightly points out that even if we were able to forge principles with the requisite level of detail, 
the resulting universals would be so detailed they essentially would be indexed only to particular 
cases—in which case they no longer look like or function like the general moral principles both 
particularists and generalists are trying to understand. 
However, if Dancy’s example is to count against subsumptivism, Dancy must first show 
that subsumptivists are committed to a principle (of the sort he proposes) whose F-properties 
cannot distinguish the two cases.  But surely there are more plausibly applicable principles 
available to generalists, which are not susceptible to the counterexample.  Principles like, 
‘expressing remorse and making amends for an injury you have caused are morally 
praiseworthy’ and ‘attempting to seduce a married person—who is moreover physically 
vulnerable—is morally wrong’ are able to differentiate between the two scenarios and yield 
correct moral judgments.  Dancy’s example plainly poses no challenge to these principles, and he 
has not shown that the subsumptivist is not entitled to them.  Moreover, the two principles just 
mentioned seem not especially recondite or tailored to block counterexamples and so are not 
susceptible to Dancy’s charge that they are artificially indexed to particular cases or so detailed 
as to be useless.  As a result, it is not damaging to our commitment to moral principles that the 
principle Dancy attributes to subsumptivists is susceptible to counterexample. 
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1.4.2  Dancy’s argument against presumptivism 
Let us consider Dancy’s variation on the previous argument, which this time is tailored to serve 
as a challenge to presumptivism.15  He writes that:  
 
the fact that an action will give pleasure can be a reason for doing it or for approving of it 
when done.  But it can also be a reason for disapproving of it.  If I tread on a worm by 
mistake, my action is perhaps morally indifferent.  But if I tread on it with pleasure or to 
give you pleasure, my action is the worse for it.  (56)  
 
To see how Dancy intends this as an argument against presumptivists, we must first make 
explicit that in the passage above Dancy implicitly attributes to them a principle to this effect:  ‘if 
an act produces pleasure it is presumptively right (i.e., that the act produces pleasure always 
counts in favor of doing it).  But, in Dancy’s opinion, if we imagine someone who takes a 
perverse delight in treading on earthworms, we find that the person’s pleasure counts against 
doing the action.16  Dancy is right about our considered judgment in this case, but for it to work 
15 It should be noted that Dancy thinks presumptivism suffers from a special weakness, in 
addition to the problems inherent in any form of generalism.  The weakness is that it provides no 
method of resolving the different and perhaps conflicting right- and wrong-making properties 
that an action might have.  In a case where we have a prima facie duty to do x and a prima facie 
duty to refrain from doing x, presumptivism provides us no resources for weighing the various 
considerations pro and con, so we can come to a determination about what we should do, all 
things considered.  According to Ross, in The Right and the Good, the determination is a matter 
of “considered opinion” (19). 
 
16 Dancy also offers a variation on this example to undermine presumptivism.  He 
supposes the following principle:  ‘that an action causes pain gives us a reason (perhaps 
overridden) for not doing it.’  His counterexample, meant to falsify the principle, asks us to 
suppose Satan is pained by every virtuous action.  Dancy argues that this fact gives us no reason 
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against the presumptivist we would have to establish that the proposed principle ‘that an act 
produces pleasure is always right-making’ is actually a plausible presumptive principle. 
Dancy has not done this.  Indeed, the principle Dancy attributes to presumptivists actually 
contradicts the philosopher Dancy takes to best exemplify presumptivism, namely Ross.  In The 
Right and the Good, Ross devotes the first chapter to debunking both the egoist’s and the 
utilitarian’s idea that ‘right’ means productive of pleasure.17  Pleasure, along with virtue and 
knowledge, is a good, Ross explains, but only “with certain limitations,” and only when it is 
“neither the actualization of a bad disposition nor undeserved” (24-5).18  For Dancy’s proposed 
principle to be one that the presumptivist would plausibly accept it would have to be amended to 
accommodate these limitations.  Once properly amended, the candidate presumptivist principle 
would be ‘if an act produces pleasure, so long as the pleasure is not undeserved or the result of a 
not to perform such actions and that therefore, as with the example discussed in the main text, 
the lesson to draw is that the putative principle (e.g., ‘do not cause pain’) is a poor candidate for 
a prima facie duty (Moral Reasons 61-2).  This would come as no surprise to (non-hedonistic) 
generalists.  Moreover, this particular example is further weakened by its degree of artificiality, 
indexed as it is to Satan.  It is not clear how we are supposed to determine the moral status of 
Satan or generalize from Satan’s case. 
 
17 Ross sums up his findings at the beginning of chapter two, when he says “it cannot 
with any plausibility be maintained” that ‘right’ means ‘productive of pleasure’ (or of any good 
for that matter) (16). 
 
18 See this passage where Ross writes:   
 
a state of pleasure has the property, not necessarily of being good, but of being something 
that is good if the state has no other characteristic that prevents it from being good.  The 
two characteristics that may interfere with its being good are (a) that of being contrary to 
desert, and (b) that of being a state which is the realization of a bad disposition.  (138) 
 
See also the passage where Ross says that once suitably qualified it is right to produce pleasure 
for ourselves and others, but only “when this does not involve the failure to discharge some more 
stringent prima facie duty” (25). 
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vicious disposition, then the act is presumptively right.’  But this amended principle is not 
vulnerable to Dancy’s counterexample.  Pleasure derived from an act of wanton violence springs 
from vice and therefore the act that produces it carries with it no prima facie rightness.  So the 
presumptivist is not committed to saying treading on the worm is right to the extent that it 
produces pleasure.  Indeed, Dancy’s example may be interpreted as registering the implausibility 
of a principle to the effect that pleasure, in and of itself, produces moral goodness.19  This truth is 
one generalists can accommodate as easily as theorists of any other stripe.20 
I think the same kind of weakness can be found throughout Dancy’s examples.  Does this 
mean that there are no persuasive anti-generalist arguments employing the above schema?  I 
think good arguments employing it can be constructed, but that it will be trickier to generate 
counterexamples than Dancy thinks.  Consider a candidate presumptivist principle: ‘an act of 
lying is the worse for being a lie.’  Particularists look for a counterexample intended to show that 
sometimes a lie can be morally neutral or even make an act morally better than telling the truth 
would.  Here we can invoke James Rachels’ classic example of the complications of linking an 
act of lying to moral censure.  In this example, Nazi patrollers stop Dutch boatmen and demand 
to know if they have Jews aboard.  If the boatmen admit they are harboring refugees on their 
boat, then they will be taken prisoner and probably killed.  If the boatmen’s lying can confuse the 
19 This is a lesson we could draw from Socrates’s refutation of Callicles in Plato’s 
Gorgias (494c-499b). 
 
20 I am aware that hedonistic utilitarians—those whose fundamental moral principle is to 
produce the greatest overall good, and who further equate the good with the pleasant—will feel 
that this gives short shrift to their fundamental criterion of goodness.  I will not try to engage 
them in debate, except to note that Mill himself, in distinguishing a hierarchy of better and worse 
pleasures, moves away from the hedonistic utilitarianism that would seem to be entailed by his 
designation of pleasure as the summum bonum. 
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Nazis and so save the refugees’ lives, then the considered judgment of anyone except a thorough-
going Kantian would be that the boatmen are right to lie. 
But does this show that the presumptivist principle ‘lying is always worse-making’ is 
false?  It would if the lie counted in favor of the lying.  But there is nothing positive in itself 
about the lying.  The reason to tell the lie is not that there is something good (something 
favorable) about telling a falsehood;  the reason to lie is that doing so is an attempt to protect 
innocent, highly vulnerable lives.  If, however, it were feasible to divert the Nazis without lying, 
then surely this course of action would be better.  Because it would always be better for the 
boatmen in these circumstances to achieve their end without telling a lie, the particularists’ 
conclusion that lying can be morally good or even morally neutral is unwarranted.  Suppose the 
presumptivists’ principle were this:  ‘lying in response to a question from a person who has a 
moral right to the information she is requesting is the worse for being a lie.’  Can we find a case 
in which such a lie is morally neutral or morally praiseworthy?  Or is this principle so recondite 
as to be unworkable?  It may be that we could find an example that would lead us to answer ‘yes’ 
to one or the other of these questions, but I cannot now generate one. 
To turn Dancy’s argument scheme into a compelling argument against generalism (either 
subsumptive or presumptive) would require pursuing this dialectic of principle and 
counterexample.  While it would be interesting to enter into the casuistry that this dialectic 
entails, I think it is ultimately distracts us from a deeper understanding of how to characterize the 
role principles play in our moral thought. 
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1.4.3 Insights in particularism and generalism 
Even if Dancy has not taken his counterexample-generating dialectic far enough, I can appreciate 
his resistance to generalism, especially in its subsumptive form.  The idea that moral reasoning is 
a matter of identifying true general principles and then applying them in a mechanical matter 
(e.g., ‘this action exhibits property F, therefore it is M’) portrays moral judgment as algorithmic, 
a portrayal which our experience of moral reflection belies.  We see the importance of sensitivity 
to the particulars of a situation;  we realize there are often morally crucial factors that can easily 
escape our notice;  and we recognize that turning our power of moral judging over to a body of 
rigid rules will make us obtuse moralists, just as a rigid application of legal rules can often lead 
to unjust verdicts.   
However, I also find that even if particularists did generate a plausible counterexample to 
a general moral principle, I still would want to make general statements like ‘lying is wrong,’ 
and I would still want to teach my children precepts like ‘do not steal.’  My imagining (or even 
experiencing) cases in which I judge that, all things considered, lying is not wrong (or not worse-
making) does not make me believe that I am rationally obliged to revise the principle that we 
ought not to lie;  nor do I feel bound to retract or hedge my commitment to it.  For 
particularists—and for generalists—what I am saying is incoherent.  But I think my remarks 
begin to capture a need to find an alternative characterization of the role principles play in our 
actual moral reasoning.  My remarks do entail that my commitment to the truth of ‘lying is 
wrong’ cannot be construed as a universally quantified proposition of the form ∀x (Fx   Mx).  
(For if that is what ‘lying is wrong’ means, then it would be incoherent of me to affirm that 
principle in the face of a case where I judge that lying is not wrong or worse-making.)  In chapter 
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four, I will propose a way of thinking about the content and logic of moral principles that makes 
sense of my retaining my attachment to them even in the face of counterexamples. 
1.5 A COMMON ASSUMPTION 
We are now in a position to lay out a taxonomy of the positions we have been discussing.  
Generalists hold that there are true moral principles that we must appeal to in giving the reasons 
for our moral judgments of particular actions.  Those principles take the form of universally 
quantified propositions with the form:  for all actions x, if x has feature(s) F, then it has moral 
property M.  Generalists think that there must be such principles and that every true moral 
judgment must appeal to at least one of them.  The two varieties of generalism differ regarding 
the nature of the M-properties of their principles:  subsumptivists hold that each principle fully 
determines the moral evaluation of the actions to which it applies;  the presumptivist holds that 
each principle only partially determines the moral evaluation of the actions to which it applies.   
Particularism is the denial of generalism.  The particularist reaches this conclusion by 
arguing that a counterexample can be generated that will falsify any principle the generalist 
proposes.  Consequently, for particularists there are no true moral principles, and principles 
necessarily should not play a role in our moral reasoning.  
It should now be clear that particularism shares a common assumption with the 
generalism it criticizes.  Both particularists and generalists have the same conception of the 
logical form of moral principles.  For both of them, a moral principle is a universally quantified 
proposition linking properties of actions with moral evaluations.  It is this underlying 
assumption, common to both particularists and generalists, which I will ultimately reject in 
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chapter four.  Doing so will make possible an appeal to an alternative conception of generality in 
moral thought that is truer to our ordinary moral reasoning and richer than either generalists or 
particularists account for. 
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2.0  DANCY’S PARTICULARISM AND A CRITIQUE 
In the previous chapter I sketched two versions of a view known as ‘generalism.’  Subsumptive 
generalism maintains that making moral judgments about what to do is a matter of subsuming 
the action in question under general moral principles.  Competent moral judges are equipped 
with an array of such principles, which have the form (∀x) (Fx→Mx), where the Fs are 
grounding properties (e.g., action x is the telling of a falsehood with the intent to deceive) and 
the Ms are moral properties (e.g., action x is dishonest, blameworthy, vicious).  The job of the 
moral judge is to identify the F-properties of the action in question, apply the relevant principle, 
and draw the appropriate conclusion regarding its M-properties.  Presumptive generalism 
likewise maintains that a competent moral judge is equipped with general moral principles.  
These connect properties of actions with moral “vectors” that count a certain weight toward the 
assignment of a given moral property to the action.  The judge’s job in a particular context is to 
identify the F-properties of the action in question, use general moral principles to determine all 
the moral vectors that apply to the action, tally the weight of these vectors, determine which 
moral property the action has on balance, and then act accordingly.   
Dancy, as we have seen, rejects both these accounts of moral deliberation and judgment.  
They are, he thinks, overly rigid, and he argues that they are vulnerable to counterexamples.  He 
concludes that moral principles are either false (as suggested by the possibility of 
counterexamples) or useless (as occurs when generalists, to ward off counterexamples, tailor 
their principles so narrowly that they fit essentially just one case). 
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2.1 DANCY’S REMINDERS AND SHAPE 
Given what we have so far discussed of his views, Dancy would appear to regard appeals to 
moral principles as misguided.  Yet no one can deny the centrality of principles to our sense of 
ourselves as moral judges and agents.  In Moral Reasons, we find that Dancy agrees.  He tells us 
that particularism must:  
 
provide some account, within the constraints which it accepts, of what is a very common 
practice of somehow appealing to general truths and previous cases in the course of 
reaching a moral judgement, and in the justification of one when reached.  (67) 
 
Dancy recognizes the need to provide an alternative account of what we are doing when we 
(think we) appeal to principles.  He says: 
 
It seems wise for particularism to allow some role to moral principles, somehow 
conceived, rather than simply announce that everyone is completely mistaken about them 
and their importance in ethical thought and education.  It is the job of a philosopher, so 
far as possible, to give an account of our practice rather than to tell us that we all ought to 
be doing something else.  (67)    
 
Dancy does not suggest that we purge principles from our reasoning.  Instead, his proposal is that 
we reconceive a moral principle as “a reminder of the sort of importance that a property can have 
in suitable circumstances” (67).  This is compatible with the particularist tenet that “no notion is 
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available of a sort of circumstance in which [a given property] must have [a specific sort of] 
importance” (70). 
Once we reconceive principles and think of them as reminders of the sort of importance a 
property can have, we can see how reminders function in Dancy’s account of moral judgment-
making.  For Dancy, arriving at a moral judgment about what to do takes place in two stages.  In 
the first stage, we examine a situation to determine, of all the circumstances, which features are 
and are not relevant and, of these, which are salient (these are the features that have the greatest 
relevance).1  According to Dancy, reminders help us discern the salient (and less salient but 
nevertheless relevant) features.  In the second stage, Dancy tells us that “from saliencies we 
move to [what he calls] shape” (112, emphasis added).  To see a situation’s shape is to grasp the 
full picture of the interrelations between saliencies.  Shape is essentially a manifestation of the 
relation between the salient (and to a lesser extent the relevant) features, and it gives us the 
“ought” judgment about what should be done or should have been done in the situation.  Indeed, 
having a proper grasp of the shape simply is the ought judgment.  In other words, for Dancy, to 
see the shape just is to see what judgment the situation calls for.2   
Some pertinent questions that arise from this account of moral judgment-making are:  
How do reminders enable us to arrive at the appropriate cluster and arrangement of salient 
1 I will leave it implicit that when we register salient features we also register those 
features that are relevant, but less than salient.  I will not make any explicit distinction between 
the two in in my discussion. 
 
2 It seems that what happens in the second stage is similar to what is captured by 
Aristotle’s practical syllogism, according to which we look at a situation and the feature(s) that 
emerge as truly salient (which seem to be similar to McDowell’s “standing concern[s]”) entails a 
particular action (“Some Issues” 30).  In chapter four, I argue that Dancy cannot give an 
adequate account of standing concerns.  This is important because, as I also argue in chapter 
four, the process of identifying saliencies relies to some extent on standing concerns, of which I 
believe general moral principles are an expression. 
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features in the first stage?  How do reminders help us move from the identification of those 
features to our discernment of the shape of the situation in the second stage?  In short, how do 
reminders underwrite the making of moral judgments? 
2.2 A CRITIQUE OF REMINDERS 
In this section I will elaborate on Dancy’s remarks about reminders and discuss the possibility of 
their role in moral judgment-making.  I argue that reminders, however we construe them, cannot 
play the role in moral reasoning that we normally assign to principles.  Indeed, as I will argue 
here, to the extent that Dancy’s reminders can appear to play that role, they presuppose general 
relations which (as I will argue in chapters three and four) are expressible in general moral 
principles. 
We can begin our elaboration of Dancy’s remarks by asking:  what form do reminders 
take?  When Dancy writes that a reminder reminds of the “sort of importance a property can 
have in suitable circumstances” he seems to have in mind the idea that the reminder links a 
specific F-property with a specific M-property, such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘permissible,’ 
‘impermissible,’ ‘morally neutral,’ ‘praiseworthy,’ ‘blameworthy,’ and so on (67, initial 
emphasis added).  Although each reminder links an F-property with a specific M-property, 
Dancy warns us against assuming any general link (any invariable connection) between an F-
property and an M-property.  Any connection between an F and an M is contingent and situation-
dependent.  A reminder tells us only that being F might be linked to being M.  Whether it is or 
not will depend on the circumstances in which F appears.   
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To illustrate this, consider an ordinary principle like ‘lying is wrong.’  If we put this into 
the language of Fs and Ms, then F stands for ‘deliberately telling a falsehood’ and M for 
‘wrong.’  To make explicit the fact that Fs are properties of acts we can translate the ordinary 
principle ‘deliberately telling a falsehood is wrong’ into a reminder that reads something like 
this:  ‘if an action can be described as deliberately telling a falsehood, then that might make the 
act wrong.’ 
One of the first things to note here is that Dancy thinks that the number of true reminders 
is unlimited, and that the more reminders we possess, the better moral judges we will be.  In 
Moral Reasons, he tells us that: 
 
those in possession of a large list of principles [understood as reminders], so long as they 
do not misunderstand their proper role, are at an advantage when coming to a decision in 
a particular case.  They want to be sure that they do not miss the importance or relevance 
of any relevant property.  A panoply of moral principles, understood in the way I suggest 
[viz., as reminders], can function as a sort of checklist for this purpose.  It will not be a 
complete list, of course, for we can give no sense to the idea that we might now have 
finished the list of moral principles or properties that can make a difference sometimes . . 
. There is no limit to the number of properties which can on occasion be important.  (67) 
 
How, then, do reminders contribute to our ability to make correct moral judgments?  Reminders 
are an aid to good moral judgment, Dancy tells us, because they help us identify and keep from 
overlooking F-properties that have been relevant to assessing (or assigning an M-property to) an 
action;  they remind us of properties that might be relevant.  The list of reminders is, therefore, 
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limitless because the number of properties that can be relevant is limitless.  This is why Dancy 
believes “we can give no sense to the idea that we might have finished the list of moral principles 
or properties that can make a difference sometimes” (67).  At one point he describes the list as 
(in the absence of some means of organization) a “bewilderingly random list of properties which 
can matter in suitable circumstances” (68).   
Dancy’s emphasis on there being “no limit to the number of properties which can on 
occasion be important” could be interpreted to mean that the list is limitless because any property 
or combination of properties has the potential to be morally significant in some situation or other 
and as such deserves a place somewhere on the list (67).  This interpretation fits with one of the 
central tenets of Dancy’s particularism:  for any property, we cannot tell in advance of its 
appearance in a particular situation its relevance (or lack thereof) because we need to know how 
it stands in relation to other properties of the situation in which it is instantiated.  Its relation to 
other properties is what determines its significance, so most any property could be relevant 
depending on the other properties of the situation—which suggests most any property could be 
recast in terms of a reminder that that property might make a difference. 
To illustrate this, let us look again at Dancy’s example of a man who crashes into and 
injures a woman pedestrian with his car.  When he pays for her care and visits her in the hospital 
to make amends, Dancy judges the act praiseworthy.  When he pays for her care and visits her in 
an attempt to seduce her, Dancy judges the act blameworthy.  A corresponding reminder for the 
first scenario is:  if an agent who causes an automobile accident that injures a pedestrian visits 
her in the hospital and pays her medical bills with the aim of making amends, then the agent’s 
act might be praiseworthy.  For the second scenario, a corresponding reminder is:  if an agent 
who causes an automobile accident that injures a pedestrian visits her in the hospital and pays her 
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medical bills with the aim of seducing her, then the agent’s act might be blameworthy.  As we 
saw in chapter one, Dancy comes up with examples like these to illustrate how there might be no 
end to the properties an action might possess that could be relevant to the moral property 
ascribed to the action.  These examples give us a clue about why Dancy believes there is no end 
to the number of reminders.  Since the properties that might be relevant are limitless in number, 
the reminders that correspond to these properties are limitless in number, too. 
But the unlimited character of the list of reminders poses a problem for Dancy’s avowed 
project of explaining in particularist terms what we are doing when we appeal to moral 
principles.  For there will be many reminders on the list whose content does not correspond to 
anything resembling our ordinary moral principles.  The above reminders generated by the 
examples of the amends-making driver and the seducing driver are so far from anything like the 
familiar moral principle ‘lying is wrong’ that it is doubtful they could play a similar role in our 
thinking. 3  A view that assimilates the proposition ‘lying is wrong’ to the proposition ‘if an 
agent who causes an automobile accident that injures a pedestrian visits her in the hospital and 
pays her medical bills with the aim of seducing her, then the agent’s act might be blameworthy’ 
launches itself on problematic footing, for it begins with a grievous mischaracterization of the 
very principles it seeks to explain. Moreover, reminders as detailed as these are susceptible to the 
charge particularists level against generalists:  whether we are speaking of reminders or 
principles, principles so narrowly tailored will be useless, for there will be few to no cases to 
which they are actually germane. 
3 We could, of course, recast the foregoing reminders in less detailed terms.  The first 
could be ‘making amends might be praiseworthy;’  the second could be ‘seduction might be 
blameworthy.’  But doing so undercuts Dancy’s characterization of reminders as a 
“bewilderingly random list of properties which can matter in suitable circumstances” (68).  
Nevertheless, I will consider this alternative subsequently. 
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There is, however, an alternative way to interpret Dancy’s emphasis on the unlimited 
character of our list of reminders, so long as we soften his claim that there is “no limit to the 
number of properties which can on occasion be important” (67).  This alternate interpretation 
promises to better accomplish Dancy’s avowed aim of showing how particularism makes sense 
of the role ordinary moral principles actually play in our moral thinking.  On this interpretation, 
we discount Dancy’s emphasis on the dizzying array of properties that might find their way onto 
the list of reminders, and assume that by “limitless” Dancy merely means to leave open the 
possibility that we might sometime in the future identify new properties, like truth-telling or 
amends-making, that possess such a degree of moral significance that they too become enshrined 
in the form of principles (qua reminders).  Dancy’s roster of reminders therefore would include 
all those general universal propositions that we typically regard as moral principles, except they 
would be rephrased so as to express their contingency.  Thus, ‘telling a falsehood is wrong’ 
would be recast as ‘telling a falsehood might be wrong,’ ‘making amends is praiseworthy’ would 
be recast as ‘making amends might be praiseworthy,’ and so on.  On this interpretation, the 
relation between specific F- and M-properties expressed by reminders basically corresponds to 
those we find in our ordinary moral principles (which is not so according to the former 
interpretation).  The particularists’ only modification to those ordinary moral principles is to 
replace ‘is’ with ‘might be’  
Although there is room on this roster for adding future moral principles, this alternative 
interpretation would require Dancy to soften his emphasis on the limitlessness of reminders;  
doing so insures reminders more closely resemble our ordinary understanding that we express 
core moral commitments in terms of moral principles, rather than in terms of a “panoply” for 
which “[t]here is no limit to the number of properties which can on occasion be important” (67).  
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However, because Dancy believes possessing a vast array of reminders makes for better moral 
judges, it is not clear he would accept this modification.  Nevertheless, this interpretation does 
harmonize with what Dancy goes on to say about the relative centrality of some principles as 
against the relative marginality of others.  Dancy develops the idea of centrality in order to 
explain how the unlimited, and therefore unwieldy, list of reminders can serve (as principles are 
supposed to) as a guide for moral judgment.  Dancy explains the idea of centrality in this 
passage: 
 
some [properties] are more commonly important than others, and some are commonly 
more important than others;  and therefore some properties should be viewed as more 
‘central’ than others, i.e., as having a natural right to figure early on in one’s list of 
principles.  This centrality does not entail that the properties mentioned in the leading 
principles [qua reminders] are always more important than those mentioned elsewhere.  
But it does create some order in what would otherwise be a bewilderingly random list of 
properties which can matter in suitable circumstances.  (67-8, footnote omitted) 
 
What does Dancy mean by identifying some properties (and some of the reminders associated 
with these properties) as central?  As far as I can tell there are two different ways to understand 
Dancy’s remarks about the centrality of reminders.  I will call them the ‘connectedness view of 
centrality’ and the ‘statistical view of centrality.’ 
The connectedness view, which is suggested by that part of the above passage in which 
Dancy observes that “some properties are more commonly important than others,” is the view 
that a reminder reminds us of the specific sort of moral importance a property can have (67).  
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The centrality of the reminder would be due to the gravity or weightiness of its M-property.  Less 
central reminders would presumably be those that associate F-properties with less grave or 
weighty M-properties.  Consider the reminder ‘it might be thoughtful to reach out to 
newcomers.’  Neglecting to reach out to newcomers would likely be thoughtless, but not outright 
wrong, as intentionally telling a lie almost always is.  Therefore, the reminder ‘reaching out to 
newcomers might be right’ would be less central on the list than ‘telling the truth might be right.’  
Another way to put this is, a reminder about telling the truth would be more central, and its 
centrality would stem from the fact that truth-telling is a weightier moral requirement.  
On this view, F-properties of actions, such as ‘being an act of welcome’ or ‘being 
truthful,’ acquire their centrality because of the role they play in the greater nexus of moral 
value.  Welcoming newcomers does not have the same importance as telling the truth does 
within that nexus.  The value of welcoming newcomers lies in our concern to treat others civilly, 
put people at ease, be considerate, make way for the possibility of friendship, and so on.  The 
deeper value of truthfulness in part has to do with the nature of the harm caused by lying.  Lying 
can inhibit the autonomy of the people lied to, it can subordinate them to those in the know, and 
it can interfere with self-determination.  The example underscores this fact:  the good advanced 
by being welcoming to newcomers to some degree presupposes and depends on the truthfulness 
of those doing the welcoming. 
This account of the varying centrality of different reminders in terms of the moral gravity 
or weightiness of connection between F- and M-properties would explain the “natural right” 
some properties have to be more central than others (67).  But it is an account I think Dancy 
would have to reject, for in his critique of Ross’s generalism he rejects the possibility that any F-
property has any general connection to any M-property.   Dancy identifies as a deficiency in 
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Ross’s definition of prima facie duty that it tells us only what moral effect a property F might 
have when it is “the only morally relevant property,” and it “has nothing to say at all” about the 
moral significance of F in particular situations (97).  Moreover, a general statement about the 
tendency of F to be morally connected to M is of little use, Dancy says, because the moral 
connection between the two will vary depending on the circumstances in which it appears;  when 
instantiated, F might not be linked with M, as in a case in which the morally correct thing to do is 
to tell a lie.  Dancy is explicit that unless instantiations of F are invariably coupled with 
instantiations of M, then a general universal proposition linking F with M tells us nothing about 
the sort of moral relevance F might have when instantiated in a concrete situation.  Dancy 
concludes that such general universal propositions are of little worth, for it is precisely F’s effect 
when instantiated that we need to know.  Hence, a general universal proposition that F might be 
M would seem to suffer from the same sort of defect Dancy finds in Ross’s notion of a prima 
facie duty;  it tells us nothing about the moral significance of F in a particular situation.  In other 
words, it cannot be the case that, for Dancy, a given reminder acquires its centrality from the fact 
that an F has a general connection of gravity or weightiness with a specific M.  The upshot is that 
making sense of the centrality of some reminders on the basis of their general moral importance 
is off limits to Dancy. 
Perhaps we can make better sense of Dancy’s notion of centrality by treating the 
connection not as a general claim about the moral relationship (of gravity or weightiness) 
between Fs and Ms, but instead as a claim about the statistical frequency of their connection.  
This statistical view of centrality, which is suggested by that part of the above passage in which 
Dancy observes that “some [properties] are commonly more important than others,” suggests 
another possibility for explaining what Dancy might mean when he talks about the centrality of a 
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reminder (67).  On this view, centrality is a function of the statistical frequency with which F is 
linked to M.  The centrality of a reminder is a function of the relative frequency with which, 
when instantiated, F is found to be linked with M.  According to the statistical view of centrality, 
one reminder is more central than another just in case the instantiation of the F-property of the 
first reminder provides a reason for assigning its M-property more frequently than the 
instantiation of the F-property of the second reminder provides a reason for assigning its M-
property.   
One major weakness of this account of centrality is that it construes the role of reminders 
in moral reasoning in terms that are vastly different from the ordinary moral reasoning with 
principles that Dancy is attempting to capture.  On the statistical view of centrality, all we can 
say about the centrality of ‘lying is wrong’ is that cases where lying provides a reason for 
judging an action wrong are more frequent than cases in which it does not.  We have to regard 
the connections between lying and wrongness, between marital unfaithfulness and wrongness, 
between theft and wrongness, as merely statistical correlations.  Thus, it must be regarded as an 
entirely contingent matter that there are these correlations.  (If we start talking about a conceptual 
connection between being F and being M, then we are back to the connectedness view that, as 
we have just seen, Dancy is committed to rejecting.)  It seems, however, in our ordinary moral 
reasoning that the character of lying, and why we care about it, are what make it wrong.  Our 
thinking that it is wrong is not merely an expression of a statistical connection between my 
noticing lying and my judging it wrong. 
There are other reasons to be dubious about the statistical view of reminders.  The 
statistical view also raises a question that points to a fundamental gap in Dancy’s account of 
moral judgment.  Statistical statements must be grounded in sets of instances.  Just as the 
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statement ‘winter snowfall in Hamilton, New York is usually eighty inches or more’ is grounded 
in observed correlations between the calendar and the amount of snow that falls, so the statement 
‘lying is usually wrong’ (on the statistical view) must be grounded in observed correlations of 
acts of lying and determinations of the wrongness of those acts.  So before particularist moral 
judges can propound a reminder, they must first have made many particular moral judgments—
enough for a responsible statistical generalization.  At some point, there must be past judgments 
that did not involve reminders. 
This need for particular judgments to precede principles (construed as reminders) is not 
just a consequence of the statistical interpretation of reminders.  It is related to the Dancy’s 
specific understanding of a reminder itself.  For reminding is bringing to the fore something we 
already knew or had in mind.  For Dancy, when we invoke a reminder that lying might be wrong 
we are bringing to mind the fact that on past occasions particular acts of lying have been judged 
wrong.4  At some point, those past judgments themselves cannot have involved reminders. 
Since reminders are logically and temporally posterior to particular judgments, they can 
play no essential role in arriving at them.  It must be possible to arrive at sound moral judgments 
without ever knowing of or considering reminders.  Experienced moral agents, as Dancy portrays 
them, use reminders as a sort of labor-saving device, or rule of thumb, to help them efficiently 
home in on the central features of the particular situation before them.  But, on Dancy’s view, it 
must always be possible to dispense with reminders so as to determine the salient properties and 
the shape of the situation directly.   
4 Although it seems to be Dancy’s view, not all reminders are records of past insights.  
Consider insights gleaned through meditation or Platonic attention.  We might remind ourselves 
of these insights, but they are not insights that record results of past experience. 
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This presents us with a significant difference between principles as we normally think of 
them and reminders.  For we invoke principles as providing a ground for our moral judgments;  
reminders cannot be so invoked, since they rest entirely on previously determined moral 
judgments.  Moreover, on the usual, prephilosophical conception of principles, the very making 
of a moral judgment has a conceptual link to principles (at the very least, to the principle that a 
judge is committed to making the correlative judgments in all cases that are relevantly similar to 
the current one).   
In promising an alternative, particularist understanding of our ordinary appeals to 
principles in moral reasoning, Dancy set out to explain how we move from perception of a 
situation to identifying its salient features to grasping its shape.  In this way, he set out to provide 
an account of moral judgment.  Now we see that his recasting of principles as reminders cannot 
explain how we make or ground moral judgments.  The discernment of the shape of a situation 
from the contemplation of its F-type features is a mystery. 
There is one other weakness of Dancy’s attempt to re-cast principles as reminders.  The 
moral principles whose role Dancy is trying to describe have the form of imperatives or 
assertions in the indicative mood, rather than the indefinite, hedged form that Dancy’s reminders 
take.  At the same time, experience of judgment and action teaches that there are occasions in 
which moral considerations point to our going against the prescriptions our principles express so 
definitely, as when it is permissible or even morally required to break a promise.  Exceptions are 
part of moral life.  For Dancy, our tolerance for exceptions is inconsistent with the content of our 
principles;  hence principles need to be redescribed (e.g., as reminders) in a way that eliminates 
that tension. 
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But this means, for Dancy, that our ordinary way of talking about judgments is 
systematically misleading.  When we say things such as, “in general one should keep one’s 
promises, but that rule does not apply in this case,” Dancy thinks we contradict ourselves.  He 
aims to resolve the contradiction by construing ‘one should tell the truth’ as really meaning ‘that 
an action is an instance of truth-telling may be a reason for doing it.’  But if that is what the 
principle really means, why do we come out with a formulation that is, by Dancy’s lights, 
literally false?   
I will argue that when we say ‘lying is wrong,’ what we say is true.  The principle plays a 
role in our general moral outlook and our deliberations that cannot be replaced by a reminder 
telling us about the possible blameworthiness of lying or that lying might be wrong.  What we 
bring to bear (i.e., what we understand) when we understand the proposition ‘lying is wrong’ is a 
normative commitment.  That commitment represents an ongoing dimension of our moral 
outlook;  it is not tentative or speculative, nor is it statistical.  Because it represents a 
commitment, it is not best thought of as something to be reminded of.  A principle is not a 
“Note-to-Self.”  Lying is wrong.  And though we might need to be reminded of that, if we for 
example fall into a habit of fibbing, that sort of reminder is a reaffirmation of our commitment to 
the principle ‘lying is wrong.’ 
2.3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE RATIONALITY OF REGRET 
So far in this chapter I have presented and critiqued Dancy’s account of our moral reasoning.  In 
this section I will offer a criticism of a slightly different aspect of Dancy’s view.  The problem I 
identify concerns how we deal with conflicts of moral principles.  In Moral Reasons, Dancy 
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considers his treatment of moral conflict to be an advantage of his view over generalism, but I 
will argue that he actually fails to account for the phenomenon he identifies. 
Dancy thinks that when there is a conflict of moral principles, agents can rationally come 
to regret a choice that they nevertheless regard as correct.  He argues that generalism cannot 
make sense of the rationality of regret in such cases, but that his particularism can.  I argue that 
Dancy actually fails to explain why it is rational to have regret in these cases, and I sketch my 
own alternative explanation for it.  My explanation employs a notion of moral reasons that is 
different from the view of moral reason connected with generalism and particularism.  The 
explanatory success of this notion is one reason to adopt it.   
The phenomenon of regret that Dancy identifies must be distinguished from a more 
common feeling of regret.  This common feeling of regret is generated by having done 
something that I (now) regard as bad or defective.  Regret does not have to have a moral 
dimension:  I may regret not studying for a big exam or not selling my stocks when the market 
was high.  But when I decide that I have done something morally wrong, I will feel an especially 
painful form of regret, one inflected by guilt or shame.5  It is morally required in such a case that 
I regret my action, and the regret is (for cognitivists) rational. 
According to Dancy, the problem of the rationality of regret arises not when I judge that I 
have done something wrong, but when I judge that I have made the right choice in a situation in 
which there was a conflict of moral principles.  For example, I might have an obligation to keep 
a promise to take a friend to her physical therapy appointment.  But if I see my elderly neighbor 
collapse in his yard as I am pulling out of the driveway to collect my friend I would also believe 
5 When I say ‘I will feel regret,’ I mean this as a normative statement rather than a 
prediction about my emotional state.   
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I am obligated to help him.  If the stars are aligned I might find a way to fulfill both obligations.  
If not, I have to choose.  The dilemma posed by such cases may be described as a conflict of 
principles:  we ought to keep our promises;  we ought to assist a person in distress.  When we 
choose one of these actions, it is rational to feel regret, as Dancy explains, because “we feel there 
is something of value that [our] choice lacks” (109).  
Dancy believes regret stems from our tendency to feel that “[m]oral principles are able, 
even when defeated in a particular case by countervailing considerations, to linger or have 
residual effects” (99).  Dancy believes any plausible reconstruction of our moral practice must 
allow room for these residual or lingering effects which issue in regret, and he argues that 
generalism cannot do so. 
Why does Dancy think generalism cannot account for regret?  To answer this we can start 
with his treatment of subsumptivism.  Assume that for the subsumptivist the right thing for the 
agent to do in the case described above is break the promise and help the neighbor.  According to 
subsumptivism, the agent’s decision to help the neighbor should be the product of a universal 
moral principle that, by bringing the description of the circumstances under it, issues the verdict 
that the morally correct response is to break the promise and help the neighbor.  If the agent does 
indeed perform the act prescribed by the principle, then he has discharged his duty;  he has done 
what he ought to do.  It would therefore be irrational for the agent to feel regret at having broken 
the promise because there is no sense in which he should have kept it.  This result is 
unsatisfactory, because as Dancy rightly points out, we commonly do feel regret in such 
situations, and our feelings seem quite reasonable, not irrational.  
Is presumptivism better able to account for the rationality of regret in such a case?  To 
understand Dancy’s answer to this question, we must turn to Ross, Dancy’s paradigmatic 
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presumptivist.  In The Right and the Good, Ross says that a prima facie duty, the notion at the 
core of presumptivism, is: 
 
the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in 
virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which 
would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally 
significant.  (19) 
 
Keeping my promise to my friend is a prima facie duty, but it is not a duty proper because it is 
also of another kind that is morally significant, i.e., it is also an act that ignores the distress of my 
neighbor (in violation of the prima facie duty of beneficence or non-malfeasance), and my 
considered opinion (we are assuming) is that beneficence (or non-malfeasance) is incumbent on 
me in this situation. 
In his discussion of the presumptivist notion of prima facie duty in Moral Reasons 
Dancy, gives two different explanations for why he finds presumptivism’s account of regret “not 
at all satisfying” (98).  Dancy initially states that the problem with presumptivism is not that it 
treats regret as irrational, but that it has no treatment of it whatsoever.  Presumptivism tells us 
what to do when there is only one morally relevant property (i.e., when only one prima facie duty 
is involved), but “nothing [is] said about conflict” between prima facie duties (98).  According to 
Dancy, presumptivism says nothing about how a range of morally relevant properties (expressed 
in terms of prima facie duties) would contribute to the final decision about what to do.  Because 
there is no analysis of a defeated or contributory reason, presumptivism is necessarily utterly 
silent about the attitude an agent should take toward an act that is a prima facie duty, but which 
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the agent determines is not a duty proper.  Dancy concludes that presumptivism fails to tell us 
anything about what attitude the agent should have toward an act that he has only a prima facie, 
not an actual, duty to perform.6 
In a somewhat later discussion of Ross’s view, Dancy claims to find a different problem 
with presumptivism’s account of conflicts between prima facie duties.  Suppose that an agent is 
under two prima facie duties A and B, but that it is impossible for the agent to fulfill both.  
Presumptivism tells us that the reason for doing A is that there is a prima facie duty to do A;  it 
tells us the same for B.  If the agent decides he ought to do B (e.g., help the neighbor), then the 
reason to do A (e.g., keep the promise) is what Dancy refers to as a ‘defeated reason.’  A 
defeated reason is associated with an ‘ought’ statement, i.e., I ought to do A (because there is a 
prima facie duty to do A).  Dancy calls the statement that the agent ‘ought to do A’ a ‘defeated 
ought.’ 
Dancy argues that presumptivism is unable to explain regret because it mischaracterizes 
the status of the defeated ought.  In presumptivism as Dancy understands it, the defeated ought 
makes “its contribution by diminishing the overall rightness of the action” that the agent in fact 
chooses (111).  For example, when the agent helps the neighbor he at the same time breaks his 
promise;  this diminishes the rightness of relieving the neighbor.  The moral significance of the 
defeated ought (i.e., that he ought to keep the promise) is exhausted through its diminishment of 
6 One may reasonably doubt whether Dancy has given a fair reading of Ross when we 
encounter a passage by Ross such as this:  
 
When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged to break, a 
promise in order to relieve someone’s distress, we do not for a moment cease to 
recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed 
shame or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do;  we recognize, 
further, that it is our duty to make up somehow to the promisee for the breaking of the 
promise.  (28)   
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the rightness of the act the agent chooses (i.e., helping the neighbor).  This diminishment leads 
Dancy to criticize the presumptivist’s account for its failure to retain the defeated ought in its 
“full vigour” (111).  
If it is to make sense of regret, Dancy believes presumptivism must retain the defeated 
ought in its “full vigour,” a quality Dancy explicates by means of an example from Philippa Foot 
(111).  Here is Dancy’s rendering of her example: 
 
It is dangerous to pick up a snake, but it may be more dangerous not to pick up this one.  
The dangerousness of not picking up this one is not reduced by the dangerousness of 
picking it up (as Ross’s account would have it), and to pick it up remains [just as] 
dangerous though not so dangerous as not picking it up.  Here the opposing reason retains 
its full force, even though overwhelmed in the particular case.  (111) 
 
The example tells us that the dangerousness of picking up the snake in question retains its full 
force or vigor because even though the circumstances are such that it would be more dangerous 
not to pick up the snake, the danger from picking it up remains undiminished.  What it means to 
retain vigor is summarized in the second and third sentences of the quoted passage.  By 
substituting into these sentences ‘wrongness’ for ‘dangerousness,’ ‘breaking’ for ‘picking up,’ 
and ‘promise’ for ‘snake’ we can formulate what it would mean for the defeated ought (about 
keeping the promise) to retain its full vigor in terms of Foot’s example.  After making the 
substitutions we get: 
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It is wrong to break a promise, but it may be more wrong not to break this promise (so I 
can help my neighbor).  The wrongness of not breaking this promise (and thereby failing 
to help my neighbor) is not reduced by the wrongness of breaking it (as Ross’s account 
would have it), and to break the promise remains [just as] wrong, though not so wrong as 
not breaking it.7   
 
Here the opposing reason to keep the promise because promise-breaking is wrong retains 
its full force (it is just as wrong), even though overwhelmed in the particular case.  In other 
words, if the defeated reason (i.e., it is wrong to break this promise) is to keep its full vigor the 
following must be true:  the wrongness of keeping this promise must not be diminished by the 
fact that it is wrong to break it, and breaking this promise must remain wrong even when it is 
more wrong to keep the promise.  In Dancy’s view, presumptivism would have an acceptable 
account of regret only if it were somehow to treat the agent’s decision not to keep the promise as 
fully wrong.8  But it does not.   
At this point we can get a clearer idea of why this is so and what Dancy believes 
presumptivism is committed to.  First, Dancy believes presumptivism is committed to the idea 
7 In other words, the fact that ‘it is wrong to keep my promise’ is true does not mean that 
‘it is wrong to break my promise’ is not true. 
 
8 If this is the upshot of the snake analogy, then I do not think it is a promising way to 
think of the reason to keep a promise.  Is it really wrong for the agent in his particular 
circumstances to break his promise to take his friend to physical therapy?  It certainly is not 
wrong in the way it would be if the agent, say, broke the promise out of laziness.  In order to 
rationalize regret do we have to say that the agent’s promise-breaking remains wrong even 
though it would be worse to keep it and not help the neighbor?  An affirmative answer is what 
Dancy requires of presumptivism.  He requires the same of his own account, but he puts it in 
different terms:  he requires that the defeated reason remain undefeated in a “reasonably 
persuasive” alternative view of the total situation (119).  
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that the wrongness of not performing a prima facie duty is diminished by the fact that if 
performed it would conflict with the performance of another prima facie duty.  Second, Dancy 
believes presumptivism is committed to the idea that the rightness of performing the chosen act 
is diminished by the wrongness of not performing the conflicting act.  In terms of my example, 
presumptivism would be committed to saying that the wrongness of breaking the promise to my 
friend is diminished by the rightness of relieving the neighbor’s distress, and the rightness of 
relieving the neighbor’s distress is diminished by the wrongness of breaking the promise.  In 
other words, the inability to act on an incompatible prima facie duty taints the rightness of the 
chosen act (the act denoted by ‘duty proper’), and the rightness of the chosen act (i.e., duty 
proper) diminishes the wrongness of violating the incompatible prima facie duty.  Dancy finds 
unacceptable presumptivism’s intermingling of the moral valence of the chosen and defeated 
acts.  And it is because Dancy believes presumptivism is committed to such a position that he 
thinks it cannot make sense of regret.   
We can clarify the view Dancy ascribes to the presumptivist by assuming that, for 
presumptivism, acts may be assessed on a scale of moral rightness and wrongness (e.g., from -5 
to 5, where 5 is most right and -5 is most wrong and 0 is neutral).  The faculty of judgment may 
then be modeled on a meter that sums the values of the various prima facie duties that are in 
play.  Using such a scale Dancy’s presumptivist would say that the agent’s act qua helping the 
neighbor is, say, a 5, and qua breaking a promise a -2.  If we follow presumptivism as Dancy 
presents it, then the wrongness of breaking the promise diminishes the rightness of helping the 
neighbor.  So the act possesses an overall rightness metric of 3.  There is an ambiguity here since 
the act can be described as an act of helping the neighbor or of breaking a promise.  Dancy’s 
thought must be that the act is a 3 under either description, and this is why the wrongness of 
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breaking the promise loses its vigor.  The wrongness of the promise-breaking in this case has 
been absorbed into the overall value of the action;  there is no longer a negative pull on my 
judgment-meter that could make me think that something is still wrong with my action of 
helping my neighbor.  Thus, Dancy concludes that the presumptivist cannot make sense of regret 
in such a case;  it is irrational.9  Consequently, Dancy concludes that presumptivism is 
unacceptable. 
I believe that there is a logical problem with presumptivism as Dancy portrays it.  For 
when we consider the above example, it appears that we have to judge one and the same action 
as having valence -2 (because it is breaking a promise, albeit not a crucial one) but also having 
valence 3 (because it is helping my neighbor, in conjunction with breaking the promise).  I see 
two complications that emerge from the idea that this particular instance of promise-breaking 
would be a -2, but in fact is a 3.  First, Dancy’s presumptivist wants to argue that regret about an 
act is rational only if the act (e.g., promise-keeping) retains its full vigor, that is, only if it in 
some picture remains at -2.  But if I am right that there is no coherent way to measure the 
wrongness of breaking this particular promise without taking into account the fact that breaking 
it is part of helping my neighbor, then there is no coherent way for Dancy’s presumptivist to 
measure what the full vigor of this particular promise would have been.  In other words, the 
requirement that full vigor be retained if regret is to be rational is not satisfiable.   
How then does Dancy explain the phenomenon of rational regret when a right action 
violates a prima facie duty?  He first aims to show that there is no logical inconsistency in 
9 It seems to me that Dancy’s presumptivist could make sense of the rationality of regret 
in terms of the diminishment of the rightness of the action performed:  I could, for example, 
regret that helping my neighbor is ‘less right’ than it would have been had it not forced me to 
break a promise.  However, I agree with Dancy that the summative aspect of this model of 
presumptivism renders it very implausible. 
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believing that an act (e.g., breaking my promise) retains the full vigor of its wrongness while also 
believing that the act should be done (i.e., the promise should be broken).  Once he establishes 
this he develops the idea of what he calls “a reasonably persuasive picture” to illustrate when it is 
rational to feel regret and why (119). 
Dancy begins with the idea that regret is “the sense that though one indeed made the right 
choice, still there was something of value which this choice lacked and another alternative did 
not lack, or there was something of disvalue which this choice had and another choice lacked” 
(120).  An agent’s regret over an act is rational insofar as the act has diminished some value or 
created some disvalue.  (These would seem to be opposite sides of the same coin;  if the chosen 
act causes some value to be diminished, then the chosen act creates some disvalue.)  For Dancy 
whether value is lost (and disvalue created) depends on whether “there is a reasonably persuasive 
picture of the situation in which [the defeated reason, e.g., that I made a promise] is a prominent 
feature, and in which it is functioning as a reason not to [do the chosen act in the prevailing 
picture of the situation, e.g., not to help my neighbor]” (119).  (This last qualification is 
necessary because we must distinguish (i) cases like the one we are considering, where the 
defeated reason is a reason not to do the chosen action, from (ii) cases where the defeated reason 
just gives the agent a reason to perform the chosen action in one way rather than another.  
Dancy’s example of the latter case is shaving:  I choose to shave, even though doing so is 
painful;  the painfulness is not a reason not to shave, but it is a reason to shave carefully.) 
In other words, the explanation of the rationality of regret is that there exists some 
reasonably persuasive alternative picture in which the defeated reason is prominent as a reason to 
perform the act it is a reason in favor of, rather than the act the agent actually chooses to do.  
There are two different ways to understand this alternative (non-prevailing) picture.  Dancy 
  54 
might mean that in the alternative picture the fact that I made a promise somehow has greater 
force or weight than it does in the prevailing picture, but it does not provide a definitive reason to 
keep my promise and ignore my neighbor.  The idea here would be that when viewed from the 
alternative perspective the promise is more significant—more prominent—than in the prevailing 
picture.  Perhaps I dwell on the disappointment that my friend will feel when I fail to pick her up 
for her appointment, and on how reliable she is in keeping her promises to others.  These 
reasons, which recede to the background in the prevailing perspective, come to the foreground 
when viewed from the alternative perspective.  As such they would provide strong, yet not 
decisive, reasons to keep my promise and support the idea that it would be wrong to break it—
even here (let us assume) I ultimately decide that the right thing to do is to help my neighbor.   
If this is the way we should understand the test for whether an agent’s regret is rational, 
then Dancy’s claim would be that if there is a reasonably persuasive alternative picture in which 
the defeated reason has more force than it does in the prevailing picture, then it is rational for the 
agent to feel regret about not performing the act underwritten by the defeated reason.  If this 
indeed is what Dancy means when he proposes the idea of the reasonably persuasive alternative, 
then I do not believe it provides a promising account of what makes regret rational, because in 
the non-prevailing picture the defeated reason to pick up my friend functions along the same 
lines as it functions in the prevailing picture.  In both pictures it is morally significant that I made 
a promise, but it does not change my decision that my neighbor’s emergency takes priority.  
There seems to be no need for Dancy to posit the existence of a persuasive alternative to explain 
regret, because whatever explanatory or rationalizing resources Dancy finds in the alternative 
picture he could find in the chosen picture.  In both, the promise is morally significant, though 
not decisive. 
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There is a second way to understand Dancy’s explanation of the rationality of regret.  He 
might mean that there must be some alternative total view of the situation in which my promise 
is undefeated;  it is a decisive reason not to help my neighbor.  The trouble I see for this way of 
rationalizing regret concerns the possibility of finding any other plausible total view of the 
situation in which the promise demands ignoring the fallen neighbor.  In order to generate this 
different conclusion, we would have to add further information about the situation:  it occurs to 
me that my friend has recently had surgery and urgently needs physical therapy, and that my 
neighborhood has streams of pedestrian traffic so someone else will surely see and help my 
neighbor soon.  When we bring in such further assumed facts, then we might arrive at an 
alternative view of the situation in which the promise dictates not helping the neighbor.  But now 
the alternative picture differs in a salient respect from the prevailing picture—in which case the 
alternative does not qualify as a plausible alternative total picture of the situation in question.  It 
is a picture of a different situation.10  And so the existence of this alternative picture of the 
10 Dancy himself seems to be aware of this complication when he is thinking about 
alternative pictures.  He writes: 
 
In a way, one can consider variations of the present situation in which these features 
occur, with others, as part of a picture which reveals the [chosen] action as wrong.  Or 
one can suppose that if this feature were present to a greater degree, it would be enough 
to persuade one not to do the [chosen] action at all.  The danger is to avoid saying merely 
that the feature would make a difference in different circumstances, because this is close 
to an admission that it does not in fact make a difference here (where it is defeated).  
(117) 
 
Here Dancy seems to acknowledge that a picture of a different situation cannot explain the regret 
I feel about this situation.   
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situation will not explain my regret at the choice I made in the actual situation to help my 
neighbor.11   
Neither of these accounts of regret in terms of alternative pictures explains the rationality 
of regret.  The unhelpfulness of Dancy’s approach is also evident in his account of tragic 
dilemmas.  A tragic dilemma is a special case of a conflict of principles in which an agent 
confronts a choice such that she does something wrong no matter what she does.  Dancy writes, 
“So for there to be tragic dilemmas, it must be possible for the various features of the situation to 
have more than one shape at once” (125).  Since the shape of a situation is what we arrive at 
through moral reflection, and since the shape yields a conclusion about what to do, we could 
paraphrase this as saying that this is a case in which the agent can reach no conclusion about 
what she should do.  (This case is thus quite different from the examples we have been 
discussing.)  We may assume that whatever the agent does, she will regret her choice.  Dancy 
wraps up his discussion of tragic dilemmas by saying that “[i]n tragic cases the situation speaks 
with two voices.  And in these cases we have the strongest sense in which reasons on the other 
side do not go away.  They stay there, shouting loudly” (125).  These passages may describe the 
phenomenon of a tragic choice from which regret will issue, but they do not satisfyingly explain 
that regret.   
On either understanding of Dancy’s view, the fact that there is a reasonably persuasive 
alternative picture in which the defeated reason (in the actual situation) is either of greater 
prominence or is decisive provides the basis for his claim that the wrongness of (e.g., breaking 
11 I do not wish to deny there are situations that when viewed from different perspectives 
call for different responses.  But these are situations in which it is unclear what I should do.  
Dancy’s focus is on situations in which I know what I should do, and I do it.  My criticism is that 
in the alternative total picture of the actual situation there is no room for the reason that was 
conflicting but weaker (in the actual situation) to become the decisive one.  
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the promise) retains its full vigor and creates the lingering or residual effects that make regret 
rational.  As I have argued, I do not think the alternative “persuasive picture” way of 
rationalizing regret is successful (119).  Even if it were, it is not necessary to posit anything like 
an alternative persuasive picture in order to make sense of our feelings of regret.  
I think there is a more straightforward account of the rationality of regret that does not 
depend on Dancy’s idea of an alternative picture that is different—but not too different—from 
the prevailing picture.  My proposal involves rethinking the object of regret.  Dancy frames the 
problem as explaining the rationality of regret for having performed an action that I judge to be 
right.  This explanation would seem to require that the defeated reason (that I have made a 
promise) remain live even after it has been subsumed under a universal principle (as 
subsumptivism would have it) or after its wrong-making influence has been absorbed and 
overpowered by the right-making influence of the prevailing reason (as Dancy’s account of 
presumptivism would have it).  So understood, neither form of generalism offers us a way to see 
the reason as still live;  and Dancy’s preferred explanation in terms of competing total pictures is 
also unsatisfactory.  In all these accounts, it is thinking that regret must be about what the agent 
has done that generates the puzzle—because it appears irrational to regret having done what ex 
hypothesi is (in those circumstances) right.   
I suggest that these approaches misidentify the target of the agent’s regret.  I believe the 
agent’s regret is better understood as being not about what she has done, but rather about the 
circumstances in which she finds herself.  Viewed this way, the puzzle about regret disappears.  
In the kinds of case in question (where the agent ex hypothesi has done the right thing) we need 
not see the agent as regretting her act, but instead as regretting that circumstances prevented her 
from fulfilling all her obligations.  In our example, the agent could rationally have regret not just 
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about the immediate circumstances of her neighbor’s collapse—that it happened at all, that it 
interfered with keeping her promise—but also about any further consequences of breaking her 
promise.  She might regret that her friend did not get the treatment she needed, or that her friend 
was left stranded, puzzled, worried, perhaps angry.  In short, she can rationally regret that 
circumstances unfolded as they did, and yet quite reasonably not regret what she did. 
More could be said about the conditions for regretting the circumstances in which one 
finds oneself.  For one, such regret must be grounded in something more than the agent’s 
recognition that a given action failed to realize something valuable that could have been realized 
had circumstances been different;  after all, circumstances can always be more favorable to 
virtue.  It would not be rational for me to regret that circumstances were such that when I spent 
an afternoon volunteering to teach literacy classes I could not also pack supplies for disaster 
relief.  It is a fact of life that one choice precludes another:  you can’t do everything.   
It would be an interesting project to try to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions 
for regret about my circumstances to be rational.  But we do not need such an account to say 
something about the structure of such regret.  Rational regret of my circumstances is more than a 
vague wish that the world had been different;  it involves envisioning a specific good that my 
action fails to achieve, one that would have been achievable if the world had been different in 
some readily identifiable ways.  This recognition presupposes that we have values that provide 
reasons for us across various actual and possible situations.  Faithfulness to promises is a value 
that gives me a reason both when circumstances are propitious and when I am faced with a 
reason that eclipses it.  When the reason to pick up my friend is not decisive, and I instead help 
my fallen neighbor, the influence of the reason on my decision does not dissipate;  it remains in 
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the form of a sort of tension (or in Ross’s words, a “compunction”12).  It remains as the 
recognition that my action fails to exemplify something I value.  It is in this sense that what 
Dancy calls a defeated reason is always live. 
This account, sketchy as it is, avoids the contortions of Dancy’s talk of various competing 
pictures of the situation.  For reasons I will discuss further in chapters three and four, I believe 
Dancy is driven to his view because he denies that a reason can have general moral relevance.  
For Dancy, the reason I have to keep my promise in propitious circumstances has no general 
relation to a reason (perhaps defeated) for me to keep my promise in different circumstances.  
Because of this, Dancy has to generate an alternate picture with a shadow-reason to explain my 
regret when I cannot keep my promise because I need to help my neighbor. 
The way of thinking about reasons which I employ above – and which will be more fully 
developed in subsequent chapters—can also help us think about tragic dilemmas.  We can follow 
Dancy’s suggestion and define a tragic dilemma as a situation in which an agent does something 
wrong no matter what she does.  We find an especially wrenching example in William Styron’s 
novel Sophie’s Choice.  Sophie, a Polish Jew, is saved from the Nazi death camps, when she is 
chosen to work in the household of a Nazi official.  Both her children, however, are on the verge 
of being sent to die, when she is told she may choose one to be spared.  If she does not choose 
one, then both will die.  Sophie chooses one of her children over the other, then suffers years of 
anguish that finally lead her to suicide.  Although regret is too weak a word to describe her 
feelings, regret is the initial seed of what grows into full-blown remorse and eventual self-
loathing.   
12See discussion of Ross in footnote six of this chapter. 
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In Sophie’s case it might be natural to say that she regrets what she did, and not (or not 
just) that circumstances prevented her from saving both her children.  What makes her choice 
tragic is that any choice she makes violates a deeply held commitment.  Her parental obligation 
to care for and to protect her children extends to both of them impartially, even if (as the novel 
suggests) she has a favorite.  No matter which child she chooses, she fails to honor that 
commitment.  And if she makes no choice she still fails because she has saved neither child.  
And whichever option she takes—choosing one child or neither—the choice is hers alone. 
Sophie’s situation is tragic in ways that other situations in which a parent might have to 
choose between her children are not.  One can imagine a parent being able to save only one of 
two drowning children—because the current is too strong, or one child is easier to reach, or is 
smaller and therefore hoist-able.  Here the parent could point to external circumstances that 
justify her choice.  Although Sophie did not create the circumstances, she does not seem to have 
any basis other than her own preference on which to base her choice.  It is natural to want to say 
that she should not blame herself, that she is rational to regret that circumstances locked her into 
a no-win situation, but that she should not blame herself for her choice.  Sophie, however, does 
not see her choice that way.  For her (and for us insofar as we see things through her eyes) ‘doing 
the least-bad thing’ is not equivalent to ‘doing the right thing in the circumstances.’   
Is Sophie’s regret rational?  I have suggested that it is understandable.  And whether it is 
rational or not, we should note that what Sophie suffers is not the sort of regret that Dancy seeks 
to explain.  For that sort of regret is elicited when an agent has done the right thing, but has 
thereby also failed to exemplify something of value.  In Sophie’s tragic dilemma, she believes 
she has done something wrong—even though, I would argue, she is not to blame, since her 
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action is wrung from her by the cruelty of her tormentors.13  Her inability to fulfill her duty to 
care for her children impartially torments her, I suggest, because of the ongoing value she places 
on such care.  This is a value that provides reasons across circumstances and across time.  
Dancy’s theory does not recognize such overarching values and their resultant reasons. 
2.4 GENERALITY IN MORAL REASONING 
I have argued that Dancy’s particularist account of making a moral judgment is mysterious.  He 
does not explain how we are to sift through features, identify saliencies, and settle on the shape 
of a situation.  There is no place for our moral outlook or values;  there is no place for our 
understanding of how our values hang together.  The ideal moral agents of Dancy’s particularism 
are supposed to be perfectly sensitive moral judges, and yet they have no general understanding 
of how their moral values are related.  I think such agents would strike us not as especially 
morally gifted;  instead they would seem alien to us, morally defective, or at least morally 
immature.  One mark of moral astuteness is the capacity to make finer and finer discriminations 
about how things in general fit or work together.  Truncated as she is, Dancy’s moral agent, even 
if she had a knack for getting things right, would not know what it was all about.   
13 It is doubtful that she would be able to, but Sophie’s could find solace in the legal 
defense called ‘excuse,’ which recognizes that an agent’s action can be wrong, but that the agent 
nevertheless might not be blameworthy.  For example, if I were coerced with a gun to my head 
into stealing a car, the theft would be wrong, but excused.  The idea is that I am not to blame 
because my responsibility is diminished by the circumstances in which I committed the theft.  
Analogously, even if Sophie’s choice is wrong, her responsibility is diminished by the 
circumstances, and she is not to blame (and should not blame herself).  See discussion of 
justification and excuse defenses in the context of what is called ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ 
(Pendleton). 
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Dancy resists the idea that moral judgment-making involves systematic thought about the 
principles that underlie those judgments (and the values they express), because he thinks that 
such principles are either false or useless.  The view I will develop in chapters three and four is 
that some understanding of general moral connections between principles and values is necessary 
for making moral judgments.  We have to have some general understanding of how our values 
are related in order to make moral judgments.  Principles express a part of this understanding, 
and often make it more perspicuous to us.  In the next chapter, I draw on Iris Murdoch’s work to 
delve more deeply into Dancy’s conception of a moral agent.  I begin to develop an account of 
moral reasoning which in chapter four culminates in an understanding of moral principles, and 
their role in moral reflection and judgment-making, that is truer to our ordinary practice than 
either the particularists’ or the generalists’ account. 
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3.0  MURDOCH, DANCY, AND VISION 
Chapters one and two demonstrate the shortcomings of both generalism and particularism:  
generalism’s principles cannot capture our ability to make correct moral judgments and 
particularism leaves it mysterious, alien, and truncated.  Although particularists are correct about 
the impossibility of codifying moral judgment in an exhaustive set of principles—there will 
always be cases that fall outside the scope of the principle, there will always be cases for which 
there is no principle—they are wrong to conclude that we must therefore reject the possibility of 
genuine moral principles and reformulate them as reminders, rules of thumb, or summaries.   The 
particularists’ attempt to reformulate principles in these terms leads to what I will refer to in this 
chapter as Dancy’s lacuna:  in its practical aspect Dancy’s view cannot account for our appeal to 
moral principles in ordinary moral discourse and reflection;  in its theoretical aspect it renders 
our ability for moral judgment mysteriously inarticulable.   
I begin this chapter with a discussion of Iris Murdoch’s notion of ‘vision’ and its 
perfection.  Building on her presentation of these ideas in “Vision and Choice in Morality” and 
The Sovereignty of Good, I develop some distinctions that will be helpful to understanding the 
lacuna in particularism.  I then use these distinctions to develop an important contrast between 
Murdoch and Dancy, a contrast which shows the limitations of Dancy’s view and the need to 
develop and carve out place for an alternate conception of generality in moral thought.  I 
conclude this chapter with an indication of how we can go beyond Murdoch’s own view to 
develop an alternative conception of generality that is unlike what we find in subsumptivist and 
presumptivist conceptions.  
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3.1 VISION:  AN EXAMPLE 
Murdoch deploys the idea of vision in the service of several points, but she is perhaps best 
known for developing it in support of her argument against what she calls the ‘universal rules 
model of ethics.’  According to this model, the proper topic of ethics is the study of “choices” 
and the universalizable reasons that justify them.  The choices that matter in the universal rules 
model concern choices of actions, and the domain of moral judgment is limited exclusively to the 
assessment of those actions. 
In “Vision and Choice in Morality,” Murdoch uses the idea of vision against the universal 
rules model to show that choices, and the universalizable reasons that justify them, are not the 
only “data” relevant to moral study.  There is other relevant data, Murdoch argues, i.e., the data 
which form the background to those choices and include an array of “inner” (or mental) activities 
that fall under the heading of what she variously calls “personal vision” or “total vision of life” 
or the “texture of man’s being.” (80-1).  A person’s vision shows itself in both inner and outer 
behavior.  In the following passage describing one of the ways in which we form opinions of 
others, Murdoch indicates the breadth of what the term ‘vision’ encompasses:   
 
When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their 
solutions to specifiable problems, we consider something more elusive which may 
be called their total vision of life, as shown in people’s mode of speech or silence, 
their choice of words, their assessments of others, their conception of their own 
lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny:  in short 
the configurations of their thought which show continually in their reactions and 
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conversation.  These things . . . may be overtly and comprehensibly displayed or 
inwardly elaborated and guessed at . . . (80-81) 
 
That we make judgments about a person’s vision is, for Murdoch, good evidence that such a 
thing exists, but she has even more convincing evidence that vision must be acknowledged.  In 
The Sovereignty of Good Murdoch offers a (now famous) example of a mother-in-law’s evolving 
attitudes toward her daughter-in-law to show that vision affects what we regard as relevant moral 
data, and it is therefore relevant data itself.  In the example, a mother, whom Murdoch calls M, 
“feels hostility” toward D, her daughter-in-law (17).  M finds D: 
 
quite a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and 
lacking in dignity and refinement.  D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently 
ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile.  M does 
not like D’s accent or the way D dresses.  M feels that her son has married beneath him.  
(17) 
 
Murdoch tells us that M, who is very “correct,” behaves “beautifully” towards D, and, 
despite her hostility, never lets her true opinion show (17).  Such is the state of things until there 
comes a turning point in Murdoch’s example:  M determines to take another look at D, and 
ultimately transforms her opinion of D.  D herself alters not at all.  To underscore the crucial fact 
that D remains the same, Murdoch hypothesizes that M’s opinion of D changes after the couple 
have emigrated or after D has died.  The emphasis of the example is that the change in M’s 
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opinion of D “happens entirely in M’s mind”  (17, emphasis added).  What brings on the change, 
and how does it occur?  Murdoch tells us that M: 
 
is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of 
giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her.  M tells herself:  
‘I am old-fashioned and conventional.  I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded.  I 
may be snobbish.  I am certainly jealous.  Let me look again.’  (17)   
 
When M looks at D again she “reflects deliberately about D” until her impression of D alters 
(17).  She finds D to be: 
 
not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but 
gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on.  (17-8) 
 
Murdoch stresses that the change in M’s impression of D emerges from what she describes as 
“just” and “intelligent” reflection on D (18).  M’s fresh impression does not arise, for example, 
from some possibly distorting motive, such as a reluctance to think of her son as unfortunate.  
Murdoch acknowledges, however, that in real life it might be difficult to determine whether M 
indeed was properly motivated in her re-directed attention toward D or had achieved a fairer 
impression of D.  In the example, however, M is explicitly presented as someone who, through 
laudable motives and efforts, is not deluded, but rather has indeed achieved a truer view of D.  It 
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is important to Murdoch’s view that M’s new impression of D arises out of “love” and “justice,” 
because for Murdoch it is through love and justice that we can come to see things aright (23).1   
3.2 VISION:  AN ANALYSIS 
The discussion of M and D in the section above puts in place enough of Murdoch’s view for me 
to begin to develop two different, yet closely related, distinctions that are implicit in Murdoch’s 
notion of vision.   
3.2.1 Vision and perception 
The first distinction implicit in Murdoch’s example is the distinction between what I call ‘total 
vision’ and ‘perception.’  Total vision, to put it merely suggestively, involves peoples’ general 
habits of mind, their overarching sensibility or orientation that they bring to situations.  Some of 
these we might call “mere” habits, but other characteristics we might call habits of character.  
These reflect people’s general normative understanding, for example, their habits of fidelity, 
honesty, compassion, generosity.  There is overlap between the two, but all these are part of “the 
texture of man’s being” or “total vision” (“Vision” 80-1).  Total vision is total because it shapes 
people’s outlook or approach, including their assessments of others, of situations, and things in 
1 The demands of love are usually considered to be at odds with those of justice, but 
Murdoch does not intend the usual contrast.  I will not here work out the relation between the 
two for Murdoch, but the idea of justice is meant to suggest fairness of vision.  Being fair to 
others in our impressions of them is a matter of being truthful about them, which for Murdoch is 
part of loving them.  Ultimately, we will treat love and justice as expressions of Murdoch’s 
overarching conception of the Good. 
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general.  Total vision is distinct from another idea that is implicit in Murdoch’s example of 
vision at work:  this is perception.  Perception involves grasping the object or objects at hand, 
discerning which features are relevant, how they are related to one other, and what their ultimate 
significance is.2 
Although Murdoch herself does not explicitly carve out this distinction, it nevertheless is 
a central point in her example.  M’s total vision plays a definite role in shaping her perception of 
D.  Because Murdoch herself does not explicitly differentiate between the two she uses the same 
term ‘vision’ to refer to both aspects of M’s redirected attention to D, but it is necessary for my 
purposes to mark the difference.  To put the distinction in terms of the example, we can say that 
when M notices she feels jealous3 toward D she determines not only to take another look at D, 
but also to take a look at herself, at her general perspective, at what I am calling ‘total vision.’  
When she reflects on her total vision she identifies distinct aspects of her own character, e.g., that 
2 My distinction between vision and perception borrows from a closely related distinction 
made by Bridget Clarke in chapter three of her dissertation The Lens of Character: Aristotle, 
Murdoch, and the Idea of Moral Perception.  In an interesting analysis of the evolution of the 
idea of vision in Murdoch’s work, Clarke finds two notions of vision that work in harmony with 
one another.  These are what Clarke calls “total vision” and “vision of individuals.”  
  
3 There are different ways to construe the role of M’s jealousy in her reflections.  I will 
suppose that there are several causes of distortion in M’s vision and that a tendency toward (or 
habit of) jealousy is among them.  However, as Murdoch uses ‘jealousy’ in the example, it does 
not necessarily refer to an aspect of M’s vision that she brings to the situation before viewing D.  
It is consistent with Murdoch’s characterization of the example that M’s feeling of jealousy is 
triggered by D, but that M’s jealousy is not a characteristic of her total vision.  On this scenario, 
noticing that she feels jealous induces M to look for possibly distorting influences that are 
characteristic of her total vision (e.g., being overly critical of non-family members or overly 
protective of her son).  Murdoch does not need to distinguish which kind of case she has in mind.  
It is sufficient for her position that the jealousy in M, triggered by D, points to there being some 
underlying aspect of total vision that M brings to the situation.  In any case, the point I want to 
bring out here is that when M reflects on her total vision she is reflecting on aspects of it that 
may interfere with clarity in her perception of D.  
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she is “old-fashioned and conventional,” which could distort her view of D (Sovereignty 17).  
Furthermore, she inspects herself for other possibly distorting influences of character, e.g., that 
she “may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. . . [that she] may be snobbish” (17).  As Murdoch 
presents the example, M’s total vision at the outset is distorted by influences such as these, and 
so she incorrectly perceives D as, among other things, “juvenile” and “vulgar,” but when M 
corrects the distortion in her total vision she rightly perceives D as “delightfully youthful” and 
“not undignified but spontaneous” (17-8). 
3.2.2 Attention and reflection 
While M’s case shows how total vision affects perception, it also demonstrates the different sorts 
of object we can take up for consideration.  This possibility necessitates a second distinction, 
which will be importantly related to the first distinction between total vision and perception.  
This is the distinction between attention (or attending) and reflection (or reflecting).   
We can direct ourselves toward, or attend to, particulars, as M does when she tries to 
make sense of the manifold of D’s behavior.  But we can also direct our focus toward something 
more general:  total vision itself.  Total vision not only serves as the backdrop against which 
perception (and ensuing judgments and actions) occur;  it can be itself the object of our focus.  
We can attend to particulars, as M does when she seeks an accurate perception of D, or we can 
reflect on our own total vision and take a critical look at it, as M does when she checks herself 
against possible distortions.  In the latter case, the object of reflection often will be (though not 
always) something quite general, as when M notes that she is certainly jealous and reflects on 
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how her jealousy4 might be linked to some characteristic of her total vision that distorts her 
perceptions of D.   
The distinction I am making between attention and reflection is not one made by 
Murdoch.  She uses ‘reflection’ to refer to the entirety of M’s task:  what M sets out to do is 
reflect deliberately on D.  This way of putting it could make us think that what M does when she 
reflects is focus exclusively on (attend only to) D.  But we would be wrong to think this.  
Murdoch is clear that M’s moral task includes movement between times when M looks again at 
(i.e., attends to) D and times when M looks at (i.e., reflects on) herself (i.e., her total vision).  
Even though it is helpful to distinguish these two different turns of mind, they are interrelated 
and cannot be completely separated.  Murdoch rightly sees both as part of the same task of 
getting straight about D.  We see the confluence in descriptions such as: 
 
M looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her attention.  M is engaged in an 
internal struggle.  She may for instance be tempted to enjoy caricatures of D in 
her imagination.  (22)   
 
On the one hand, M is looking at D, but she is also involved in an internal struggle;  she is 
struggling with herself to keep her imaginings of D in check, so that when she looks at D she will 
see her as she actually is.5  The part of M’s task that Murdoch characterizes as M’s internal 
4 See previous footnote, for the various roles jealousy could play in M’s reflections.  
 
5 We see evidence of the confluence also in accounts of the skills M has that enable her to 
engage in this task.  She is “an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, 
capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her” (17).  We see that 
for Murdoch, M needs to be able to attend to the object which confronts her, but she also must be 
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struggle involves an examination of how she, M, is seeing things;  her focus turns inward as part 
of her attempt to see things straight outwardly.  When I speak of ‘reflection’ I will restrict its 
reference to just that part of M’s task in which she turns inward and reflects on herself, that is, on 
her total vision.  
Attention and reflection are intertwined in Murdoch’s discussion, but now that they are 
teased apart, we can sketch in the role of the idea of the Good in Murdoch’s account of efforts 
like M’s.  Although it is beyond the present scope to investigate Murdoch’s full position, we can 
for our present purposes treat love, justice, and the Good as playing the same basic role in 
Murdoch’s position about the process of seeing things aright.  To understand their role and their 
importance to efforts like M’s, it is important to mark that such efforts to see things aright 
require the virtues of love and justice, or as Murdoch often puts it, such efforts require us to 
adopt the “just and loving gaze” and look in the light of love and justice (34).  For Murdoch, 
when we look in the light of love and justice, we are looking in the light of the Good.  The Good 
is the “starting-point” of any effort to see things aright (71).  Not only is the Good the starting-
point, but for Murdoch it is also the focus.  She writes, “Good is the focus” when “an intent to be 
virtuous co-exists (as perhaps it almost always does) with some unclarity of vision[,]” which we 
are seeking to correct (70).6   Thus, M’s starting point is the Good, and goodness, or the Good, is 
her focus.  Moreover, “goodness” is “what should be aimed at . . .” (70).  So, for Murdoch, when 
able to turn her focus inward (i.e., reflect), so she can engage in “self-criticism” or self-
assessment. 
 
6 I am not sure how successful we must be before it is correct to say that the Good is the 
object of our attention.  Having the proper intention is presumably not sufficient in itself to make 
the Good the object of our attention;  presumably we must have some degree of clarity of vision 
for this to be so. 
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M tries to see D as she really is, the Good is M’s starting-point, focus, and aim in the effort to see 
things aright. 
However, as we have noted, for M to see things aright requires not only attending to D, 
but also, reflecting on herself, specifically on her total vision.  Although Murdoch does not 
distinguish between attending and reflecting, it is fair to think that the Good figures the same 
way in both, for they play such intertwined roles in achieving clarity of vision that Murdoch 
herself does not explicitly distinguish them.  This fits with the Murdochian idea that the full 
process by which we work toward clarity is through the Good.  “[T]he idea of the Good [i]s the 
source of light which reveals to us all things as they really are,” she writes, drawing approvingly 
on the Platonic myth (70, emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Good is the starting-point, focus, 
and aim in exercises of both reflection and attention.   
Murdoch’s directive to look with a just and loving gaze (in both attending and reflecting), 
which we will call ‘Murdoch’s injunction,’ is not a command that applies only when it is people 
we are trying to see aright.  Murdoch tells us that these “same virtues [love and justice, or the 
Good] . . . are required throughout . . . [F]antasy (self) can prevent us from seeing a blade of 
grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another person” (70).  Moreover, this effort to ward off 
the self and see things aright (in the light of love and justice, or the Good) is “a progressive 
attempt to see a particular object clearly” (23).  M’s activity, for example, is “something 
infinitely perfectible,” for, as Murdoch tells us, as soon as we introduce the ideas of love and 
justice, we have introduced “the idea of progress, that is the idea of perfection” (23).  The 
implementation of Murdoch’s injunction to look with a just and loving gaze (in both attending 
and reflecting) is, therefore, progressive and infinitely perfectible.   
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With this overview of Murdoch’s position in place, we can lay out the relation between 
these two distinctions (between perception and total vision and attention and reflection) that I 
find in Murdoch and their relation to the Good:   
 
• Total vision refers to those general characteristics that form the backdrop to perception of 
particulars.  When we turn ourselves toward our total vision, we have total vision as our 
object, and we examine it, as M does, with the intention to improve and ultimately perfect 
it.  We will refer to this turn of mind as reflection. 
• Perception refers to the grasp of particulars, including persons, in situ.  When we turn 
ourselves to particulars and examine them as M does, we do so with the explicit intention 
to see them as they really are and to improve and ultimately perfect our perception of 
them.  We will refer to this turn of mind as attention.   
• Vision, though I rarely use the term, refers to the complex effort, such as M’s, to see 
things aright through both attention and reflection, which (as we will see) is an on-going, 
infinitely perfectible effort to put ourselves in a just and loving relation to others.   
 
We can see that total vision forms the backdrop to perception of particulars, but we can 
adopt a more critically engaged stance toward both total vision and particulars:  we can reflect on 
total vision, and we can attend to particulars—and in both we are guided by and focusing on the 
Good.  It is a complex question how exactly the Good guides on Murdoch’s view.  It is sufficient 
for our purposes, however, to examine Murdoch’s presentation of M’s transformation in vision.  
Her transformation is an example of ‘seeing in the light of the Good,’ and it gives us adequate 
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indication of how the Good guides.  We turn now to a discussion of M’s changing perception of 
D. 
When M thinks deliberately about D until her impression of D alters there are a number 
of different things that might be going on that involve changes in both her total vision and her 
perception of D, but these changes are difficult to pin down.  The line between total vision and 
perception is not bright;  their relation is in some ways dialectical, but not always.  An alteration 
of total vision may effect an alteration in perception, but not every alteration in total vision will 
cause perceptual changes.  Similarly, an improved perceptual capacity may effect a change in 
total vision, but not all changes in perception will lead to changes in total vision.  Wine-tasting 
provides a ready (non-moral) example of perceptual change without change in total vision:  the 
more primitivo I taste the better I become (theoretically anyway) at discriminating between 
primitivos of different regions, producers, vintages, etc.  But my improved perception need not 
involve anything like an alteration of total vision.  We can think of an analogous case in the 
moral sphere.  The more I work with second-graders, the better I (in theory) become at 
distinguishing genuine behavior problems from the common self-assertiveness of seven year-
olds, but I may not experience an alteration of total vision.  I might simply put the details of my 
new understanding toward what I learned while getting my masters degree in classroom 
management about how to handle this age group.  But there is no bar to my undergoing some 
change in total vision:  I might, for example, discover I am overly impatient with completely 
typical second-grade behavior and alter my set point, so I am more tolerant and no longer see 
certain displays of assertiveness as contrarian, but rather as appropriately confident and self-
possessed.   
  75 
The basic point of the foregoing examples is that we cannot identify a predictable 
connection between changes in perception and changes in total vision.  In what follows, I present 
additional examples that illustrate some of the different ways change in perception can be related 
to change in total vision. At times, in these examples, the effort to identify the relation between 
change in perception and change in total vision risks making them look more distinct than they 
are.  Nevertheless, the following examples help eke out the precise relation Murdoch has in mind 
in her discussion of M and D.   
3.2.3 Change in perception without change in total vision 
We can begin with an examination of a scenario slightly altered from Murdoch’s in which M’s 
change in perception does not involve any change in her total vision.  If we focus on just a single 
aspect of the example, say M’s being old-fashioned, we can craft an account of her change in 
perception according to which her altered perception of D is basically the result only of 
improvements in M’s powers of attending (like the wine-tasting example).  We can imagine that 
M is out of the loop and unfamiliar with the ways of the younger generation;  certain of D’s 
behaviors, ways of talking or interacting, though really just “of the moment,” are alien and 
offensive to M and put her off D.  In such circumstances, M may not need to make any 
substantive changes in her total vision in order to see D better.  What M really needs to improve 
her perceptual capacities is more experience of the world around her and greater familiarity with 
how younger people behave in it.  More experience of particulars will give her a truer 
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understanding of D.7  In this sort of case, M’s more accurate perception of D is not really due to 
a change in vision, but comes about through attending and acquiring improved powers of 
perception.   
3.2.4 Change in perception with three types of change in total vision  
Recasting Murdoch’s example in the foregoing manner shows how perceptual change can occur 
without change in total vision.  This is not the sort of case Murdoch is interested in.  Murdoch’s 
example is intended to highlight the way in which change in total vision can improve perception.  
However, the relationship between change in total vision and change in perception has many 
variations.  I want to discuss three possible relationships in order to pinpoint exactly the sort of 
change Murdoch has in mind in her discussion of M and D.  
3.2.4.1 Temporary change in total vision 
One possible source of change in total vision is what we might call a ‘short term’ cause.  For 
example, suppose M struggles to see D, sometimes finds her gay, not noisy, but then lapses back 
into what for her is a typical stance toward those close to her son, a stance of jealousy and 
hostility that clouds her vision.  The change in total vision is unstable and temporary.  To take 
another example, suppose M is not an especially possessive or hostile person when it comes to 
sharing her son’s affection, but M’s encounter with D, a woman apparently so different from M, 
has thrown M (and her total vision) off kilter.  The trauma brought on by D, and the full 
7 We can see here how the distinction between total vision and perception might blur:  
M’s new familiarity with the ways of the younger generation might bring about a change in her 
total vision, for example, if she were to incorporate some aspect of the youthful sensibility into 
her own. 
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realization that both she and her son are forever linked with D, has stirred up possessiveness and 
hostility that interfere with M’s typically generous nature and occlude her perception of D.  
Suppose, however, that M gets a grip on herself, and after giving attention to D and reflecting on 
her own distortions of vision, M restores her typical generous nature.  In each scenario, M’s total 
vision is thrown off balance and then restored.  (It is not hard to imagine the scenarios in both 
examples in terms of an on-going cycle of short-term changes in total vision—in which case we 
would say that M is struggling to see D aright.)  The point of these examples is that neither 
involves the sort of genuine change in total vision that M experiences in Murdoch’s example. 
3.2.4.2 Improperly motivated change in total vision 
Another possible scenario, slightly modified from Murdoch’s, is one in which M’s altered 
perception of D results from a change in total vision that is triggered, so to speak, from the 
outside.  Suppose M remarks to her husband and friends on D’s impertinence and childishness.  
They might challenge her interpretation of D’s behavior and point out how she seems jealous of 
D and therefore might be judging D unfairly.  These external proddings might induce M to think 
that she has been wrong about D, and M might, e.g., successfully repress her jealously, and 
regard D as fine and worthy of her son.  We can imagine there might be a kind of mediated 
quality to M’s impression of D:  M comes to a more truthful view of D because she has been told 
by people, whose opinions she respects, that D is not really rude and unworthy of her son.  She 
alters her general standards for acceptable behavior,8 but she does it in an attempt to conform her 
8 We can see how it is difficult to identify a genuine change in total vision.  If M merely 
changes her view of D in response to the goading of others, it may be that her total vision cannot 
really be said to have changed.  She might be going along with those whose opinion she values 
in order to please them or to avoid their goading.  It may be that she makes herself take up the 
general attitude that D is fine, in such a way that when she sees D otherwise, she has to tell 
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view of D with the views of people she respects and to stanch their unpleasant criticism her.  In 
this case, M is not motivated by love and justice (or the Good) to genuinely alter her own total 
vision to see D aright.  For Murdoch, this is not a properly motivated change.  For M to undergo 
a genuine change in total vision—the sort of change Murdoch means to describe in her 
example—she must be motivated from within by love and justice.9   
3.2.4.3 Properly motivated change in total vision 
In the example actually described by Murdoch, M is capable of self-criticism and of giving 
careful and just attention to an object before her.  Along with these capacities, M is concerned or 
motivated to undergo self-criticism and give just and loving attention to D.  She is driven to 
reflect on her own total vision from within by the value she places on the Good, on being loving 
and just.  Because M recognizes the importance of looking with a just and loving gaze, she 
moves herself to take another look at her own attitudes and overall approach to D.  Granted M, in 
her reflections, contemplates the specifics of D’s behavior, but in attending deliberately to D, she 
reflects also on aspects of her own vision, and considers possible distorting influences like 
whether she is old-fashioned, snobbish, jealous, or hostile.  The critical point is that the alteration 
in M’s vision is driven by her own concern for love and justice;  the value she puts on a just and 
herself she is wrong and make herself regard D as a fine girl, suitable for her son, and so on. We 
can imagine M having to remind herself that D is not what she reflexively thinks, that actually D 
is all right.  
 
9 It is possible that M, in this scenario, could be motivated from the outside by concerns 
of love and justice, say, if her family encouraged her to think she needed to be more concerned 
with love and justice.  This is not the case Murdoch describes, but we can see how it might be a 
step in an evolution of thinking that eventually would lead to someone’s being motivated by love 
and justice from within, which is the case Murdoch describes.  We might think for the family’s 
encouragement to get any traction at all, M must have some pre-existing (or at least proto-) 
concern for love and justice, even if it is not well developed. 
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loving gaze propels her examination of whether her own gaze is actually just and loving when 
she looks at D. 
This is the reading of the case of M and D, which I believe is actually intended by 
Murdoch.  It presents the change in M’s total vision as not temporary, not motivated from the 
outside, and not driven by self-interest.  A genuine alteration of total vision, as I understand 
Murdoch, is stable and motivated from within by a concern for love and justice, a concern for the 
Good.  What is truly distinctive, for our purposes, is that the concerns of love and justice—from 
within M’s own total vision—motivate her to critically reflect on it and bring it more in line with 
those concerns. 
3.3 DANCY AND MURDOCH:  A CONTRAST 
With these distinctions in place, and the precise point of Murdoch’s example established, we are 
situated to develop a contrast between Murdoch’s and Dancy’s positions.  In order to develop 
this contrast, I will first have to translate Murdoch’s position into terms closer to Dancy’s.10  
Once we see how their positions line up, we will discover that Dancy does not have in view the 
possibility, or the necessity, of Murdochian reflection.  Without it, Dancy is hindered from 
recognizing the full scope of our ability for moral judgment-making, as well as the full extent to 
which generality figures in it.  
10 I hope to be following Kieran Setiya’s directive that in order to help Murdoch “speak 
more audibly to contemporary philosophers, so that she cannot be ignored, her ideas must be 
reframed as interventions in existing disputes, her arguments must be recovered, and her 
conclusions made clear” (1-2). 
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Murdoch’s example focuses on forming correct perceptions of persons, and she shows 
how a person’s vision affects the accuracy of her perceptions.  She does not speak per se of 
judging individuals’ actions, but there is nevertheless a distinct sense in which perception of 
individuals involves judging their actions.  For example, when M makes judgments about D’s 
character (initially, that she is crass, juvenile, rude, not good enough for her son) she has judged 
D’s overt behavior along the way.  When, after reflection, M thinks D is spontaneous, gay, 
delightful, certainly worthy of her son, she has, among other things, revised her view of D’s 
overt behavior and has accordingly altered her opinion of D’s character.  Because Murdoch 
wants to show, as against the prevailing behaviorism of her time, that action is not the only topic 
of moral evaluation, her example is constructed to exclude overt behavior from the data 
immediately relevant to M’s transformation.  In the example, as I noted earlier, Murdoch 
supposes that D is dead or expatriated or otherwise absent from M’s life, which eliminates the 
possibility that M has changed her behavior toward D or that D herself has changed her behavior.  
D’s absence is meant to bring into relief the fact that the only change lies with M and, more 
importantly, that the change is entirely internal to M.  However, there is no doubt that the 
example should not be grounds for supposing that Murdoch lacks awareness of, or concern for, 
the importance of correct action.  First, for Murdoch, correct perception of others will involve 
making judgments about their actions.11  Second, part of the reason perfection of vision is 
important is that it is meant to prepare us for, and to issue in, morally correct action.  Murdoch 
herself warns against interpreting her focus on vision as a lack of interest in action: 
11 Murdoch’s focus, however, is not on making moral judgments.  One of the reasons for 
this is that ‘judgment’ suggests a finality of opinion that Murdoch warns against.  Any 
impression of a person, like D, should never be treated as the final word;  the process of seeing 
someone as she is is on-going, always needing refinement and adjustment, infinitely perfectible. 
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I would not be understood, either, as suggesting that insight or pureness of heart are more 
important than action . . . Overt actions are perfectly obviously important in themselves, 
and important too because they are the indispensable pivot and spur of the inner sense.  
(43) 
 
It is perfectly correct to say of Murdoch that her focus is on improving vision, i.e., improving 
total vision in order to achieve improved perception of persons.  However, she well recognizes 
the importance of action—not only because it is the “pivot and spur” of the inner sense, but also 
because action is “obviously” important in its own right.12 
I stress the manner in which Murdoch’s view involves moral judgment about action in 
order to bring out points of contact between her position and Dancy’s.  Dancy’s explicit focus is 
on moral judgment as applied to action—on judging whether an action is good or bad, on 
determining which action an agent should perform.  The task of moral judgment, as Dancy 
describes it in Moral Reasons, is to take into account all the relevant features of a situation, 
organize them into a coherent narrative structure (or shape), and on that basis form a judgment 
about what ought to be done (or ought to have been done) in that situation.13  Dancy’s idea is 
that, in the competent ethical agent, action accompanies judgment when the situation demands it.  
So with respect to moral judgments—whether they are primarily about individuals or actions—
12 Nussbaum, in an article in The New Republic, charges Murdoch with ignoring the 
importance of action in favor of efforts at perfecting vision.  It is certainly true that Murdoch’s 
emphasis is not on action, but this appears to be a response to her view that many philosophers of 
her time denied, or at least ignored, any role for the inner and not an indication that Murdoch 
gives the inner greater importance than overt action.  It is interesting to note that part of the 
reason for Nussbaum’s charge is her personal experience of Murdoch. 
 
13 See the discussion of Dancy’s notion of shape in section 2.1 of chapter two. 
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we might think the difference between Murdoch and Dancy is merely a matter of emphasis.  
Determining whether this is so depends to some extent on understanding how each conceives of 
our basic ability for moral judgment. 
In several chapters of Ethics without Principles, Dancy offers helpful insight into his 
basic conception of that ability.  In discussing how we are able to make moral judgments in new 
cases, he explicitly discusses what we bring to a new situation that enables us to make judgments 
when confronted with a new case, i.e., what enables us “to establish what reasons are present in 
the case” at hand (142).  He writes that what we bring is sophisticated and requires training and 
experience, but the question he wants to explore is how competent judges bring their training and 
experience to bear in new cases.  According to Dancy,  
 
The particularist will say here that our skills in reason-discernment are not rule-
based, meaning by this that we do not extract rules for the operation of reason-
giving features from the cases we have come across and then try to subsume new 
cases under those rules.  Reasons do not behave in the sort of invariant way that 
would be necessary if we were to place such rules at the centre of our 
epistemology of reasons.  Rules of this sort, even if they could be found, would be 
at best a dispensable crutch for judgment.  (142) 
 
Dancy notes that even if we know that the ability is not rule-based, this tells us “nothing 
about how we should conceive of our ability to determine reasons in new cases” (142, emphasis 
added).  Thus, the question remains:  how do we bring our training and experience to bear when 
we make a new judgment?  Dancy explains that: 
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 Particularists conceive of the knowledge brought to a new case as much more like 
knowledge-how than like knowledge-that.  That is, it is a skill of discernment, not 
knowledge of a set of true general propositions discovered by thinking about 
previous cases and applied somehow to new ones . . . [T]o know the practical 
import of a concept is to know the sorts of difference that its applicability can 
make to how one should respond.  But knowing this is just being able to tell the 
difference made case by case, in a way that is informed by one’s past experience 
but not articulable in propositional terms.  The competent judge is not the person 
in command of general truths about the behaviour of reasons, all extracted from 
experience.  She is a person who can tell the difference when she comes across it.  
(142-3) 
 
Dancy characterizes the knowledge we bring to a new case, the knowledge that enables us to 
“move to a new judgment” as “a skill of discernment.”  He asks what this skill of discernment is, 
if it cannot be thought of in terms of a mastery of general truths.   
 
What, after all, is it that we know when we are competent to judge, in a particular case, 
the contribution made by a given feature in the light of the entire context? What is the 
nature of the knowledge that we bring to the new case?  (191) 
 
His answer is: 
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the most explicit way of expressing what we know is that we know the sorts of difference 
that the presence of this feature can make in different sorts of situation.  What we need to 
know is the rough limits of a certain range within which the differences actually made 
from case to case are to fall.  But this sort of knowledge seems to me to be essentially 
inarticulable, since it is not propositional.  (191, emphasis added to last sentence) 
 
From these passages we can see that for Dancy competent moral judges develop through 
experience a certain skill of discernment, or know-how, that enables them to make accurate 
judgments in new cases.  What competent judges need to know is the sorts of difference features 
can make in different situations and the rough limits of the range in which those differences are 
to fall.  But this know-how, argues Dancy, should not be thought of as a mastery of general 
truths;  on the contrary, the skill is essentially nonpropositional and inarticulable.   
I would like to look more closely at Dancy’s claim about the inarticulability of 
discernment because it might appear to be at odds with what he has said elsewhere about the (in 
principle) ability of competent moral judges to articulate the grounds for their moral judgments.  
In chapter seven of Moral Reasons, Dancy gives a detailed description of discernment as a 
process of constructing a narrative account of a situation:  in discernment (that is, in coming to a 
moral judgment) competent ethical agents can identify which features are relevant, determine 
how they are related to one another, and settle on their ultimate significance as they appear in 
actual situations.  For Dancy, all of this is (in theory) articulable by the agent:  she can tell you 
which features are relevant;  she can tell you why she finds them so;  she can tell you how they 
are related to one another and what, taken as a whole, they amount to.  Given his narrative 
account of discernment, it is clear that when Dancy speaks of inarticulability he does not mean 
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someone who discerns that an action is wrong is not capable (in theory) of giving reasons why.  
As should be clear from the passages above from Ethics without Principles, what is inarticulable 
is our “know-how,” i.e., the ability by which we come to settle on these reasons and formulate 
judgments.  In other words, what is inarticulable is what we know that equips us to be competent 
judges.  On Dancy’s view, we cannot say more about this knowledge than that it is knowing the 
“sorts of difference that the presence of [a] feature can make in different sorts of situations” 
(191).  But what we know when we know the difference, Dancy tells us, is “essentially 
inarticulable, since it is not propositional” (191).  Therefore, what is inarticulable, according to 
Dancy, is the knowledge that makes accurate discernment possible.   
If the above reading is correct, then there are two different ways Dancy uses the term 
‘discernment.’  Discernment can refer to a moral judgment,14 whose grounds are in principle 
perfectly articulable, or it can refer to the inarticulable know-how (i.e., the inarticulable “what 
we know”) that equips us to arrive at a judgment.  Discernment in the first sense is perfectly 
articulable:  I can perfectly well (in theory) articulate the reasons or cite the features that 
undergird my judgments.  Discernment in the second sense is not:  I cannot tell you what I know 
that enables me to identify the relevant features, what I know that enables me to relate them to 
one another, or what I know that enables me to settle on their ultimate significance.  Of 
discernment in the second sense, there simply is no account to be had.  Discernment in the first 
sense, which I will just refer to as ‘discernment,’ resembles what I, on Murdoch’s behalf, labeled 
14 Recall that for Dancy discernment is equivalent to finding a situation’s shape, which in 
turn is equivalent to arriving at a moral judgment about which action is appropriate in the 
situation.  See discussion in section 2.1 of chapter two. 
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‘perception.’15  Both involve getting a read on particulars in situ.  Discernment in the second 
sense I will refer to as the ‘skill of discernment.’  It is the know-how or ability that enables 
discernment.  Though perhaps superficially similar to total vision in that, like total vision, it 
provides the backdrop to reading particulars, Dancy’s discernment in the second sense—I will 
argue—turns out to be quite different from the Murdochian idea of total vision.  This is 
important because, as will become apparent, without total vision it is not possible to give an 
adequate account of our ability to make moral judgments.  However, before we can see how this 
is so, we need to set Dancy’s ‘skill of discernment’ alongside Murdoch’s ‘total vision’ to identify 
how they differ.   
Murdoch’s idea of total vision and Dancy’s idea of a skill of discernment both concern 
what the moral agent brings to situations, but they have very different implications for what we 
can say about the characteristics and abilities of these agents.  Dancy is concerned with the 
problem of how we bring past experience to bear on new situations and what he sees as the 
futility of determining from the way in which a feature “behaved” in a past case how it will 
15 I will use ‘perception’ and ‘discernment’ interchangeably.  For my present purposes, 
there is no significant distinction between the idea of perception in Murdoch and discernment (in 
the first sense) in Dancy—even though for Dancy when an agent has discerned a situation’s 
shape she is said to have made a moral judgment about it (see previous footnote), and Murdoch 
does not characterize the upshot of perception in terms of conclusory moral judgments.  In my 
attempt to compare and contrast Murdoch’s and Dancy’s respective positions, I will sometimes 
talk of Murdochian perception in terms of moral judgment-making even though Murdoch herself 
never equates the two—in part because she believes that to do so would suggest finality of 
opinion.  She warns against thinking finality is possible. For Murdoch, correct perception is an 
on-going, endlessly perfectible task.  When I speak of Murdochian perception in terms of moral 
judgment I do not mean to be implying the sort of finality Murdoch believes is unattainable;  
rather I mean only to refer to a moment in the on-going process of perfectible perception. 
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“behave” in a subsequent case.16  When Dancy tries to get clear about what it is that a competent 
moral agent brings to a new situation, his focus is on the agent’s past acquaintance with features 
in the new situation and the differences these features have made in previous contexts.  Dancy 
concludes that what it is that we know, although inarticulable, equips us with the ability to make 
correct moral judgments, and this ability improves through experience.  For Dancy, however, the 
most we can say about what we know is that our experience of how various features have 
behaved in previous situations is fodder for the development and improvement of our perception 
(discernment in the first sense) and through this experience we are able to learn how “to tell the 
differences [features make] case by case” (Ethics 143). 
But if we find the example of M and D plausible, then it undermines Dancy’s view 
regarding the essentially inarticulate character of the knowledge that enables the skill of 
discernment (in the second sense, i.e., the ability for moral judgment).  For my purposes there are 
two main points to be gotten from Murdoch’s example, which are relevant for the contrast I am 
drawing between Murdoch and Dancy.  First, M’s transformation in vision demonstrates the 
complex and interrelated way in which perception and total vision express our general normative 
understanding and bear on our ability to make moral judgments.  For Murdoch, total vision bears 
on what we perceive, and what we perceive bears on our moral judgments.  Therefore, total 
vision bears on our moral judgments and is at least an element of what equips us to make moral 
16 For this characterization of the problem, see Dancy’s discussion in Moral Reasons 
where he writes: 
 
the behaviour of a reason (or a consideration that serves as a reason) in a new case cannot 
be predicted from its behaviour in elsewhere.  The way in which the consideration 
functions here . . . may be affected by other considerations here present.  So there is no 
ground for the hope that we can find out here how the consideration functions in general, 
somehow, nor for the hope that we can move in any smooth way to how it will function 
in a different case.  (60) 
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judgments.  To paraphrase the point using some of Dancy’s terms, we can say that total vision is 
(at least) an element of the “ability” or “know-how” that we bring to bear in the discernment of 
shape (i.e., the making of a moral judgment).  In other words, there is a connection between what 
we on Murdoch’s behalf are calling ‘total vision,’ which we bring to bear in perception, and what 
Dancy calls ‘the ability for moral judgment,’ i.e., the ‘skill of discernment,’ which we bring to 
bear in discernment (i.e., Murdoch’s ‘perception ’).   
There is, of course, a sense in which Dancy’s conception of this ability expresses our 
normative understanding, but it manifests itself differently from the normative understanding we 
find in total vision.  For Dancy, when we make a moral judgment we have, on the way to 
discerning the shape of the situation, grasped the moral role of all the relevant features.  Insofar 
as we have discerned a shape (i.e., made a moral judgment), our judgment can be said to express 
our normative understanding, our knowledge-how, our skill of discernment.  But we must also 
take note of the fact that—and this is the second main point of Murdoch’s example—M’s 
improved perception comes about largely because of the critical stance she takes toward that 
dimension of what she brings to bear that Dancy calls her “know-how” or “ability” for moral 
judgment and which, inspired by Murdoch, we are calling ‘total vision’.  For Murdoch, making 
moral judgments involves not just the immediate outward focus on some situation the grasp of 
which is expressive of our normative understanding;  it will often involve a turning inward to 
take up total vision itself as an object, specifically as an object of appraisal, improvement, and 
ultimately perfection.  Murdoch shows us that articulable reflection on and modification of total 
vision is a vital component of our moral activity, and she gives us articulate details about how we 
should go about critically reflecting on vision to improve it.  It seems impossible for Dancy’s 
moral agent to take up a critical stance toward and engage in critical reflection on non-
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propositional, inchoate know-how.  This absence of propositional content is the lacuna in 
Dancy’s view. 
We can now see that despite apparent similarities between Dancy and Murdoch, there is a 
crucial contrast in their positions.  We learn from Murdoch that whatever else our basic ability 
for moral judgment is, and however inarticulable aspects of it may be, a capacity for reflection 
on total vision is an integral part of it,17 and there is certainly something we can say about that.  
While we can agree that some aspects of our basic ability for moral judgment may well be 
inarticulable, Murdoch has shown that there is much we can articulate about, and much we can 
and should “articulable-y” do to improve, total vision.   
Murdoch’s example thus shows how astute grasp of particulars is not just a matter of 
identifying in the moment those features that are normatively significant.  It is also a matter of 
perfecting total vision—as a way of perfecting our grasp of particulars.  If we accept Murdoch’s 
17 I have intentionally remained neutral about the relation between Dancy’s basic ability 
for moral judgment, i.e., the skill of discernment, and Murdochian reflection on total vision.  For 
my purposes it is necessary only to show that whatever the ability for moral judgment is, it 
includes total vision and reflection on it.  Since I have left it that the skill of discernment, total 
vision, and reflection on total vision are all abilities that are in some way or other part of our 
basic ability for moral judgment, it could seem that there is no necessary point of disagreement 
between Dancy and Murdoch about articulability.  Dancy could say that some other part of our 
basic moral capacity is articulable.  But the skill of discernment, for Dancy, just is the basic 
capacity to perceive situations in a manner that culminates in moral judgment.  We learn from 
Murdoch, that that capacity (moral judgment-making) necessarily involves total vision and 
reflection thereon. This allows me to say, because of Murdochian points about the possibility and 
necessity of reflection on total vision, that Dancy is wrong to conclude that our basic ability for 
moral judgment is inarticulable.  So the taxonomy of my position is this: (1) For Dancy the skill 
of discernment just is the “basic ability for moral judgment,” (2) This skill or ability, this know-
how, is non-propositional, (3) Total vision and reflection on total vision are necessarily part of 
the basic ability for moral judgment, (3) Dancy rules out the possibility of any propositional 
knowledge of these insofar as they are part of our non-propositional know-how, but (4) it is an 
open to Dancy to expand his ideas about the skill of discernment, so that it encompasses the 
articulable dimension of total vision and reflection on total vision without affecting the core of 
his particularism. 
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point that the possibility of moral judgment presupposes total vision, we consequently must 
allow that any theory of our basic ability for moral judgment must make room for it.  
Furthermore, it must allow for the possibility of critical reflection on total vision in the manner 
described in Murdoch’s example.  If we take seriously Murdoch’s point that total vision is 
essential moral data, then reflection on the nature and quality of our total vision is not optional to 
the project of moral reasoning and judgment-making.  Because Dancy believes our moral “know-
how” is non-propositional, he cannot find a place for reflection in the normative understanding 
that shapes perception, and therefore, he cannot give a complete picture of the full range of our 
basic moral activity.  Dancy has a blank space, a lacuna, which he might have “filled” with 
propositional knowledge, such as we find in articulated in reflection.  Instead, he leaves it not 
just empty but articulable-y un-fillable.   
3.4 DANCY’S PARTICULARISM:  A LACUNA 
I wish to examine two responses to the charge that there is a lacuna in particularist views like 
Dancy’s because they fail to recognize a role for Murdochian reflection.  The first response has 
particularists acknowledging a role for it, but carving out that role by recasting Murdoch’s 
injunction ‘to look with a just and loving gaze’ as a reminder.  The jumping off point for this 
response is an argument by Elijah Milgram in his essay “Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and 
Particularism” that particularists like Dancy cannot accept Murdoch’s injunction.  Milgram 
argues that Dancy’s particularist critique of principles requires Dancy to reject such foundational 
principles as Aristotle’s ‘do as the phronimos does.’  Milgram argues that it likewise requires 
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Dancy to reject Murdoch’s injunction (which serves a function similar to ‘do what the phronimos 
does’ in Aristotle’s practical ethics). 
Let us suppose Milgram is correct that particularists would reject Murdoch’s injunction.18  
Milgram’s idea is that because particularists believe there are no general moral relations that 
obtain across all situations, they will argue that it is always possible an exceptional case will 
arise in which moral considerations will demand we set aside Murdoch’s injunction.  For 
Murdoch, however, the injunction to look with a just and loving gaze is not susceptible to 
exception.19  In her view there is no set of circumstances in which we should abandon the aims 
18 My view is that Milgram is incorrect because Murdoch’s injunction should not be 
construed along subsumptivist or presumptivist lines.  In other words, Milgram has 
misunderstood the domain to which the particularist critique applies;  it applies to subsumptivist 
and presumptivist principles only.  Moreover, as I argue in chapter four, the particularist can and 
should accept some principle that plays the role of Murdoch’s injunction or Aristotle’s ‘do as the 
phronimos does.’ 
 
19 This is not to say that there might very well be special circumstances in which a 
detached gaze is what is required by considerations of love and justice.  Robert Brustein, in a 
review of a play based on Primo Levi’s first book, If This Is a Man, writes about how the Jewish-
Italian chemist and Holocaust survivor set out to render comprehensible the abomination of the 
Holocaust.  He writes of Levi that: 
 
Unlike most other Holocaust memoirists, Levi assumes the manner of a reporter rather 
than a judge.  He does not write about the death camps in order to formulate new 
accusations, but rather, using what he is later to call “the calm sober language of the 
witness,” to provide “documentation for a quiet study of certain aspects of the human 
mind.”  In other words, Levi is applying the scientific method in which he was trained as 
a chemist to create an anatomy of human behavior.  (25) 
   
In Levi’s circumstances taking on the scientific or disinterested gaze is a heroic effort of vision, 
which arguably expresses Murdoch’s injunction to look with just or loving gaze.  Murdoch’s 
injunction is not a command to love everyone we seek to understand.  This distinction is 
especially important to understanding Levi’s stance toward the individuals he describes, which 
include both victims and perpetrators of the Holocaust.  In circumstances such as Levi’s, 
Murdoch’s injunction might plausibly ask only an effort at detached description, an effort that 
might perhaps be a preliminary step on the way to, say, forgiveness.  In any case, this would 
depend on the substantive understanding of love and justice.  
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of the injunction and instead look with antipathy or injustice.20  It is not the case for Murdoch 
that we should perhaps, depending on the context, combat the ego and take up a just or loving 
gaze.  This stance is not optional.  
Particularists might respond, however, that even though they cannot accept an 
unconditional injunction, they can accommodate it by recasting it as a reminder:  ‘be reminded 
that accuracy might require fighting off the selfish ego and looking with a just or loving gaze.’  
Such a reminder would develop, in the way of all Dancy’s reminders, as a result of focusing on 
the “behavior” of features in previous cases:  in case after case particularists would notice that 
when we look on a situation with a greedy or selfish attitude we arrive at incorrect or distorted 
moral judgments.  We would notice further that in case after case when we look with a just and 
loving gaze (in the manner Murdoch describes) we are able to fight back the ego, ward off 
distortion, and thereby arrive at correct moral judgments.  On the basis of these accumulated 
cases, we would come to the conclusion that if we adopt a just and loving gaze, we have good 
reason to think the ensuing judgment is correct.  Therefore, a reminder to that effect is warranted.    
20 This is not to deny that there might very well be circumstances in which it is virtually 
impossible to regard another in light of the Murdochian ideal.  At a later point in Brustein’s 
review (discussed in the previous footnote), Brustein writes of moments when Levi 
understandably is unable to contain his fury:   
 
[Levi's] prose occasionally erupts out of its measured, quasi-analytical style into an 
explosion of outrage and anger—like the moment when, referring to the German doctor 
who stares through him as if he were a fish in an aquarium, he remarks, “That look 
explains the great insanity of Germany.” As for the sadistic assistant who wipes his 
greasy hands on Levi's shoulder, he thunders:  “I judge him and the innumerable others 
like him, big and small, in Auschwitz and everywhere.  (25)  
 
Brustein presents these as episodes when Levi can no longer maintain his ideal stance of 
detachment, but they are certainly open to alternate interpretations consistent with the ideal, for 
certainly there are cases in which looking with a just and loving gaze is consistent with and 
might even call for rage or contempt.   
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However, reformulating the Murdochian injunction as a reminder serves more to 
highlight the differences between Dancy and Murdoch than the similarities.21  First of all, as we 
have already seen, recasting it as a reminder alters the status of the Murdochian assertion that we 
should look with a just and loving gaze.  Murdoch clearly envisions it as fundamental and non-
contingent;  but even if we set this difference aside there is another, even bigger difference 
between the two.   
If particularists recast Murdoch’s injunction in terms of a reminder, we have to wonder 
whether we have moved outside particularism’s own framework.  The explicit task of Dancy’s 
ethical agent is the contemplation of features of situations, not features of him or herself as the 
agent making the judgment about the situation.  Murdoch’s point is that total vision plays a role 
in how we read or perceive the situation itself.  Total vision and perception are interrelated, but 
we have distinguished the two ideas, not only to illustrate how total vision plays a role in 
perception of particulars, but also to emphasize the importance of reflecting on total vision itself.  
It would be possible to force the two ideas that Murdoch has distinguished into Dancy’s 
framework:  the particularist could treat the agent’s perception of the particulars as part of the 
situation itself, but this is a puzzlingly convoluted way of trying to get to the agent’s total vision 
into the agent’s sightline.  The awkwardness of bringing reflection on total vision into view 
21 What Murdoch’s view does is open up a place for critical assessment of our 
commitments.  Dancy would have us re-conceive our general moral commitments as reminders.  
This re-conception is supposed to counteract the blinding effects of thinking in terms of 
principles.  I want to argue that the idea of accuracy does not require us to reduce principles to 
reminders. To put Dancy’s worry in Murdochian terms, we have to clear away principles to get 
accuracy in vision (just as we must fend off the ego).  But why think a principle must function as 
a prejudice?  I will show in chapter four that in the idea of Murdochian reflection and perfection 
of vision there is a way for principles to retain their status as true expressions of our moral 
knowledge while not being susceptible to the charges made in the particularist’s critique of 
principles.  
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reflects the fact that Murdochian vision does not fit comfortably into particularism’s framework.  
Moreover, even if we accept the awkwardness of forcing reflection into the situation itself, we 
have to admit that once it is brought into view, the particularist does not have much to say about 
it—since what we know that equips us to see the shape of a situation (i.e., to make a moral 
judgment) is inarticulable. 
At this point particularists like Dancy might offer another response to the charge that they 
fail to recognize a role for Murdochian reflection.  They might say that because they have the 
idea of accuracy in perception, their position already includes it.  Particularists might argue that 
the Murdochian injunction to look with a just or loving gaze is just a way of saying ‘be accurate.’  
Murdochian talk of perfecting vision is just a way of talking about the characteristics of accurate 
perception:  it should be loving and just and free of selfishness.  Insofar as particularists embrace 
the idea of accuracy in discernment (and because discernment and Murdochian perception are 
essentially the same), they might argue, it is open to them to discuss the characteristics of 
accuracy in perception, if he were to choose to do so.  Since discussion of the characteristics of 
accuracy in discernment (or perception) just is discussion about the characteristics of good 
vision, Dancy can be said to have the idea of vision.  Moreover, since he has the idea of 
improvement in discernment he can be said to have the idea of perfecting vision.   
According to this line of defense, the only real difference between Murdoch and Dancy 
would be that Murdoch, with her discussion of reflection and total vision, is more expansive 
about how to achieve distortion-free vision.  Although there is room on Dancy’s view to provide 
us, as Murdoch does, with a detailed picture of the forces of distortion and how to counteract 
them, Dancy simply has not taken on the job of spelling out the various techniques we should 
employ in our efforts to be accurate.  If he had, he could cash out the idea of accuracy in more or 
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less detail and, in doing so, could even draw on the Murdochian ideas of love and justice, if that 
were his inclination. 
One reason to be wary of this interpretation is that Murdoch herself is clear that M’s 
project to take another look at D is not aptly characterized purely in terms of an attempt at 
accuracy.  She explains that: 
 
What M is ex hypothesi trying to do is not just to see D accurately but to see her justly or 
lovingly.  (Sovereignty 23) 
 
Murdoch makes this comment in the context of a discussion opposing behaviorist views of the 
time, which designated as genuine activity only that which manifested itself externally.  As part 
of her extended case against that view, she makes the above remark about accuracy and 
elaborates on the nature of M’s inner activity, which (as we mentioned earlier in this chapter) 
Murdoch characterizes as an “infinitely perfectible,” “progressive attempt to see a particular 
object [D] clearly” (23).  The concepts of ‘love’ and ‘justice’ are important to this 
characterization because: 
 
As soon as we begin to use words such as ‘love’ and ‘justice’ in characterizing M, 
we introduce into our whole conceptual picture the idea of progress, that is the 
idea of perfection . . . (23) 
 
These passages help bring into view the importance for Murdoch of the endlessly perfectible 
activity of putting oneself in the right relation to the object of which we seek a clear view.  The 
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right relation, according to Murdoch, is one in which we take up a just or loving gaze toward the 
object of our attention.  Creating and maintaining the kind of relation such as we see between M 
and D: 
 
is essentially something progressive, something infinitely perfectible . . . M has 
engaged in an endless task.  (23) 
 
The task to which Murdoch refers is the perfection of vision, which is illustrated in M’s efforts to 
get straight about D.  M is prompted by considerations of love or justice, which are internal to 
her vision, to make sure she is looking at D in the proper loving and just manner;  in light of 
these considerations she assesses her attitudes, prejudices, commitments, etc., to determine 
whether she indeed stands in the proper relation to D.  To state the point more generally, putting 
ourselves in the proper relation is the essential task of perfecting vision.  We are never finished 
with the task;  it is one of on-going maintenance and perfectibility. 
Here is what I take Murdoch’s remarks to mean.  The on-going, endlessly perfectible 
character of the task of putting and keeping ourselves in the right relation to others is not aptly 
described as merely one of ‘accuracy.’  ‘Accuracy’ is not a relational concept, and accordingly 
we cannot use it to describe the relation in which we should stand to others:  the relation is not 
more or less accurate. ‘Accurate’ has its natural place as a characteristic of judgments;  its related 
concept, ‘correct,’ has its place as a characteristic of actions.  When Murdoch says that M is not 
just trying to see D accurately she means that M is not simply trying to make an accurate 
judgment about D (e.g., she is not bumptious, but gay) or make the correct move toward her 
(e.g., re-write her will, so D is the beneficiary in case her son predeceases D).  In the first 
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passage excerpted in this section, Murdoch tells us that, in addition to being accurate (in her 
judgments and correct in her actions), M is also trying to see D justly or lovingly.  What 
Murdoch means is that M is also involved in an on-going effort to perfect her vision of D and 
thereby maintain a relation of love and justice to D.   
When Dancy-style particularists reduce Murdoch’s injunction to look with a just and 
loving gaze to an admonishment to ‘be accurate,’ they eliminate the space for the on-going 
Murdochian task of perfecting just and loving relations to others.  The particularists’ attempt to 
assimilate the task of accuracy in perception (or discernment) to the on-going task of perfection 
of vision fails.  The former represents a moment of judgment or action;22  the latter is an on-
going effort to perfect the relation in which we stand to the objects of our attention.  When 
Murdoch talks about the perfection of vision, as in the example of M and D, she is not simply 
talking about accurate perception, but also about the perfection of the relation in which we stand 
to the object of perception.  For Murdoch, the perfection of this relation, the perfection of vision, 
is one of our chief moral tasks and represents an end in itself.  While it is not the handmaiden of 
accuracy, accuracy is the likely result of efforts at perfection:  if we are successful in our efforts 
to achieve (or at least approximate) the relation of love or justice to another, in the moment when 
it comes time to make a judgment (or take action), we will be best positioned to achieve accuracy 
in judgments (or correctness in actions). 
According to this particularist reading of Murdoch, talk of perfecting vision is another 
way of talking about the possibility of accuracy in discernment, the possibility of a judgment’s 
being better or worse, the possibility of seeing objects of attention more or less clearly.  
22 This is what Murdoch calls “the quick flash of the choosing will,” which she charges 
the behaviorist with having reduced the individual to (53). 
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Deliberate reflection on total vision, of the sort M displays in the case of D, takes up the question 
of whether we really have got an accurate grasp of the objects we confront, and so, according to 
the particularist, its topic really just is whether a correct judgment has been arrived at.  I have 
argued that Murdoch’s idea of reflection on total vision encompasses more than reflection about 
whether our judgments are accurate.  We have seen that we cannot accept the particularist’s 
argument that reflection on total vision is just a means of working out the requirements of 
‘accuracy’ in perception case by case.   
Noticing that we can engage in fruitful reflection on total vision in the absence of any 
particular object of attention brings out how reflection on total vision is not exclusively an 
activity that involves articulation of the grounds of (accurate) perception in particular cases.  We 
can imagine cases involving reflection on and improvement of total vision that do not have an 
immediate connection to any particular object of attention.  For example, I might observe that 
time and again I feel jealous of others, including in situations where jealousy seems completely 
unwarranted and produces distorted judgments.  From this I might determine to take steps 
against my jealousy—perhaps by making myself focus on all I do have or on how unpleasant it is 
to see the trait in others or on how unhappy the emotion makes me.  Such steps exemplify the 
Murdochian effort to perfect vision, but they are not directly tied to the contemplation of any 
particular object about which I am trying to get a clear view.  That such reflection is possible, 
and in fact quite familiar, should make it clear that perfection of total vision is not just about 
accurate judgment or correct action.  Perfecting vision—perfecting our relation to the object of 
our attention—is not a task that aims solely at attaining accuracy in judgment or correctness in 
action.  It involves critical assessment and perfection of ourselves.  It plays a role in preparation 
for judgment and action, but for Murdoch it also has moral value in and of itself.  
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While Dancy clearly has the notion of accurate perception (or discernment), just as 
Murdoch does, he cannot really be said to have the idea of vision, insofar as that idea 
encompasses the on-going perfection of the ideal moral relation in which we should stand to 
others.  This is not surprising.  If we go back to the root of their respective views we find that, 
although they both reject some form of generalism, they have very different grounds for doing 
so.  Murdoch’s primary reason for rejecting what she calls the ‘universal rules model’ is that it 
focuses exclusively on moral assessment of actions and fails to acknowledge the relevance of 
people’s vision.   At least part of the reason the model has no room for vision is that it treats the 
data to which universal rules are meant to apply as, in theory, equally intelligible to everyone.  
Accordingly, there is no cause to think that how we see things will affect possibilities for the 
intelligibility and application of the rules. 
Dancy, of course, rejects generalism (and therefore the universal rules model), but he 
does so because he believes it is impossible to codify correct action in a system of rules.  No 
doubt Murdoch would agree about this impossibility, but she stakes her rejection of the model on 
very different grounds.  She is concerned about what the model leaves out, what she calls vision.  
Dancy’s view is susceptible to the same deficiency as the universal rules model, for his view, 
too, leaves out anything that could play the role of vision.  It is ironic that this is so.  
Particularism originated in the Aristotelian account of the role of good character in moral 
judgment-making.  The Aristotelian notion of good character is akin to Murdoch’s conception of 
vision, whereby the intent to be virtuous (to focus on and aim at the Good) drives moral 
judgment-making.  Dancy, in addition to rejecting the universal rules model, also rejects the need 
to appeal to something like good character to explain moral judgment in his particularist 
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account.23  In doing so, our ability for moral judgment-making is no less mysterious than it was 
at the end of chapter two.   
3.5 BEYOND MURDOCH:  IDEALS IN VISION 
I conclude this chapter with the assertion that part of the solution to this mystery involves 
acknowledging that we cannot fully make sense of the idea of vision and reflection on total 
vision without appeal to a certain kind of generality.  This is not a thesis Murdoch advances, but 
if we look again at the characteristics of total vision in her example of M and D, we find there is 
a place and a need for it.   
Some characteristics of M’s total vision are tied to M’s unique personal history.  For 
example, a fatherless childhood or loveless marriage might exacerbate her jealousy;  an anxiety-
prone disposition might exacerbate her hostility.  But these idiosyncratic characteristics of vision 
are not directly relevant to the connection I am trying to draw between vision and generality.  To 
understand this connection it is vital to see that, in Murdoch’s example, M’s wish to take another 
look at D is traceable to a quite general interest in love or justice.  This too is part of her total 
23 See for example Dancy’s argument in Moral Reasons that John McDowell need not 
appeal to “the notion of the virtuous person” essentially because it is an unnecessary heuristic for 
explaining how we arrive at moral judgments (57).  Dancy characterizes the virtuous person as 
“equipped with a full range of sensitivities to the sorts of considerations that can matter morally” 
and says that the these sensitivities, this ability, “is not conceived in terms of someone who is 
equipped with a full list of moral principles and an ability to correctly subsume new cases under 
the right one.”  But Dancy has perhaps misunderstood the notion of a virtuous person, whose 
“sensitivities,” he says, “have no content of their own.  They are . . . simply the ability to 
recognize whatever morally relevant features we come across for what they are, case by case. . . . 
There is nothing that one brings to the new situation other than a contentless ability to discern 
what matters where it matters . . .”  (50, emphasis added). 
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vision.  M has as her primary motive the desire to see D as she is, which, for Murdoch, just is the 
intent to be virtuous.  The intent to be virtuous, in turn, just is the intent to look in the light of the 
Good.  For Murdoch, it is M’s good intentions and her capacity for self-criticism that set her on a 
path of reflection.  In reflection, she comes to suspect herself of being prejudiced, jealous, 
narrow-minded, and snobbish, and she believes it is wrong to be this way. 
While M considers these general moral characteristics of her total vision (or character), 
she must also figure out how to correct her stance of prejudice, jealousy, narrow-mindedness, 
and snobbishness.  To do this she must reflect on general aspects of the Good, as they bear on 
her specific situation.  My point of departure from Murdoch is that I do not think we get a full 
picture of the actual moral work M engages in if we limit our account of her reflective 
deliberation to an appeal to love and justice and their neutralizing effects on the ego.  Reflection 
on total vision is a process of clearing away distortions of vision and looking in the light of the 
Good, but it will also involve reflection on substantive ideals as they bear on her specific 
situation.  What I am saying is that, in Murdoch’s example, M must reflect on ideals.  To give 
just one example, the ideal of family may vary across cultures and subcultures, but M must have 
and reflect on some general notion of what “family” should be like in order to assess her stance 
and behavior toward D.  Reflection on total vision is a means of working out the general grounds 
of clarity in vision.  Ideals capture the generality, not explicit in Murdoch, which shows itself in 
the substantive content of M’s reflection.  In the next chapter, I develop the concept of ideals and 
show how they offer a possibility for a kind of generality, not envisioned by generalists or 
particularists.24  This alternate conception of generality points to an understanding of moral 
24 It is plausible that Ross can be interpreted in such a way that his prima facie duties play 
a role similar to the one I assign to ideals in Murdochian vision.  My understanding of the role of 
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principles, which (as evidenced in concrete examples in the next chapter) gives a better account 
of the action-guiding role of moral principles than either the particularists’ or the generalists’ 
accounts. 
reflection would be a supplement to Ross’s barebones position that when faced with conflicting 
prima facie duties, the most we can say about the process of making a moral judgment is that it 
culminates in a “considered opinion (it is never more)” (19).  Supplementing Ross’s view in this 
way would run against the grain of Dancy’s interpretation of Ross.  According to Dancy, Ross’s 
prima facie duties are expressions of invariable relations between properties and the 
contributions they make to evaluations of actions (e.g., an action is always the worse for being a 
lie).  Dancy’s interpretation of Ross’s prima facie duties follows the basic outlines of Hare’s 
subsumptivism (insofar as both admit of invariable relations between properties and moral 
evaluations of action) and is not compatible with the view I am advancing.  
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4.0  THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT OF GENERALITY 
While I sympathize with the particularist’s criticism of generalism, there is a lacuna in the 
particularist’s conception of moral thought:  it fails to give a satisfactory account of general 
moral principles and the role they play in moral reasoning.  In chapter three, I developed two 
features of Murdoch’s account (reflection and perfection of vision) in order to show that there is 
a need to fill this lacuna—but Murdoch’s account stops short of doing so.  In this chapter I 
develop an account of how to fill the particularists’ lacuna:  I call it the ideal-based account of 
generality.1  This account draws on both vision and ideals to develop a kind of generality that 
neither particularists nor generalists recognize, but which is necessary to give sense to the 
richness of real-life moral thought.  
At the heart of my ideal-based account of generality is the notion of an ideal.  I begin this 
chapter by developing an example that demonstrates the need for such a notion.  I use the 
example to show how ideals can deepen and enrich Murdoch’s account of the injunction to look 
with a just and loving gaze.  Her injunction urges us to establish an unvarying general relation 
between moral beings.  But how are we to implement this injunction?  The answer to this 
1 At times I will refer to it simply as the ‘ideal-based account.’  It is worth noting that the 
title of Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s book Principled Ethics. Generalism as a Regulative 
Ideal suggests they might offer a view of generality similar to that of the ideal-based account of 
generality.  Despite invoking the concept of ideals, their view understands moral principles 
differently than the ideal-based account.  According to McKeever and Ridge, the ideal to which 
generalism aspires is the articulation of specific defeating conditions, enabling conditions, their 
relative weight, and so on, with the aim of working toward a complete codification of morality in 
a set of “unhedged principles” (177-95).  It will become clear in this chapter that the ideal-based 
account of generality does not regard ordinary moral principles as candidates for this sort of 
pursuit, in part because it does not regard moral reasoning as codifiable. 
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question involves moving beyond the terms of Murdoch’s own account and widening our 
conception of generality to include the notion of generality proposed by the ideal-based account.  
There are multiple steps in the demonstration of how we move beyond Murdoch’s injunction.  In 
sections 4.1 through 4.5, I develop an example that illustrates what ideals are, how they function 
in moral thought, and how they are related to general moral principles.  The upshot is that a 
proper understanding of the Murdochian process of perfecting vision involves bringing ideals to 
bear in our reflections.  In section 4.6, I address a number of questions whose answers are 
essential to understanding the role of ideals, principles, and the Good in the ideal-based account 
of generality.  After addressing these questions, I tackle several versions of a criticism 
particularists might raise against the ideal-based account of generality, specifically, versions that 
converge as a challenge that the account cannot show a general action-guiding role for ideals or 
their related principles.  In sections 4.7 through 4.9, I develop and respond to these criticisms by 
showing that particularists and generalists hold an assumption that prevents them from seeing an 
alternate conception of generality that can make sense of ideals and principles as truly action-
guiding;  it prevents both parties from seeing how ideals and principles play a crucial, action-
guiding role in reflection:  as spurs to reflection, objects of reflection, and on-going ends of 
reflection.  In this enriched account of reflection, we see how cultivation of our commitment to 
ideals and principles is, in turn, part of how we cultivate good character and exemplify it in our 
actions.  In section 4.10 of this chapter draw on an Aristotelian notion of generality, which is 
often misunderstood, to strengthen the plausibility of the notion of generality proposed by the 
ideal-based account.  Finally, in section 4.11, I conclude with an argument that points the way to 
a reconciliation between particularism, generalism, and the ideal-based account of generality:  
once we understand how ideals and the principles associated with them play a role in moral 
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reasoning, we can see that it is possible for both particularists and generalists to embrace the 
alternative conception of generality found in the ideal-based account. 
4.1 MORAL REFLECTION AND EXAMPLES 
To explore the full dimension of moral thought, we need examples rich enough to capture the 
moral complexity of real life.  Murdoch was so convinced of the importance of this fact that she 
shifted her focus from writing philosophy to writing novels, a form in which she could, so to 
speak, create extended examples with detail sufficient to give her readers myriad resources for 
perfecting their moral sensibilities, their vision, their perception.  Often it is with the aid of 
realistically rendered, richly detailed examples that we are trigged to reflect on our own vision;  
such examples can provide a guiding model for reflection; and they can illustrate the wide range 
of on-going aims and considerations that come into play in moral reflection.   
Murdoch’s breakthrough example of M and D, which I discussed in chapter three, has 
exactly that richness of detail to make undeniable her point that something is missing in the 
behaviorist account of moral reasoning that reigned in her time.  As with the behaviorists of 
Murdoch’s era, for whom Murdoch’s example provided an enriching supplement to their 
impoverished fund of moral data, the particularists of our day can benefit from examples with 
detail and complexity more like those we actually encounter.  As it stands, their examples tend to 
be too thin to give the full richness of detail necessary to identify the way in which general moral 
principles play a role in moral thinking. This absence of detail creates an inevitable blindness in 
the particularists:  they cannot see what is not present in their examples.  A corrective can be 
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found in examples that show what is left out by particularists.  In what follows, I offer such an 
example.   
4.2 AN EXAMPLE 
H’s wife, W, with whom he has three grown children, has been hospitalized for a number of 
years with severe Alzheimer’s disease.  For about a year H has been romantically involved with 
O, a widowed woman who is about his age.  They have been friends for many years, but now 
they are also lovers.  Their relationship is founded on the basis of genuine affection, 
commonality of interests, companionability, and mutual respect.  H lives with O, but he keeps 
the house in which he and W raised their now adult children.  The house is on the same block as 
O’s.  It is still furnished but unoccupied; occasionally their grown children stay there.  H lists 
two phone numbers in the directory at work:  one is the landline at the home he shared with W, 
and one is the landline at O’s.  H continues to care for W, both practically and emotionally;  he 
visits W regularly, and without O’s support and companionship H would not be able to care for 
W as well as he does or love her in the limited way in which this is still possible for him.   
4.3 MORAL REFLECTION AND IDEALS 
Just like M in Murdoch’s example from The Sovereignty of Good, H is “an intelligent and well-
intentioned person, capable of self-criticism” (17).  He wonders whether he is doing the right 
thing, and so determines to take another look at the entirety of his situation.  H’s question is 
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about his conduct;  specifically, it is about whether he is acting improperly toward W.2  Here H’s 
situation does not exactly parallel M’s.  M wonders if she has a correct view of D’s character, 
while H wonders if he is acting properly toward W (and no doubt others, e.g., O and his 
children).  But this does not make the structure of H’s basic task significantly different from M’s.  
As we have already seen, perfection of vision is part of the task of any moral agent, whether she 
seeks an accurate view of a person or a correct judgment about action.  Just as M must reflect on 
her vision to assess her judgment of D, so must H critically reflect on his vision to assess his 
conduct toward W.  
In the process of reflection, in contrast to the moment of action, H checks himself—his 
commitments, predilections, aversions, possible prejudices, etc.—in the manner in which M 
does, to make sure he sees things aright.  There is both an inward and outward direction to his 
reflections.  In the case of inward reflection, he considers his dispositions, character traits, 
values, and commitments (that is, he reflects on his vision) to make sure they are not distorting 
his judgment.  In the case of outward reflection, he considers the circumstances in which his 
actions occur, as well as the people affected by them.  Both sorts of reflection are part of the 
project of seeing things aright, so he can judge the acceptability of his conduct. For the purposes 
of my example, I will restrict H’s focus to his marriage and whether he is acting properly toward 
W even though his attention would have to range more widely for his reflection and ultimate 
assessment to be complete.  (For example, he would have to consider whether he is acting 
properly toward his children in having a relationship with O.) 
2 I focus on H’s assessment of his conduct in order to make my discussion line up more 
neatly with Dancy’s conception of moral judgment, which ranges over actions, as opposed to 
character.  
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Obviously, one of the most salient features of H’s situation is that he is married to W, so 
it is of central importance to his reflections that he consider the significance of this fact.  As soon 
as he does, his reflections take on a substantive complexity:  he must consider the question of 
what marriage is and whether he is living up to its aims and demands.  The complexities can 
roughly be divided into a public and a private dimension.  In his social, legal, and cultural 
traditions,3 H will find a rich articulation of the various aims of marriage, which we might call 
the ‘standard’ or ‘public’ dimension of the concept because it depends on a given culture’s 
shared understanding of the concept.  While the concept H considers must be intelligibly related 
to some public conception of marriage,  it will also have a more personal dimension, involving 
H’s and W’s own particular understanding of the concept.  We might call this the ‘personal’ 
dimension of H’s conception.  H is married to W, and so H will have to consider not just the 
relevant public conception of ‘marriage,’ but also how he and W together think (or, in W’s case, 
thought) about marriage, including the hopes, expectations, obligations, and freedoms they 
associated with their own particular marriage as it was lived and articulated (implicitly as well as 
explicitly) between them.  
 Dividing the concept of marriage into a public and private dimension can make the two 
seem like entirely distinct strands, but they are entwined and not always clearly distinguishable.  
Even so, as I reconstruct H’s moral reflections, I will speak of them separately, because I want to 
make explicit how these two different strands function in H’s thinking about his conduct.  The 
starting point for H’s reflections will to some greater or lesser extent involve simply getting clear 
about what exactly ‘marriage’ means in its standard or public usage. Although I will attribute to 
H what might be recognized as a standard western conception of marriage, there are many other 
3 For brevity’s sake I will refer to these collectively as H’s ‘traditions.’ 
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plausible starting points for his reflections.  He might have a non-standard western conception of 
marriage, a non-western conception of marriage, a non-standard, non-western conception of 
marriage, etc., but for it to be a conception of marriage at all it will have to be intelligibly related 
to some concept of marriage.  In any case, my point does not depend on which conception of 
marriage H embraces but rather on how he uses (both dimensions of) his conception of marriage, 
whatever it is, in arriving at judgments regarding the morality of his actions.  In doing so, he will 
find that marriage is meant to exemplify a number of interrelated purposes. 
These purposes and their relative significance to whether something is or is not an 
acceptable part of marriage have changed markedly over time.4  For centuries marriage was 
primarily a way of securing inheritance and consolidating wealth.  We can see, for example, in 
Roman society how these purposes determined permissible and impermissible sexual activity.  
Because a predominant purpose of marriage for a Roman citizen (who was by definition male) 
was to perpetuate the ruling class, there was no requirement of sexual fidelity to his wife, that is, 
there was no connection between ‘marriage’ and a prohibition on adultery, as we know it today.  
The sexual activity permitted to the married Roman male citizen extended to all that was 
consonant with the essential power-amassing purpose of marriage.  He was entitled to sex with 
any slave or servant, whether male or female, adult or child. The sex acts themselves were 
primarily treated as expressions and proof of his power.  Because he had wide discretion over the 
treatment of any offspring—they could be raised as his own, made into slaves, abandoned, or 
killed—they were no real threat to his power.  The sexual activity of Roman male citizens and 
their daughters and wives were also circumscribed according to whether they encroached on a 
4 See Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals, where he argues that institutions and 
practices (e.g., punishment) persist, but the reasons for them change. 
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Roman male’s power.  Thus, all Roman male citizens were entirely off limits to other Roman 
male citizens, not because of prohibitions on homosexuality, but because the “submitting” male 
weakened himself by allowing another male sexual dominion over him.  The daughters and 
wives of Roman male citizens were also off limits unless the father or husband gave permission.  
The sexual activities of daughters and wives were, thus, an expression of the power of their 
fathers and husbands, which they asserted over their wives and daughters through their 
jurisdictional decision about who could have sex with them (Graff 55-6). 
The current western conception of marriage that I attribute to H involves the union of 
financial and material resources, which generally enhances the overall material well-being of 
both partners, and thereby, in some sense, enhances their power.5   Nevertheless, contemporary 
western marriage is not primarily about the accrual of power.  Childrearing is arguably one of the 
aims of contemporary western marriage.  Married unions are supposed to provide a stable, 
nurturing environment for raising children, if there are children, but having children (or wanting 
children) is plainly not the primary purpose of marriage.  Recent legal decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court have increasingly underscored the lack of centrality of childbearing and 
childrearing to the current conception of marriage in the United States.6  Of greater importance is 
5 Hereinafter I will refer to H’s western conception of marriage simply as ‘conception’ or 
‘marriage’ or ‘conception of marriage,’ unless the context requires more specificity. 
 
6 There is a long line of contemporary United States Supreme Court cases that underscore 
this fact, which begins most notably with Griswold v. Connecticut and continues with recent 
same-sex marriage rights cases, such as United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges.  
Childrearing, though not directly important as a matter of law, was nevertheless empirically 
important in recent same sex marriage cases:  the Court found no empirical data that could show 
a meaningful difference between the well-being of children raised in same-sex families and 
children raised in heterosexual families.  This finding was pivotal to the Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis and the resulting conclusion that states had no compelling interest in 
restricting marriage to heterosexual unions.  So even though there is little support as a matter of 
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the idea that marriage involves an intimate, reciprocal relationship between two people.  Each is 
to be to the other a friend, a companion, a confidante, a lover, a helpmate.  They are to be 
partners, who will assist the other through life’s vicissitudes, who will stay with the other in 
sickness and in health, in plenty and in want.  The marriage contract is supposed to formalize 
and, as such, help satisfy human needs for intimacy, care, companionship, and sex.  It provides a 
public forum for expressing love and commitment, and in the process supposedly transforms that 
love into something more durable.7   
The foregoing is an overview of the interrelated purposes of the current western 
conception of marriage in its public dimension.  In H’s examination he will find that many of 
these interrelated purposes are associated with principles that both support these purposes and 
express the values that undergird them.  For example, one purpose of marriage is to form a life-
long attachment to a single partner because it is believed there is value in two people having this 
sort of enduring relationship.8  The legally binding marriage contract is meant to strengthen the 
law for the idea that the right to marry is tied up with the ability or desire to have or to raise 
children, the empirical data involving the rearing of children was central, for example, to the 
Court’s decision in Windsor to overturn a central part of the Defense of Marriage Act.  
 
7 See the last chapter of J. S. Mill’s Subjection of Women. 
 
8 In non-western conceptions of marriage, this is not always the case.  For example, 
polygynous conceptions of marriage do not emphasize a single wife for the husband.  Clearly, 
marriage need not be conceived (nor practiced) as a purely diametric or two-place relationship.  
Polygynous conceptions will involve principles that promote values in partnering other than 
those tied up with exclusive coupledom.  For example, the Senegalese Family Code stipulates 
that if a man chooses polygyny, he “can have no more than four wives concurrently” (United 
Nations).  The upper limit to the number of wives can be seen as a principled expression of the 
need to find a balance between the value of having many offspring and the value of not being 
economically overstretched.  In a recent working paper on discrimination against women, the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner questions whether polygyny succeeds in this 
regard (United Nations). 
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life-long bond and to buttress it against life’s vicissitudes.  The prohibition on divorce is meant 
to further strengthen the bond, and even if the traditional prohibition on divorce has weakened, 
the illegality of spousal abandonment and gross neglect has not.  It is wrong to abandon one’s 
spouse (in fact, it is grounds for divorce).  The prohibition on adultery also is meant to strengthen 
the bond by supporting sexual intimacy through an exclusive, life-long sexual relationship.9  
Principles such as ‘do not commit adultery,’ ‘do not divorce,’ and ‘do not neglect or abandon a 
spouse’ are all meant to foster conduct that will help spouses sustain an enduring attachment.  As 
such, each principle is an expression of the value of doing so.  
What H is doing when he reflects on the relevant conception of marriage—its purposes, 
principles, and values—is reflecting on an ideal, specifically, as I shall call it, the ‘ideal of 
marital fidelity.’10  The ideal articulates that which a marriage, ideally, aims at and exemplifies.  
A preliminary articulation of the ideal of marital fidelity can be drawn directly from its complex 
and interrelated purposes:  in the ideal,11 marriage is a life-long, sexually exclusive, reciprocal 
relationship between two people in which each is to the other a friend, companion, confidante, 
9 Again, this is not always the case in non-western conceptions of marriage.  See previous 
footnote.  Nor is it the case in some western conceptions of marriage in the “private dimension.”  
See the story of Jim and Anna Marie Will’s marriage in People.  They describe their marriage as 
happy, loving, and sexual.  The husband identifies as gay;  the wife as heterosexual;  and they 
stay married “not for [our child],” says the wife, “we stay married because we love each other” 
(Jerome et al. 81-2). 
 
10 I will use ‘marital fidelity’ or ‘ideal of marriage’ to refer to the ideal that H is 
considering.  As per footnote five, I will use ‘marriage’ or ‘conception of marriage’ or 
‘conception’ to refer to the western conception I attribute to H.  When I do not adhere to this 
distinction it should be clear from the context whether I am referring to the ideal or the 
conception.  
 
11 Again, this is indexed to the relevant western conception of marriage on which H is 
reflecting. 
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lover, helpmate, and partner, who will assist and care for the other throughout their lives in a 
bond that is resilient enough to endure whatever alterations or hardships in circumstances might 
develop.  The articulation of the ideal includes not only these interrelated purposes, but also 
familiar principles like ‘do not commit adultery,’ ‘do not divorce,’ ‘do not neglect or abandon a 
spouse.’  The relationship between such principles and the ideal is dialogic.  Getting clear about 
the ideal of marital fidelity can help H understand its value and how the associated principles 
help express it.  And getting clear about the associated principles, and the values they express, 
can help H understand the ideal of marital fidelity.  Thus, in H’s endeavor to see things aright, he 
takes up as a point of reflection the ideal of marriage, some of which is articulated in terms of 
principles.  As H works out the ideal of marriage, he will find that its purposes and associated 
principles are an outgrowth or expression of values that a marriage is meant to exemplify.  The 
ideal regulates H’s reflections, because his task, in reflection, is to consider how best to 
exemplify marital fidelity in his relationship with W.12 
As soon as we try to describe the ideal of marriage, we see that surely there is no 
marriage that can exemplify it without ever deviating or falling short.  Even though the ideal may 
never be attainable, it articulates that to which a marriage aspires, that toward which it aims.  
12 In Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of Riggs v. Palmer is helpful 
for understanding how principles can regulate.  In Riggs a grandson murdered his grandfather 
before the grandfather can alter his will and disinherit the grandson.  A suit was brought to 
prevent the grandson from inheriting.  In his defense, the grandson argued that because the will 
was valid, he should inherit, even though he was guilty of the murder.  The New York Court of 
Appeals agreed that the will was valid, but in ruling against the grandson, the court found that 
the statute of wills was not decisive and that principles of law must be considered alongside the 
statue.  Specifically, the court relied heavily on the principle ‘no man may profit from his own 
wrong,’ which, as Dworkin points out, does not “purport to set out conditions that make its 
application necessary” (27).  Riggs v. Palmer is evidence of how principles can have regulative 
force and must be taken into account even when they do not apply subsumptively or 
presumptively. 
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The ideal is aspirational because what it articulates is not static or the sort of thing that is 
achievable once-and-for-all.  For example, one dimension of marital fidelity is the provision of 
companionship, which finds expression in the principle ‘do not desert a marriage by neglect or 
abandonment.’  But while we seek perfection in companionship, it is not the kind of perfection of 
a process that can go from ‘not being done’ to ‘being done,’ as with for example, a perfect 
backflip.  It is not as though a spouse can complete the task, check it off the list, and move on to 
some other project.  The provision of companionship is akin to what John McDowell in “Some 
Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology” calls a “standing concern” (30).  Standing concerns can 
be thought of as on-going ends, as opposed to ends that have a finite completion point.  
Furthermore, the term ‘on-going end’ should not be understood to suggest there is a ‘means-end’ 
relationship between the ideal and its associated principles, such that if H followed the principle 
forbidding adultery, he would thereby achieve the aspect of marital fidelity that concerns sexual 
intimacy.  The point is that the ideal, including its principles, articulate the standing concerns that 
spouses should seek always to exemplify in their actions.  It is in this sense that an ideal and its 
associated principles articulate standing concerns or on-going ends.  As expressions of on-going 
ends, principles like ‘do not neglect or abandon a spouse’ articulate part of the content of marital 
fidelity.   
The ultimate point I am making with the example of H is that the conception of marital 
fidelity occupying his reflections is an overarching ideal.  The ideal articulates the good toward 
which a marriage ideally aims and which it ideally exemplifies.  Its articulation is tied to the 
interrelated purposes of marriage and includes moral principles like ‘do not commit adultery,’ 
‘do not divorce,’ and ‘do not neglect or abandon a spouse.’  The ideal is regulative, and it is 
aspirational.  It is regulative because it represents the enduring good that spouses aim to 
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exemplify in their conduct.  It is aspirational because striving to exemplify the ideal is on-going 
and endlessly perfectible. 
4.4 PRINCIPLES AND IDEAL-BASED REASONING 
As soon as H reflects on the ideal, he is face-to-face with some basic principles:  ‘do not commit 
adultery,’ ‘do not divorce,’ ‘do not neglect or abandon a spouse,’ ‘love and care for your spouse 
in sickness and in health, until death do you part,’ and so on.  If H did not understand that these 
obligations come with being married, it would have to be said that H has misunderstood what 
marriage is (since I attribute to him a standard western conception).  Not only are such principles 
a likely starting point for his reflections, but H would be obtuse if the principle against adultery 
never occurred to him in the course of his reflections.  Once it does, the matter would seem to be 
settled against him:  adultery is prohibited.  But H’s question is whether sexual fidelity is 
required in his case.  Of course, if H divorced W and married O, he would not be committing 
adultery, but then he would have to substitute the question of whether divorce is acceptable in his 
case and begin his reflections anew.   
In any event, after H gets clear about marital fidelity and what marriage ideally aims to 
be, he must determine how the ideal relates to his current situation.  How is the ideal of marital 
fidelity pertinent to his and W’s situation now?  Determining how it relates to his current 
circumstances, and in what manner and to what degree (both of which will be shaped by those 
purposes which were relevant before W’s illness), will have H considering such questions as 
these:  Is providing care and comfort for his spouse pertinent in his circumstances?  Is providing 
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companionship pertinent?  Is providing friendship pertinent?  Is monogamy?  Is insuring the 
financial security of his spouse?  How relevant is the fact that there is a marriage contract?   
To gain further clarity about whether his relationship with O is morally appropriate or 
wrongly self-gratifying, H also will have to examine the history of his and W’s marriage so as to 
work out the more personal and individualized understanding he and W shared and developed 
over the course of their relationship together.  That is, he will have to examine not only the 
public dimension of marital fidelity, but also his and W’s specific, personal understanding of it, 
including the significance of, among other things, sexual fidelity, their marriage vows, their 
views on friendship, love, and intimacy and their understanding of how to best fulfill these 
central components of the marital relationship.   
Reflecting on the more personal dimension of the ideal of marital fidelity could have H 
considering such questions as:  Did they ever express their wishes about remaining sexually 
faithful in the event one of them became seriously ill?  What were their thoughts about the 
permissibility of sexual relations outside of marriage?  Did they ever discuss open marriage?  
Did they have an open marriage?  Were either of them jealous of the other’s relationships outside 
the marriage?  What were their thoughts about the permissibility of divorce?  Did they embrace 
or reject certain social or religious prohibitions on divorce?  How did they regard the status of 
their marital vows?  Did they write their own vows?  Did they use traditional, scripted vows after 
careful consideration or merely as an expedient?  Did they place weight on the fact that they 
were bound by law to one another?   
So how might H’s reflections unfold?  According to the ideal of marital fidelity, marriage 
aims to be a relationship of multifaceted intimacy, including reciprocity in friendship, emotional 
support and companionship, and sexual intimacy.  None of these fundamental intimacies is 
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straight-forwardly pertinent to his and W’s circumstances now.  Along with a diminishment in 
all manner of possibilities for intimacy, the sexual dimension of H and W’s intimacy simply is 
no longer possible.  Although H is committed to the ideal of marriage, the sort of love and 
intimacy that is bound up in sexual exclusivity is no longer attainable.  H simply cannot 
exemplify this aspect of the ideal in his marriage to W, and he would have to conclude that 
trying to attain it with W is futile.  While H retains his commitment to the ideal of marriage, 
there is a wide range of human connection that is impossible to achieve and futile to work 
toward.  In these respects the ideal no longer speaks to H and his marriage to W.  Sexual (as well 
as other) intimacy is no longer an on-going end that H can exemplify in his relation with W.  The 
principle prohibiting adultery nevertheless has an on-going connection to the ideal of marriage 
(so long as the conception does not change), but the underlying value that the principle expresses 
is not one that H, in his circumstances, has even a hope of exemplifying in his relationship with 
W.  As such, that which is valuable about sexual fidelity in marriage is not a value that H can 
exemplify in his relationship with W. 
It could be argued that if H were really concerned to stay true to the ideal of marriage, he 
would not have a sexual relationship with O, even though its emotional sustenance makes him 
better able to care for W.  But if sex and sexual intimacy can be a valuable component in adult 
companionship, as the ideal of marital fidelity itself suggests, then H might justifiably conclude 
that it is a good that continues to be central to his well-being.  The ideal of marital fidelity is not 
essentially a “master principle.”  The ideal of marriage can overlap, for example, with ideals that 
pertain to adult friendship and companionship.  Even if H’s relationship with O made no 
difference to his ability to care for W, these other ideals bear on his case, and they support his 
relationship with O because he can exemplify them in his relationship with her.  Moreover, 
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attempting to exemplify with W the kind of intimacy that is fostered through sex is not only not 
possible with W, but an attempt by H to achieve it might even be wrong.13   
On these grounds, H might conclude that his sexual relationship with O is not wrong—
because sexual fidelity is tied up with a marital aim that is unattainable in his situation and so is 
not an aspect of the ideal that his marriage to W has any hope of exemplifying.  Of course, it is 
true that H would not be wrong to insist on a platonic friendship with O.  My point is that it is 
not wrong for him not to, so long as H aims to exemplify such aspects of marital fidelity as he 
can.  
H can and should aim to exemplify other dimensions of marital fidelity in his relationship 
with W.  In his reflections, H will likely find that the ideal of marriage (in both its public and 
personal dimension) which is pertinent (or speaks) to his current circumstances concerns 
providing care, comfort, and support in times of need.  The significance of this aspect of the ideal 
bears heavily in his marriage:  W cannot care for herself to any degree, and her needs are 
extreme.  For a number of reasons, including the sheer fact of having made a commitment to be 
the one who will be there through thick and thin, we can imagine that H finds caretaking to be an 
aspect of marital fidelity with resounding relevance.  If so, he concludes that he must provide all 
13 In Matthew Thomas’s novel We Are Not Ourselves, we get a glimpse into the sporadic 
sexual relationship between a wife and her Alzheimer-afflicted husband.  The wife initiates the 
sexual contact, while the husband, utterly passive, appears both disarmed by and detached from 
the physical outcome of the act.  Each time, it is as if he is experiencing sex for the first time, 
without any understanding of who is doing what to him or what it is happening to his body.  It is 
never clear why the wife initiates a sexual encounter.  Is she paying homage to their sexual past?  
Is she attempting to create a shadowy connection, however limited, through sexual contact?  Is it 
her way of taking care of him, by giving him pleasure?  If so, it is not clear that pleasure is what 
the husband experiences.  Is it a self-interested act for her own sexual pleasure?  Or does she 
enjoy having power over him?  Does she find gratification in the novelty of his perplexed 
response?  Regardless, their sexual encounters highlight the contrast between sexual intimacy in 
the ideal and what is possible for Thomas’s characters—and by extension what is possible for H 
and W. 
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the care and support he can in all the ways that are still available to him.  He might also conclude 
that maintaining the legal bond is an important aspect of marital fidelity, not just because of his 
marital vow but also as an expedient for caring for W (e.g., expedients such as legal guarantees 
of a spouse’s right to make healthcare decisions, a spouse’s right to visit, etc.).  So while divorce 
would release him from adultery, H surely would find that it would interfere in numerous ways 
with his efforts to exemplify marital fidelity in what remains of the relationship he can have with 
W.  So, H does not divorce W.  Instead, he takes special pains to affirm his relationship with her.  
He continues to keep their family home and their landline;  he lists their number in the directory 
at work, even though he lives with O.   
4.4.1 Ideals, principles, and subsumptivism 
H’s various actions—his rejecting divorce, his caretaking visits, his keeping the house and listing 
the phone number—each is an exemplification of the ideal of marital fidelity.  However, 
according to the ideal-based account of generality, these actions of H exemplify the ideal of 
marital fidelity not because they are necessitated by a subsumptive application of a moral 
principle.  (We will subsequently examine whether or not they exemplify the ideal on 
presumptivist grounds.)  Actions like the first two exemplify dimensions of the ideal expressed 
by principles ordinarily associated with marriage and would seem to be deductively required by 
familiar principles prohibiting divorce and requiring care and support.  However, H is not in the 
right because the rightness of his conduct is deductively entailed by a subsumptive application 
of, for example, ‘do not divorce’ or ‘care for your spouse in sickness and in health.’  If this were 
the way principles functioned, then we would have to say that H is in the wrong with respect to 
the principle against adultery.   
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There are two particularly interesting facets of H’s circumstances.  The first is that H’s 
relationship with O, which involves adultery, enables him to be a better caretaker of W, which in 
turn makes him better able to exemplify marital fidelity, especially that aspect expressed by the 
principle ‘do not neglect or abandon one’s spouse.’  The second is that H could easily make the 
problem of adultery disappear simply by divorcing W.  However, divorcing W would make 
caring for her logistically and legally much more difficult for H, and it symbolically connotes a 
weaker, less caring relationship.  Both of these are good reasons to conclude that H’s adultery is 
not wrong.  Subsumptivism, however, simply cannot make sense of this conclusion—because it 
cannot handle the moral complexity of H’s case.  According to the ideal-based account of 
generality, the reason H is in the right is two-pronged:  H can no longer exemplify with W that 
part of the ideal that concerns sexual intimacy, and H continues to exemplify that part of the 
ideal that is still possible with W. 
Keeping the house and listing the phone number also exemplify the ideal of marital 
fidelity, even though the ideal is not expressed in terms of any specific moral principle requiring 
them.  There are no ordinary general moral principles that say ‘if a spouse falls sick, then keep 
the family home’ or ‘list your family landline at work.’  Even though, strictly speaking, neither 
keeping the house nor listing the landline falls under a familiar moral principle, they nevertheless 
are concrete exemplifications of H’s enduring connection to W.  These actions exemplify care 
for and connection to W,14 and they are more personal ways in which H is able to exemplify the 
14 Preserving the connection to W might be important to H, not just because of W’s 
needs, but also because of his own, a possibility illustrated in Alice Crary’s discussion in Inside 
Ethics of Iris Murdoch’s husband John Bayley.  Just as Crary describes Bayley as “called on to 
do as much as he can to—in a phrase of Hilde Lindemann’s—‘hold her in her identity,’” H might 
feel called on to help W hold onto as much of her identity as is still possible for her (144, 
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values that underlie the principle against neglecting or abandoning one’s spouse.  They, 
therefore, exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity, and H is in the right to do these things, but it is 
not subsumptivism that makes it so. 
If H found that the ideal was pertinent (or spoke) to his circumstances in some other way, 
then his conclusion might well be otherwise.  We can imagine circumstances in which H’s 
careful consideration of the relation between the ideal of marital fidelity and his situation 
resulted in a different conclusion about the pertinence of sexual fidelity.  For example, H or W 
might have been especially jealous of other relationships, or they might have had an 
understanding that sexual infidelity was something they would never tolerate in the other no 
matter what transpired, including severe illness.  Under either of these circumstances, H might 
well have decided that the mutual understanding he and W had of the role of sexual fidelity in 
their marriage continued to make it an aspect of the ideal of marital fidelity that is pertinent or 
integral to their marriage despite W’s incapacity.  If so, he would (let us assume) modify his 
conduct so as to exemplify this aspect of the ideal.  He would end his sexual relationship with O 
and might even conclude that further curtailments of their relationship were required to 
exemplify marital fidelity to W.  
On either scenario—whether H does or does not find that adultery is wrong—the 
underlying point remains the same:  the aspects of the ideal of marital fidelity that are pertinent 
to H’s situation will determine which concerns, or on-going ends, have prominence.  The 
example of H and W demonstrates that as H works out both the public and the personal 
dimensions of the ideal of marital fidelity—those which are practically feasible, as well as those 
footnote omitted).  For example, helping W hold onto some part of her identity could in turn help 
H hold onto part of his identity as a husband, as a caretaker, etc. 
  122 
                                                                                                                                                             
which are not and those to which he might only be able to gesture—the principles that express 
these aims are alive in his thinking.  But not in the way the subsumptivist thinks they are.   
As long as H’s and W’s situation is more like the first scenario than the second (in which 
there are further considerations against adultery), then there is good reason to think that the 
subsumptive application of the principle ‘do not commit adultery’ gives the incorrect verdict in 
H’s case.  H is not worthy of blame for his relationship with O, although a subsumptive 
application of ‘do not commit adultery’ says otherwise.  But if this is true, if the subsumptive 
application yields an incorrect verdict, then is it not the case that the particularist is correct to 
conclude that the principle forbidding adultery is false?  The ideal-based account of generality 
holds that the particularist’s conclusion is incorrect.  The principle forbidding adultery is not 
false.   
The principle is true, but not, as the particularist argues, on condition that it be recast as a 
“reminder,”15 “a rule of thumb,”16 or a summary17 of past instances of choiceworthy conduct.  A 
principle is not a reminder—it is not like a ‘Post-It’ on the refrigerator that says ‘don’t forget to 
pick up the kids after hockey practice.’  H does not make a mental Note-to-Self:  ‘don’t forget 
15 Dancy develops this idea in Moral Reasons (67). 
 
16 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (68).  
 
17 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (73).  At times Nussbaum 
seems to equate summaries with rules of thumb, as when she writes that “summaries or rules of 
thumb [are] highly useful for a variety of purposes, but valid only to the extent to which they 
correctly describe good concrete judgments, and [are] to be assessed, ultimately, against these” 
(68).  It is worth noting that he two they are different.  A rule of thumb is something that offers 
guidance;  it tells us what to do, though in a generally-and-for-the-most-part way.  A rule of 
thumb is easily overridden, but it does carry normative force.  A summary is an empirical 
statement describing past (correct) judgments.  By itself, a summary does not tell us what to do, 
but only what has been done. 
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that adultery might be wrong’ or ‘don’t forget you might not ought to commit adultery.’18  The 
principle expresses a value to be grasped, not a task to which one must be alerted.  Nor is the 
principle a rule of thumb19 to be jettisoned, like Smart’s revised Nautical Almanac, if it does not 
suit current conditions.20  The principle forbidding adultery is not a “dispensable crutch.”21  
Finally, it is not a mere summary22 or record of what has been choiceworthy in the past.  What 
the principle expresses is something on-going:  an on-going value in the ideal of marital fidelity.  
According to the ideal-based account of generality, principled articulations of the ideal do 
not apply subsumptively.  Subsumptivism produces morally implausible results.  For example, a 
subsumptive application of ‘do not commit adultery’ yields a morally suspect verdict about H’s 
behavior.  The question remains, however, about whether such principles apply presumptively. 
18 The absurdity of this formulation is brought out in George Saunders’s story “The 
Semplica-Girl Diaries” in his book Tenth of December:  Stories.  
 
19 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (68). 
 
20 In section three of “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” J. J. C. Smart imagines a 
variation on the Nautical Almanac example that John Stuart Mill gives in Utilitarianism 
(Utilitarianism 24).  Unlike Mill’s Nautical Almanac, Smart’s imaginary almanac is only 90% 
accurate at giving sailors their location at sea.  As such, the nautical location tables represent 
rules of thumb to be jettisoned when there is time to make an actual calculation to determine the 
sailors’ exact location.  
 
21 This is Dancy’s characterization in Ethics without Principles (142). 
 
22 This is Nussbaum’s characterization in Love’s Knowledge (73).   
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4.4.2 Ideals, principles, and presumptivism 
The presumptivist says that the principle forbidding adultery tells us that adultery is always 
tainting or worse-making—a fact which must be put into the equation of pros and cons that count 
for and against any of H’s actions to which the property ‘adulterous’ could be ascribed. 23   
How might such an equation be formulated in H’s case?  Let us continue to suppose that 
H is able to care for W with greater devotion than he would be able to if he did not have the 
emotional sustenance he gets from his relationship with O.  Suppose also that H is trying to 
decide which action is morally superior:  an action of genuinely devoted care toward W that is 
“facilitated” by adultery or a less genuinely devoted action that is not.  Suppose the presumptivist 
finds that on balance the former act is morally superior to the latter, but according to the 
presumptivist, it nevertheless is defective.  In other words, according to the presumptivist, even 
though the adulterous care-taking is on balance the right action for H to perform, the action is not 
23 Sometimes Dancy refers to F-properties, e.g., adultery or theft, not as worse-making 
but as “wrong-making” (Moral Reasons 99).  But, to be clear, Dancy’s understanding of this 
presumptive form of generalism (which in Moral Reasons he calls ‘Generalism 2’) does not hold 
that the presence of such an F-property makes the act to which it applies necessarily wrong.  
According to Dancy, what it tells us is that there is a presumption that the action is wrong and 
that even if the act (to which F can be ascribed) is ultimately right, it is still tainted or worse than 
it otherwise would be;  it is defective to the extent that it is F.  Even if the ultimate computation 
leads us to the conclusion that the action is right, it is not purely right.  In short, F is always 
worse-making.  The fallacy in this version of generalism, according to Dancy, is that properties 
like F are not invariably worse-making or tainting or defect-inflicting.  I am not convinced 
Dancy’s interpretation is correct, but according to Dancy, Generalism 2 is essentially an 
interpretation of Ross’s idea of prima facie duty.  Ross argues that when an action can be 
characterized by more than one prima facie duty, the determination of whether an act is right or 
wrong, is a matter of considered judgment. As far as I can tell, Ross does not characterize 
‘considered judgment’ in terms of weighing the moral valence of properties that are invariably 
worse-making and properties that are invariably better-making.  He speaks only of prima facie 
duties resting on circumstances of moral significance.  He does not say they rest on 
circumstances that possess a certain invariable sort of moral significance (e.g., always worse-
making).  See also footnote six in chapter two. 
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as good as it would be if H were not committing adultery.  It possesses a defect because the 
adultery counts against it.  The adultery is worse-making, even though the adulterous care-taking 
is not on balance wrong. 
The foregoing example takes for granted that any act of genuinely devoted caretaking 
(which is made possible in the context of H’s relationship with O) must be balanced against the 
taint of adultery.  Yet, if we take more care in our formulation of the presumptivist’s equation, 
we begin to see how difficult it actually is to understand how the caretaking and adultery are 
supposed to be related to one another in the presumptivist’s calculations.  In what way is the 
adultery actually wrong-making?  How are we to identify the discrete actions that are “up” for 
evaluation?  Are we to think that each act of adultery with O counts against one or all acts of 
genuine care toward W?  How bizarre to weigh them against each other.24   
Indeed, the presumptivist’s weighing technique yields bizarre conclusions.  For example, 
if W were dead, then an act of caretaking by H (e.g., laying flowers on W’s grave) would be 
morally superior to a similar act of caretaking (e.g., bringing flowers to W’s bed side when she is 
alive) because upon W’s death H’s relationship with O is no longer adulterous.  Would that then 
mean that H’s subsequent sexual relations with O are morally superior to those when W is alive?   
Similar bizarre results would occur if H divorced W.  H could continue caring for W and 
conducting his relationship with O in exactly the same fashion, altering none of his behavior 
except that now he and W are divorced.  He would be free of the adultery, while doing exactly 
the same thing.  Would that make H’s subsequent acts of genuine caretaking toward W less 
24 It is akin to the problem faced by the utilitarian when she attempts to determine which 
act on balance will lead to utility maximization.  Which acts should she consider?  How should 
she characterize them?  How many links in the chain of consequences should she attempt to 
predict?  An act that looks to be utility maximizing now might actually be utility diminishing in 
its longer range effects, and so forth. 
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wrong (that is, better) than H’s adulterous, pre-divorce genuine acts of caretaking?  Why not 
think there is something morally superior in H’s continuing to stay married to W, even though he 
has a relationship with O that is more like a true marriage than his marriage to W?  Why not 
think that there is something gallant in H’s staying married to W, despite his relationship with O, 
and that this brings greater moral value to his genuine acts of caretaking toward W?  If it does 
bring greater value, is the worsening effect of his adultery thereby diminished (as per 
presumptivism)?  Honoring W with flowers exemplifies an important dimension of the ideal of 
marital fidelity, whether W is dead or alive.  Providing W with heartfelt care exemplifies marital 
fidelity, whether H remains technically married to W or not.  It seems absurd for the 
presumptivist to maintain that the moral superiority of these actions could rise if W dies or if H 
divorces W.  
The example of H shows that it is possible to give a plausible account of his conduct 
according to which, contra the presumptivist, adultery is not worse-making.  According to the 
ideal-based account of generality, we do not need to speak about H’s conduct in the pejorative 
terms invited by presumptivism.  The question of the morality of H’s conduct does not lend itself 
to a tallying of Fs that are wrong-making (e.g., the property of being an act of adultery) and Fs 
that are good-making (e.g., the property of being an act of genuine caretaking).  In fact, 
evaluating H’s conduct in presumptivist terms yields such bizarre results that the need to look for 
alternatives to presumptivism feels pressing.25  
25 We saw similarly strange results in the treatment of the rationality of regret in section 
2.3 of chapter two. 
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4.4.3 Defectiveness and imperfection 
A first step to finding an alternative requires pushing back against presumptivism’s insistence on 
the claim that there are F-properties that are always worse-making.  For the presumptivist, any 
action that can be described as a violation of a moral principle is to some degree tainted or 
defective—terms which, for the presumptivist, entail that the agent, who performs the defective 
act, is to some degree blameworthy for having done so.  This claim is the ultimate cause of 
presumptivism’s bizarre results, and therefore, it must be rejected.  Why think that H’s conduct 
toward W is defective, blameworthy, or the worse for the absence of sexual fidelity, as the 
presumptivist believes?  According to the ideal-based account of generality, imperfection—
falling short of the ideal—does not necessarily entail defectiveness in H’s conduct or in H’s 
marriage to W. 
Consider the common marketplace disclaimer that certain imperfections are not to be 
considered defects due to the nature of the materials involved.  The disclaimer relies on the 
assumption that certain imperfections do not constitute defects, because there is nowhere to lay 
blame for the defect.  For example, in the very production of objects (often handmade) so-called 
imperfections will arise, but we do not consider these defects, because they are not the result of 
someone’s acting carelessly or in some other blameworthy fashion.  There will be color 
variations in tanned goods or ceramic glazes, but the artisans are not to blame.  As Aristotle 
might say, such imperfections are in the nature of the thing.  
A similar idea can be extended to H’s marriage.  Both sexual and non-sexual 
companionship are no longer possible for H and W, but no one is to blame.  It is not through the 
bad behavior of H or W that sexual, as well as non-sexual, companionship has become 
impossible.  People fall ill;  people age;  people lose certain capacities.  That’s life, not a defect.  
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Their marriage can no longer exemplify that dimension of marital fidelity pertaining to 
friendship and sexual and non-sexual companionship.  The marriage is imperfect, but it is not 
defective.  No one is to blame.  We might say W has a physiological defect, namely, a buildup in 
the brain of beta amyloid and tau, which causes her Alzheimer’s, makes her incapable of 
companionship, and creates a far from ideal marriage.  Clearly, this is not a moral defect.  Again, 
no one is to blame.  Therefore, according to the ideal-based account of generality, it is wrong to 
say that H’s conduct is defective, and likewise wrong to say that H’s marriage is defective.   
4.4.4 Inadequacies in subsumptivism and presumptivism 
The predicament for the presumptivist is as serious as the subsumptivist’s.  Neither view can 
make sense of the plausibility of the conclusion that H’s adultery is neither wrong, nor even 
worse-making—because neither view can handle the moral complexity of H’s circumstances.  
The subsumptivist cannot account for the puzzle that arises in H’s case, i.e., that his adultery is 
not wrong.  The presumptivist cannot forestall the contorted thinking that comes with its 
insistence that H’s adultery is always worse-making.   
4.5 TWO DISTINCTIONS 
The ideal-based account of generality rejects the problematic interpretation of principles that 
creates a predicament for subsumptivists and presumptivists alike.26  The rejection turns on two 
26 In section 4.7, we will see in greater detail that this same interpretation of principles 
creates a predicament for the particularist, as well. 
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distinctions out of which emerge the conception of generality advanced by the ideal-based 
account.  The first is a distinction between two types of subsumptivism.  The second is between 
two types of propositions.  We will consider each in turn. 
4.5.1 Absolute subsumptivism and contextual subsumptivism 
Absolute subsumptivism is understood along traditional syllogistic lines.  According to this view, 
subsumption involves bringing a particular case under a rule or principle.  The principle—or 
major premise, as it is often called—takes the form of ‘if F, then M.’  The act of subsuming is 
expressed in the minor premise, the proposition that F.  In H’s reflections, when he brings the 
principle prohibiting adultery to bear on his case, he recognizes that his case falls under the 
principle ‘adultery is wrong.’  The ideal-based account of generality has no problem saying that 
what H is doing is subsuming his case under a principle.  Its dispute lies in the answer to the 
question of what happens next:  what does the principle say?  The traditional syllogistic view 
insists that if a case is subsumed under a principle, then the principle absolutely must apply.  
That is why the ideal-based account calls the traditional view absolute subsumptivism.  For the 
absolute subsumptivist, there is no debate about the question of what the principle says.  The 
answer is ‘M.’  The proposition ‘if F, then M’ applies, absolutely, just in virtue of the 
subsumption.  It is at this juncture that the ideal-based account of generality breaks with 
generalists and finds commonality with particularists. 
Particularists deliver a compelling argument against the existence of invariable moral 
relations of the sort ‘if the instantiation of F, then M’ for all situations;  the case of H itself 
provides reasons for doubting their existence.  While the ideal-based account of generality sees 
merit in the particularists’ argument against the existence of invariable moral relations, it 
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nevertheless declines to side with the particularist in concluding that, therefore, the possibility of 
principles is foreclosed.  General moral principles are possible, insists the ideal-based account of 
generality—and not just as watered down reminders, rules of thumb, or summaries!  The 
generalist might find this aspect of the ideal-based account of generality especially vexing 
because, for the generalist, the existence of invariable relations of the sort ‘if the instantiation of 
F, then M’ and subsumptivism go hand-in-hand with the possibility of moral principles.   
We can imagine the generalist reasoning as follows:   
  
If there is such a thing as a principle, then subsumptivism must be true, and the truth of 
subsumptivism depends on the existence of invariable moral relations.  How can the 
ideal-based account of generality intelligibly maintain talk of principles while rejecting 
the existence of the underlying invariable relations presupposed by subsumptivism?  In 
other words, if the ideal-based account of generality doubts the existence of invariable 
moral relations, then it must reject subsumptivism;  and if it must reject subsumptivism, 
how can it plausibly argue for the existence of moral principles?   
 
The response to this line of questions is that the ideal-based account of generality does embrace 
subsumptivism—but not the traditional syllogistic or absolute version.  It develops an alternative 
called contextual subsumptivism, which departs from generalism’s traditional, absolutist 
understanding of subsumption.  According to contextual subsumptivism, H does in fact subsume 
his case under the principle against adultery, but the subsumption is not syllogistic;  it is not 
absolute.  Instead of treating the principle as applying absolutely in the traditional syllogistic 
manner, the ideal-based account of generality offers a different explanation of the way in which 
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the subsumption figures in H’s thinking.  The ideal-based account construes the judgment that 
ensues after the subsumption in terms of a mediated application of the principle—mediation that 
involves reflective engagement with the relevant ideal along with the wider context of its related 
principles and purposes.   
Contextual subsumptivism gives a name to the complex process of reasoning from which 
H’s judgment results.  However, before we can say more about contextual subsumptivism, we 
must examine the way in which the distinction between absolute subsumptivism and contextual 
subsumptivism is intertwined with another distinction that emerges from the ideal-based account 
of generality, a distinction between two types of propositions.  
4.5.2 Invariable propositions and unvarying propositions 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, we must distinguish between propositions 
that are invariable in their application and propositions that are unvarying in their relation to the 
ideal.  Each type of proposition represents a different way of understanding principles.  In 
ordinary usage, principles have the form of commands:  ‘do F’ or ‘do not do F.’  Their 
corollaries, respectively, are:  ‘F is right’ or ‘F is wrong.’  Often the forms are used 
interchangeably.  Instead of saying ‘do not do F,’ we say ‘F is wrong’ and mean the same thing.  
When we use the second formulation to invoke a principle we seem to be recasting the principle 
as a proposition with the form ‘all Fs are M,’ where M is a term like ‘right’ or ‘moral’ or ‘good.’  
According to the ideal-based account of generality there are two ways to understand a ‘principle 
qua proposition’ like ‘all Fs are M’ or ‘all Fs are not M,’  either as a proposition that is invariable 
in its application or as a proposition that is unvarying in its relation to an ideal.  A proposition 
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that is invariable in its application, i.e., an invariable proposition, is a proposition that has the 
form ‘all Fs are M’ and claims that for any instantiation of F, then M.  
If a principle is understood as an invariable proposition, then the principle states that for 
every case that can be subsumed under it, the action it prescribes should be performed.  The idea 
is that any subsumption of a case under a principle is necessarily a case of absolute 
subsumptivism, and the action prescribed by the principle should be performed.  Thinking of 
principles as propositions that are invariable in their application goes hand-in-hand with absolute 
subsumptivism.  Because absolute subsumptivism stipulates that principles apply absolutely, we 
can say that the absolute subsumptivist understands principles as propositions that are invariable 
in their application.  
According to the ideal-based account of generality, principles should not be understood 
in this manner.  Rather, they should be understood as propositions that are unvarying in their 
relation to the ideal.  A proposition that is unvarying in its relation to the ideal, i.e., an 
‘unvarying proposition,’ has the same form ‘all Fs are M,’ but it does not make the same claim as 
an invariable proposition;  it does not purport to claim that for any instantiation of F, then M.  
According to the ideal-based account, principles are unvarying propositions because they possess 
an unvarying connection to the ideal.  What they express is implied in, for example, the ideal of 
marriage, and as such, they articulate a dimension of the ideal.27  Although ideals are stable, they 
27 To reiterate a point made earlier, I do not mean with this talk of the ideal to suggest 
that there is only one possible expression of the ideal of marriage;  rather I mean only to refer to 
the ideal to which H aspires in his conduct and appeals to in his evaluations of it.  In other words, 
I take H to be working with a specific ideal:  the predominate conception of his western culture, 
which ex hypothesi he accepts and which he understands through the filter of his and W’s own 
interpretation of how the ideal figures (or figured) in their particular union.  There are of course 
other cultures or subcultures or traditions with very different ideals of marriage any of which 
could just as easily have been drawn on to develop the example of H.  
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can and do change.  The associated principles might change as well, but to the extent the ideal is 
stable, the connection between it and its associated principles is unvarying.  For example, 
according to (the western conception of) the ideal of marriage, ‘do not divorce,’ ‘do not commit 
adultery,’ and ‘do not neglect or abandon a spouse’ are unvarying because the substantive 
content they express gives voice to the on-going and unvarying aims of marriage in the ideal. 
Understanding principles as unvarying propositions is central to understanding the idea of 
contextual subsumptivism advanced by the ideal-based account.  A case might be subsumable 
under a principle, but when the principle is understood as an unvarying proposition the way it 
figures in moral reasoning is very different from the way it figures when understood as an 
invariable proposition.  H’s case, for example, is subsumed under the principle prohibiting 
adultery, but the principle—understood as unvarying in its relation to the ideal—does not apply 
in the manner of absolute subsumptivism.  The principle, in other words, is not understood as 
invariable in its application.  But if this is the case, how does it apply to H’s case?  It applies in 
the manner of contextual subsumptivism, a view that argues that principles apply contextually, a 
view that understands principles as unvarying propositions that can be understood, and applied, 
only in light of a wider context—which necessarily includes their unvarying relation to the ideal. 
According to contextual subsumptivism, H’s task is to make a judgment about how the 
principle prohibiting adultery bears on his case.  While H’s judgment involves his thinking 
about, reflecting on, and understanding the principle and its connection to the ideal, he will 
reflect on other principles associated with the ideal, like the prohibitions on divorce, neglect, and 
abandonment.  This appeal will necessarily invoke a fuller context that includes much more than 
just the principles and purposes bound up with the ideal of marital fidelity.  Among other things, 
it will include facts about H’s understanding of the public and personal dimensions of marital 
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fidelity, facts about his understanding of the public and personal dimensions of any overlapping 
ideals, and of course it will include facts about the particulars of his situation. 
In his reflections, H will recognize that following the principle prohibiting adultery (as 
absolute subsumptivism requires) would not genuinely contribute to his exemplifying the ideal of 
marital fidelity.  This recognition is a factor in H’s thinking about how the principle applies to 
his case and how (or whether) it directs him.  Even though H ultimately concludes the principle 
prohibiting adultery does not direct him (in the manner of absolute subsumptivism), the ideal-
based account of generality insists that there nevertheless is nothing strange about characterizing 
an aspect of H’s reflection in terms of subsuming a case (his) under a principle (‘do not commit 
adultery’).  In fact, according to the ideal-based account, reflection is exactly the arena in which 
we can expect an exercise in any sort of subsumption to take place.  Contextual subsumptivism 
recognizes a place for subsumptivism in reflection, but characterizes its significance in terms of a 
complex, contextual judgment.  As a threshold matter, in H’s reflection he must recognize that 
the (western) ideal of marriage is bound up with monogamy, that his case is characterizable as 
adulterous, and that there is a principle prohibiting it.  In any scenario in which H responsibly 
reflects, he recognizes in some manner the fact that his case is subsumable under the principle.  
This is true, even though it may very well be that when H reflects on his situation, he does not 
explicitly declaim to himself:  “There is a principle that says ‘do not commit adultery.’  My case 
is subsumable under the principle.  I must reflect on the significance of this.”  Even if H does not 
say these things to himself, he still has to figure out why adultery is wrong—which is just 
another way of saying he has to understand why there is a principle prohibiting it and how it 
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figures in the context of his situation.28  If he does not understand why adultery is wrong, then he 
cannot figure out whether it might not be wrong in his case.  Coming to understand the basis of 
this principle is an essential step in his reflection about whether his conduct with O, while 
adulterous, might nevertheless, when taken as a whole, exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity.  
Without this understanding, it is of no significance to H merely to recognize that his case is 
subsumable under a principle.  According to contextual subsumptivism, this understanding is 
integral to the complex, contextual judgment that emerges from H’s reflections. 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, the ideal opens up a way to think 
about conduct that exemplifies the ideal of marital fidelity without necessitating the treatment of 
the ideal as setting forth a list of requirements or demands that each and every spouse must fulfill 
on pain of disapprobation.  The ideal regulates, but the ideal is not a test.  It supports 
propositions like ‘H should not do that action because it would interfere with the on-going effort 
to exemplify the ideal’ or ‘H may do that because it does not interfere with the on-going effort to 
exemplify the ideal.’  A spouse’s conduct may fall short of the ideal without necessarily being 
blameworthy;  a corollary to this point is that a marriage may fall short of the ideal without being 
defective for not satisfying the ideal.  This last is a matter of complexity, but in the very notion 
of an ideal is the suggestion that it is something not exactly (or at least not typically) attainable in 
28 This is related to John McDowell’s statement in “Deliberation and Moral 
Development” that it is “harmless to acknowledge the availability of truths with [the] shape” of 
such propositions as:  “’Other things being equal, an unpaid debt . . . should be paid’” (28-9).  
The ceteris paribus clause refers to something like ‘in normal conditions.’  The work of the 
moral agent is to determine whether conditions are normal.  McDowell emphasizes that when we 
acknowledge such truths we must be “clear that the acknowledgment is no concession to the idea 
of a method” for moral judgment-making (29).  According to the ideal-based account of 
generality, recognizing the availability of such truths is not merely harmless;  it is vital to moral 
reflection, and the ceteris paribus clause is redundant, because ordinary moral principles should 
not be understood as universally quantified statements. 
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every aspect on any occasion.  No marriage is perfect.29  An actual marriage is something (as 
with vision and the just and loving gaze) that is endlessly perfectible;  the ideal marriage is that 
which we strive to better and better approximate.  The on-going effort to exemplify an ideal is 
part of the on-going aim of perfecting vision.  Perfecting vision, and the determination of 
whether one is achieving a just and loving gaze, involves reflecting on the relevant ideal (or 
ideals) and the general moral principles that help articulate the ideal.  When H considers W, for 
example, he must take up the ideal of marital fidelity, with its attendant principles, to determine 
whether his conduct expresses a just and loving gaze toward W and their situation.  Ideals and 
their related principles give necessary content to the injunction to look with a just and loving 
gaze;  they give content to the on-going aim of trying to see things aright.  As such, ideals and 
principles play a necessary role in both discernment and the perfection of vision itself. 
4.6 QUESTIONS FOR THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT 
While the discussion of the example of H is meant to show how ideals and principles play a role 
in H’s moral thought, the example alone is not sufficient to address some important questions 
whose answers are essential to understanding the ideal-based account of generality.  What 
follows is an attempt to shed light on some of these questions. 
29 This looks ahead to section 4.10, but I am brought in mind of Michael Thompson’s 
point that we can produce a complex conjunctive predicate that is true of a species, but not true 
of any member of the kind denoted by the species.  What Thompson means, he says, is, 
“nobody’s perfect” (“Representation” 288).  The same, presumably, is true of a marriage;  no 
marriage is perfect because no marriage instantiates the ideal in every respect on every occasion. 
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4.6.1 Is there a highest or ultimate principle or ideal? 
The ideal-based account of generality is grounded in Murdoch’s injunction to look with a just 
and loving gaze.  For Murdoch, looking with a just and loving gaze is another way of directing 
the agent to clear away the ego and look in light of the Good.  The injunction is so general that it 
might seem to be simply a command along the lines of  ‘see things accurately,’ but the ideal-
based account maintains that, really, it is more than this.  The injunction is a command to adopt a 
certain perspective, the perspective of ego-less love and justice.  The ideal-based account of 
generality regards this as a substantive command to look in light of the Good, and also ultimately 
as a command to work out and exemplify the Good in action.  In this sense, Murdoch’s 
injunction represents the highest or ultimate principle in the ideal-based account, and the Good is 
the ultimate, overarching ideal.  
4.6.2 Where do ideals come from? 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, we can say that Murdoch’s injunction 
represents a command to bring the joint concepts of love and justice to bear in an overarching 
regulative ideal, which, inspired by Murdoch, we might very generally characterize as the 
‘Good.’  The ideal-based account takes on the task of explaining how this might work and cashes 
out ‘Good’ in terms of more specific ideals and their related principles.  The point is that these 
ideals give substance to the concept ‘Good.’  So, in a sense, ideals “come from” the concept of 
the Good.  Although a detailed account of the relation between ideals and the Good is not 
feasible here, it might be helpful to point out that ideals will vary depending on the culture and 
time period.  For example, the ideal of marriage varies depending on culture and changes over 
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time within cultures.  However, despite these contingencies, marriage is an ideal, insofar as it is 
an interpretation of the Good.   
As an interpretation of the Good, an ideal has both a prescriptive and descriptive 
dimension.  An ideal can be articulated in descriptive terms that are more or less detailed, as 
indicated in the discussion of marriage in section 4.3, e.g., it is monogamous, it is companionate, 
and so forth.  However, because it is an articulation of some aspect of the Good, it can be 
reformulated in prescriptive terms as specific, substantive iterations of Murdoch’s injunction.  
These can take the form of prescriptive statements, such as ‘a spouse should not commit 
adultery,’ or as commands, like ‘do not commit adultery.’30  
4.6.3 How are ideals related to each other? 
Ideals are unified to the extent that they represent a more-or-less worked out interpretation of the 
Good.  As such, they bear an organic relationship to one another, and many of them overlap.  For 
the sake of highlighting certain aspects of H’s reflections, the example focuses only on the single 
ideal of marriage.  In actuality, the full scope of H’s reflection will be subject to an array of 
considerations, invoking other ideals, that complicate how the ideal of marriage will figure in his 
thinking.  In addition to the fact of his marriage to W, there are a variety of other important 
concerns in H’s life that will need to be registered and which should always be alive in his 
thinking.  They will add further complexities to the role that marital fidelity and its related 
principles will play.  For example, imagine that H is attached to friends, to work, to certain 
30 See section 4.10.2 for more discussion of the descriptive and prescriptive nature of 
ideals. 
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hobbies, and so on.  Ideals come with all these.  The ideals to which H aspires in each area will 
not always be easy to reconcile and at times will compete with each other—which raises a 
question about how H can live with all these ideals.  A fully developed answer is beyond our 
current reach, but according to the ideal-based account of generality, Murdoch’s injunction is the 
starting-point.  Her notion of the Good is the umbrella under which an agent seeks to harmonize 
all the various ideals in their moment-by-moment exemplification.  The ideal-based account lays 
out and begins to fill in the framework for describing this complex process of harmonization in 
our moral judgment-making.   
4.6.4 How are ideals related to principles? 
Part of the substantive content of ideals is expressible in terms of principles, and we can say that 
the principle is implied in the ideal.  For example, the ideal of marriage, according to the 
standard western conception, entails a prohibition on adultery.  However, some familiar moral 
principles are not tied as directly to any particular ideal as the prohibition on adultery is.  These 
principles cut across many ideals;  some examples include the general ideals of truthfulness and 
beneficence and their related principles, respectively, ‘be honest’ and ‘be beneficent.’  These 
principles certainly can be related to more specific ideals, like acquaintanceship and marriage, or 
ideals that come with professions like nursing or lawyering.  For example, how we would 
exemplify truthfulness might be different with an acquaintance than with a spouse;  how a nurse 
would exemplify beneficence might be different from how a lawyer would.  Nevertheless, 
honesty and beneficence are not exclusively associated with specific ideals;  they express general 
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aspects of the overarching ideal of the Good.  In this sense, they can be thought of along the lines 
of principled formulations of Aristotelian virtues.31   
4.6.5 Are principles hypothetical imperatives? 
It is tempting to think that principles, on the ideal-based account of generality, should be 
regarded as hypothetical imperatives.  It can seem that the ideal-based account holds the view 
that in order to attain an ideal, a person must follow the related principle(s).  For example, if a 
person wants to attain the ideal of marriage, then she should follow the principle prohibiting 
adultery.  There are at least three reasons it would be wrong to think of principles as hypothetical 
imperatives.  First, the very formulation of the issue in terms of following a principle to “attain” 
an ideal is misleading;  it is misleading to speak of attaining an ideal because this way of talking 
suggests the end, i.e., the attainment of the ideal, is something that can be accomplished once and 
for all.  We should instead characterize behavior in terms of whether it exemplifies an ideal.  
Second, speaking of attainment suggests a means/end relationship between principles and ideals.  
This is not correct.  If agents adhere to a principle, it does not follow that their conduct 
exemplifies a pertinent ideal.  Not committing adultery does not mean a marriage exemplifies the 
ideal or even comes close to the ideal.  Likewise, never telling a lie does not guarantee a person’s 
conduct exemplifies honesty:  we can imagine someone who always, so to speak, “takes the 
Fifth.”  Third, even though some ideals are optional, many are not.  Marriage, for example, is 
optional;  therefore, in a sense, the principle against adultery is also optional.  But it is not 
31 See Rosalind Hursthouse’s essay “Normative Virtue Ethics” in which she argues that 
the virtues can be formulated in terms of principles (such as ‘be courageous,’ ‘be honest,’ ‘be 
generous’) that are as satisfactorily action-guiding as deontological or utilitarian principles. 
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optional for H because he is married.  In H’s case, according to the ideal-based account, because 
sexual intimacy is no longer possible with W, the principle prohibiting adultery does not 
articulate an aspect of the ideal that is possible.  However, it nevertheless articulates part of the 
ideal of marriage and therefore bears on his situation.32  In contrast, the ideal of truthfulness is 
not optional.  A person cannot follow Murdoch’s injunction and opt out of aspiring to and being 
regulated by truthfulness.  
4.6.6 Is it possible to violate a principle or an ideal? 
Our discussion has emphasized the role of ideals in articulating aspects of the Good to which we 
should aspire.  Insofar as we are successful in our aspirations, we have done well.  But if we fall 
short of the ideal, where do we stand?  Does it make sense to speak of an action as violating an 
ideal or a principle?  To answer these questions we must draw on the distinction made earlier 
between behavior that is defective and behavior that is imperfect.33  Some behavior that fails to 
exemplify the relevant ideal is defective, i.e., wrong or bad.34  But some behavior that falls short 
of the ideal nevertheless exemplifies it, and is simply less than perfect, i.e., imperfect.  It is not as 
good as it could be.  Of course, whether an act is wrong or merely imperfect is a complex 
32 See the discussion of absolute subsumptivism and contextual subsumptivism in section 
4.5.1. 
 
33 See the discussion of the difference between defectiveness and imperfection in section 
4.4.3. 
 
34 I say “some” because the behavior might exemplify some relevant overlapping ideal. 
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judgment.35  The ideal-based account of generality sheds some light on how this judgment is 
made.  
Judgments about where an action lies on the continuum between defectiveness and 
imperfection may or may not include reference to a principle related to the ideal.  As an example 
of the latter, consider an alternative scenario in which W, in more lucid times, tells H1 that she 
would like to keep the family home because she would like her memorial service to be held 
there.  Assume H1 has the financial means to keep it, but never promises to do so.  In fact, the 
request annoys him.  In time, W develops Alzheimer’s.  Because W will never know the 
difference, H1 sells the house before she dies.  It seems fair to say that H1’s conduct is wrong.  
As an example of the former, consider an alternative scenario, years before W ever got sick, in 
which H2 commits a straightforward act of adultery.  H2 simply has an extramarital encounter.  In 
this case it also seems fair to say H2’s conduct is wrong.  Now consider a third case, the case we 
have been discussing from the outset of this chapter, in which W is sick, and H and O are a 
quasi-married couple.  This case is not straightforward, but as in the second (straightforward) 
scenario, H’s conduct goes against the principle against adultery.  Unlike the second 
(straightforward) scenario, there is good reason to think H’s conduct is not wrong (for reasons 
given in section 4.4.3). 
35 The distinction between being imperfect and being wrong suggests a refinement to the 
response given by Jon Ives, Apple’s Chief Design Officer, to the charge that the circular hockey 
puck mouse was one of Apple’s few design failures because some people found it hard to use.  
Ives defended it on grounds that arms and wrists differ, and one mouse might not suit them all.  
Ives continued, “Everything we make I could describe as being partially wrong, because it’s not 
perfect.”  The ideal-based account of generality would say that the shape of the mouse was not 
wrong—as in bad or defective—just because it was not perfect.  We might think of differences 
in arms and wrists as analogous to “overlapping ideals.” Surely, a mouse that suits no one (or 
just a few) is defective, just as a mouse that suits most everyone is not.  The difference between 
the two lies on a continuum, while the aim is to create a mouse that is perfect for all.  (Parker)  
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At this point we might ask how the ideal-based account of generality differentiates these 
cases and how it makes sense of the very idea of a violation.  It is helpful to distinguish between 
a violation of a principle and a failure to exemplify an ideal.  We can think of a violation of a 
principle in the manner invited by absolute subsumptivism:  if an action can be subsumed under 
a principle, and the principle prohibits the action, then performing the action violates the 
principle.  But as should be clear by now, according to the ideal-based account, a judgment about 
whether an action violates a principles in the absolute subsumptivist sense, is different from a 
judgment about whether the action is wrong.  In the first scenario, no clear-cut, ordinary moral 
principle is violated, but the conduct is nevertheless wrong.  In the second, a principle is violated, 
and the conduct is wrong.  In the third case, a principle is violated, but the conduct is not wrong.  
The difference in these cases lies in their relationship to the relevant ideal(s) and how and 
whether they exemplify them. 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, in the first scenario, H1 fails to 
exemplify marital fidelity.  His behavior is wrong, not less than ideal or imperfect.  He 
completely disregards certain important aspects of marital fidelity.  He wantonly ignores an 
important wish for no reason in circumstances in which she is helpless to contest or to express 
her wishes about some alternate arrangement.  According to the scenario, it would have been no 
real hardship to have kept the house.  H1’s action also fails to exemplify various overlapping 
ideals.  Although, he never promised he would keep the house, H1 he has not been faithful to her 
wishes;  we might say H1 has broken something like an implicit promise, about an especially 
important matter that is tied up with showing marital fidelity, with showing respect in death, and 
with striving to satisfy last wishes.  It is worth repeating here that any individual action must be 
judged in light of its full context of ideals, principles, and circumstances.  Imagine that H1 cares 
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for W with as much devotion as H does, but H1 does not have anyone like O in his life—and he 
sells the house.  We would still have reasons to conclude that selling the house is wrong, even 
though H1 exemplifies marital fidelity in other conduct.  It is not just that H1’s action could have 
been better, could have more closely approximated the ideal of marital fidelity.  H1’s action does 
not exemplify marital fidelity in any way.  In fact, there is no ideal in light of which H1’s conduct 
good. 
In the second scenario, H2 violates the familiar moral principle prohibiting adultery, and 
his action fails to exemplify the ideal.  As in the first case, his action is not simply less than 
perfect, it is wrong.  The very fact that he violated a principle that articulates some of the content 
of the ideal is relevant to his failure and to the conclusion that his action is wrong, but this 
conclusion is not made solely on the basis of the violation.  That an action violates a principle 
does not necessarily mean it is wrong or defective, as opposed to simply less than perfect.36  
How the determination is made is a non-algorithmic, complex judgment, part of which can be 
explained in terms of ideals.  As in H1’s case, we can say that H2’s action does not exemplify 
marital fidelity.  Moreover, there is no ideal that this behavior exemplifies, no ideal in light of 
which it is good. 
The third scenario (which, really, is the original scenario) demonstrates the point that 
behavior (i.e., H’s adultery) that violates a principle is not necessarily wrong or defective.  The 
fact that H’s behavior violates a principle is not sufficient to conclude that his behavior is 
defective or wrong, nor is it sufficient for concluding that his behavior fails to exemplify the 
ideal.  According to the ideal-based account of generality, H’s behavior is not wrong because it 
36 An action can be not wrong, but less than ideal, as in H’s adultery.  We often talk this 
way, as when we say of the decision to break a trivial promise in order to tend to pressing work:  
“Well, it’s not ideal, but . . .”  The implicit ending to the sentence is “but it’s not wrong.” 
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nevertheless exemplifies marital fidelity (and other ideals as well, e.g., those in light of which his 
relationship with O is good). 
The foregoing scenarios are intended to illustrate the relationship between principles and 
ideals and how to think about the moral reasoning involved in making judgments about when 
conduct is wrong.  Clearly, according to the ideal-based account of generality, this determination 
is not best made sense of in terms of the concept of ‘violation’ of a moral principle.  The first 
case illustrates how conduct can be wrong in its failure to exemplify an ideal regardless of 
whether it involves a violation of a clear-cut, ordinary moral principle.  The second case, which 
involves the violation of a moral principle, shows how the violation can be an important (albeit 
always non-decisive factor) in the determination of whether the behavior is wrong.  The third 
case illustrates how conduct might be good in that it exemplifies an ideal—even when it involves 
the violation of an ordinary moral principle.  In short, whether conduct is wrong or not is a 
matter of whether it fails to exemplify some ideal.37   
It should be clear that, according to the ideal-based account of generality, it is possible to 
violate a principle and yet nevertheless exemplify an ideal.  This raises the question of what role 
a principle plays in the determination of whether and to what extent conduct that violates it, 
nevertheless, exemplifies it.  The first part of the answer to this question is that the very fact that 
a principle is violated is an important consideration in any judgment about the wrongness of the 
violating conduct.  But the violation does not occur a-contextually.  The violation always must 
37 This may seem unsatisfying because in the case of overlapping ideals, the interesting 
question is which ideal ought we exemplify.  Some find Ross’s account similarly unsatisfyingly 
because it does not tell us which prima facie obligation prevails when conflicts arise between 
those that are relevant.  My account does not have an answer, if by answer we mean ‘decision 
procedure.’  However, it does offer a much more detailed account than Ross’s, the generalist’s, 
or the particularist’s. 
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be assessed in light of the context.  In many cases, the very fact of the violation is relevant 
because the judgment at issue just is the moral status of the violation (or contemplated violation).  
Another part of the answer to this question is taken up in sections 4.8 and 4.9, in which an 
account is given of the important role principles play in reflection and cultivation of 
commitment.  The upshot of those sections is that principles play a role in moral thinking 
according to which they are not best thought of as yardsticks against which to measure the 
rightness or wrongness of particular actions.  According to the ideal-based account, a principle 
represents an on-going commitment, the cultivation of which acts like an internal rudder that 
steers us in our actions and keeps us on a proper course. 
It is worth noting here how the concept of ‘violation’ relates to ideals.  For the most part 
we have discussed whether conduct exemplifies an ideal.  In the first two scenarios above, we 
might be tempted to say that the actions in question violate the ideal of marriage.  We do 
sometimes speak this way, such as when we say that a person has violated our trust.  But because 
ideals are complex, it also can seem odd to speak in the toggled terms of ‘violates x’ or ‘does not 
violate x.’  The concept of violation seems more at home in the realm of principles, which is why 
we often say things such as:  technically the action violates a principle, but it is not wrong.  In 
contrast, we cannot really speak of an action that is a technical violation of an ideal—because the 
ideal does not set down technical (or algorithmic) requirements.  The role of the ideal is to help 
frame our judgment-making—to help frame the judgments we make in light of the complexities 
of the full context, which includes ideals.  For example, if we focus only on the violation of the 
principle against adultery, there is no difference between H’s conduct in the second and third 
scenario.  But, of course, the conduct is different and in ways that matter to the judgment about 
whether H’s violation of the principle is wrong or not.  This is where the ideal comes into play in 
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judgment.  Instead of characterizing wrong actions in terms of violations of ideals, we should 
speak in terms of exemplification:  we should say that whether behavior fails to exemplify some 
ideal is a complex, non-algorithmic determination, which takes into view the context of ideals, 
principles, and circumstances necessary to make a responsible judgment.  
Up to this point we have fudged the issue of pinpointing exactly which ideals are at issue.  
Instead, at times, we have said that conduct is not wrong if it exemplifies some ideal.  It can seem 
obfuscating, if not circular, to argue that the reason why H’s adultery is not wrong is because it 
exemplifies some aspect of the Good articulated by an ideal.  Why is it Good?  That is the 
question.  If the answer is simply because it exemplifies the Good, then moral judgment-making 
seems ungrounded.  The ideal-based account of generality, however, provides a framework for 
thinking about what more we can say.  The framework is expressed in terms of ideals;  ideals 
provide a structure of principles and purposes that help us avoid the potential circularity.  In H’s 
case, when we see that the principle prohibiting adultery is an expression of the content of an 
ideal, we can look to the ideal and its general framework of considerations to help us understand 
the significance of the violation.  Because H’s conduct nevertheless exemplifies the ideal of 
marriage we can conclude that it is not wrong.  Determining whether an action is wrong is a 
judgment that reflects awareness of a continuum where there can be behavior that does not 
exemplify an ideal and behavior that does.  A violation of a principle is a factor in the judgment, 
and we conclude that the behavior is defective or wrong when it completely fails to exemplify 
the relevant ideal.   
When there are competing or overlapping ideals the judgment is more complex;  it might 
be that behavior that fails to exemplify a relevant ideal nevertheless exemplifies some other 
relevant ideal.  Again the judgment will be about where the action falls on a continuum.  
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Consider Ross’s example in which a trivial promise is broken in order to prevent a serious 
accident (18).  The rule about keeping promises is violated, but nevertheless we might conclude 
with Ross that the action is good because, e.g., it exemplifies the ideal of friendship or 
parenthood or citizenship, etc.  Whatever the relevant ideal(s) might be in such a case, the 
breaking of the promise is not wrong because rendering aid exemplifies some dimension of the 
Good, which can be articulated in terms of the relevant ideals.  In light of the full context—
which could even include a post-hoc notification to the promisee of the reason for breaking the 
promise and an apology—we might well find that the behavior even exemplifies the ideal of 
fidelity in promise-keeping itself. 
4.6.7 Is the ideal-based account unrealistic? 
The ideal-based account of generality claims to be giving a reconstruction of what happens in 
ordinary moral judgment.  It aims to describe a way in which we use ideals in our moral thinking 
and to make sense of principles in a way that is neither generalist nor particularist.  But the 
question remains of whether it simply is too complicated to be a fair characterization of what 
actually does or can happen in moral reasoning, except maybe in the overwrought philosopher’s.  
Is it too arcane to be a fair characterization of our ordinary moral reasoning?  The particularist 
seems to have a more straightforward and accessible account:  the details “wash over” the agent 
(perhaps this is intended as a kind of reflection) and the shape of the situation presents itself.  
Good moral judgment-making, for the particularist, just is seeing the shape of a situation.  This 
simple, straightforward picture of moral judgment-making is open to everyone, the particularist 
might say.   
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The central idea in the ideal-based account of generality is a robust conception of 
reflection, which centers on ideals and associated principles.  The view argues that ideals and 
their related principles have a true normative force in reflection.  Is reflection the province only 
of the overwrought philosopher?  Of course not.  In fact, current multi-disciplinary research 
suggests principled reflection is a crucial element (1) in determining our behavior and (2) in 
changing our behavior. 
 One example that lies in the intersection of psychology, philosophy, and criminal 
rehabilitation is the work of a London-based organization called The Forgiveness Project—
which suggests, even if it does not prove, that there is an important role for reflection in moral 
reasoning and moral transformation.  The Forgiveness Project runs several different programs, 
including RESTORE, the in-prison arm of The Forgiveness Project.  RESTORE’s organizing 
idea is that many offenders offend in order to seek revenge for wrongs that have been done to 
them.  Learning to forgive is seen, therefore, as critical for breaking the cycle of offending 
behavior.  RESTORE relies on five strategies to achieve its mission to reduce offending 
behaviors by bringing about personal change in the offender.  Three of these strategies are 
especially relevant to the picture of moral thought described by the ideal-based account:   
 
(i) creating a safe space for reflection (on, e.g., criminality, society, humanity, 
forgiveness, and revenge, and how they are related to the individual participant) 
(ii) transforming the offender’s perspective (through, e.g., “appreciating, seeking and 
attaining forgiveness”) 
(iii) “catalysing different choices and intentions” (by, e.g., focusing on positive life paths 
and following inspirational examples of reconciliation) (RESTORE).   
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The program begins each day with personal reflection.  This endeavor is supported and 
developed in many ways, including meeting crime victims, trading stories, exploring existing 
habitual behaviors, and engaging in self-appraisal, empathy training, and other guided cell-work.  
All of these are aimed at encouraging transformative reflection.  RESTORE seems to work.  
Participants in the program show lower rates of offending behavior in prison and after prison 
than those who do not participate.   
RESTORE regards personal reflection as a key component in the participants’ success, 
but the fact that the program emphasizes reflection and the fact that reflection is seen as a key 
component in producing better outcomes in action do not prove that ideals and their related 
principles have a place in this process.  However, it really is not a stretch to characterize some of 
the content on which participants are encouraged to reflect in terms of ideals.  Some are very 
general like ‘humanity,’ which presumably includes principles like the right to life, liberty, and 
security, the right of conscience, and so on, as well as rights against cruel and unusual 
punishment, enslavement, servitude, arbitrary arrest, detention, exile, and so on.  Other ideals are 
less general, like ‘forgiveness’ (the centerpiece of The Forgiveness Project), which might be 
thought of in terms of abbreviated commands, like ‘be forgiving,’ or ‘turn the other cheek.’  
Forgiveness also can be expressed in more specific principled terms, like Buddhism’s twelve 
principles of forgiveness, which seem primarily to be principle-like instructions or steps to take 
in order to become forgiving, e.g., ‘be willing to grieve,’ ‘discover that it is not necessary to be 
loyal to your suffering,’ ‘reflect on the benefits of a loving heart,’ ‘practice forgiveness in easy 
cases,’ and so on.  These principles are interesting because they can look like hypothetical 
imperatives, which is an interpretation of moral principles that the ideal-based account of 
generality rejects.  However, against this interpretation of principles-as-hypothetical-imperatives 
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is the obvious fact that following these principles will not necessarily make a person forgiving.  
Moreover, following these principles would seem to result in something more like a form of 
reflective exercise meant to help a person better understand the ideal of forgiveness (by shifting 
various beliefs, emotions, and habits) in order to make exemplification of the ideal of forgiveness 
more reliably and steadily achievable.  But, again, it is not a stretch to characterize the Buddhist 
forgiveness program as one that involves reflecting on the ideal of forgiveness and on the 
meaning of the related principles. 
Also important for showing the plausibility of the ideal-based account of generality are 
the first-person accounts of perspective transformation that have been gathered by The 
Forgiveness Project.  These accounts, which are listed on The Forgiveness Project website under 
“Stories,” suggest that the kind of thinking described by the ideal-based account of generality is 
not overwrought.  The accounts, of course, are not given in terms of the nomenclature and 
philosophical systemization that we find in the ideal-based account, but we can find a degree of 
sensitivity and commitment to what is aptly characterized as reflection involving ideals and 
principles.   
Consider the story of Jacob Dunne, a participant in The Forgiveness Project, who by the 
age of fifteen had been expelled from two schools.  At eighteen—immersed in what he calls a 
“gang mindset”—he was in a group brawl and threw a punch that killed a man.  In prison, he 
says: 
 
I was consumed by anger [at friends for snitching on him] and . . . self-pity, as if I was 
the only victim of these tragic circumstances.  There was no space in custody for me to 
reflect on what I’d done.  No one was there to challenge me and I was surrounded by 
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other inmates who shared the same common criminal values I did.  By the time I was 
released I had become an even worse person than when I went in.  (Dunne) 
 
Dunne complains that in prison “there was no one to challenge [his] common criminal values,” 
and “there was no space in custody for [him] to reflect” on his actions.  He found both in 
RESTORE, a restorative justice charity, where he corresponded with and eventually met his 
victim’s parents, gained their forgiveness, and also learned to forgive the “snitches.”  As a result 
of the program, he says,  “I decided to move forward in a positive way . . . I was determined to 
do . . . everything I could to prevent others from going through the kind of trauma [the victim’s 
parents] went through.”  Ultimately, Dunne went from being homeless after prison to enrolling in 
2015 at university (Dunne).   
If we describe Dunne’s experience in terms of the ideal-based account of generality, we 
would say that Dunne effectively shifts his overarching ideal away from the gang mindset to the 
Good.  Furthermore, it is no stretch to say that when Dunne decides that he is determined to 
prevent others from experiencing the pain suffered by the parents of the man he killed, he is 
committing himself to ideals—some of whose content can be articulated in terms of principles 
such as:  prevent suffering, atone for wrongs, and so on.38  
Another storyteller on The Forgiveness Project website is Sammy Rangel, who describes 
a childhood of violence and sexual abuse that began when he was three years old.  By the time he 
was eleven, he had joined a gang, and by seventeen he was in prison, where, he says, the gang 
fighting that had started on the outside crystallized: 
38 So can the content of gang pseudo-ideals, e.g., Omerta. 
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 Now I had an ideology where violence was glamorized and glorified.  It gave my life a 
sense of meaning and legitimized everything I did . . . I went in as a street punk and came 
out as a brutal leader with a killer mentality.  I started walking the streets with both a gun 
and a shank.  I’d tell people I was more animal than man.  Seven months later I was back 
in for armed robbery and again immediately put in the segregation hole.  (Rangel) 
 
In prison, he was involved in gang fights, race riots, shootings, stabbings, and beatings.  Rangel 
says that his transformation came incrementally, but took firm hold in an in-prison drug 
rehabilitation program: 
 
When a fellow inmate told me that I didn’t love my daughter because I hadn’t properly 
tried to find her, that hurt terribly because I knew it was the truth.  In an instant I went 
from feeling self-pity to feeling remorse.  In fact, it was the first time I’d experienced 
empathy.  (Rangel) 
 
Rangel organized his transformation around love and forgiveness: 
  
When I left prison I decided I needed to find forgiveness from my son and daughter, and 
also to forgive my mother [who had repeatedly abused him physically] and everyone else 
who had hurt me – including her brother [who had raped him].  (Rangel) 
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Now Rangel has a master’s degree in social work;  he consults with law enforcement and other 
agencies on violence reduction strategies, and he founded a group that helps others exit lives of 
crime and violence.   
There is no doubt that the mechanism of Rangel’s transformation was complex and had 
multiple causes.  It does, however, share features with Dunne’s.  He is triggered by the charge 
that he is not a good parent, that he does not really love his daughter.  In what we can call a 
reflective moment he realizes that this is true.  Driven by an experience of “empathy” for the 
“first time,” he makes a choice to exemplify what the ideal-based account of generality would 
call the ideal of parenthood.  We are not told how he fares in this pursuit, but from his account 
we can see that the ideal, along with principles like ‘communicate with your child,’ ‘get to know 
your child,’ and ‘love your child,’ are at work in his thinking and serve as an internal rudder for 
him:  he will find his daughter, he will make amends, he will exemplify parental love.  What the 
details of Dunne’s and Rangel’s stories are meant to show is that ideals figure in people’s 
thinking.  
Evidence that the ideal-based account’s emphasis on ideals and reflection is not an out-
of-reach philosopher’s creation can be extracted from much less detailed examples.  When a 
brother was released from prison, he said he needed to repair his relationship with his son.  How 
did he arrive at this conclusion?  There can be a tendency to think that if such words are not 
uttered by a moral sophisticate, then they erupt essentially from nowhere.  This is unrealistic and 
demeaning.  We are all moral sophisticates in a sense, even if we are not always moral, because 
except in the most perplexing cases we all have some grasp of values embedded in the Good, and 
to the extent that we have such values, we strive—with greater or less success—to exemplify 
them.  And to the extent that we think at all, we seem to possess the ability to reflect on what we 
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value in—more or less—articulate detail.  The virtuous peasant and the particularist shape-
diviner are both the product of a philosophical blind spot (or else hubris) because both are, 
however inadvertently, seen as instances of some sort of idiot savant.  Commitment (including 
proto-commitment) to ideals and principles, and reflection thereon, is not an esoteric activity.  
Moreover, the claim that it is not esoteric is perfectly compatible with the claim that it can and 
should be guided, educated, and developed, as in programs like RESTORE.  As with most 
endeavors, educated coaching and practice help.39 
Ideals not only play a role in rehabilitative reflection.  There is relevant research in the 
intersection of psychology and philosophy that, unsurprisingly, suggests a vital role for ideals 
and principles in the lives of people who are morally exemplary or “moral exemplars,” to borrow 
the term used by Anne Colby and William Damon in The Power of Ideals.  Colby and Damon 
focus their book on six moral exemplars:  Jane Addams, Nelson Mandela, Dag Hammarskjöld, 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Eleanor Roosevelt.  While acknowledging 
that all these moral exemplars were without doubt flawed in various ways, the authors use them 
as case studies to show how their “choices and actions were clearly informed . . . by ideals” (52). 
The authors do not offer an explicit definition of the term ‘ideal,’ but their discussion 
suggests that it is something like an abstract moral value to which a person is committed and 
which goes beyond immediate self-interest.  We are given examples of specific, often 
interrelated ideals in the discussion of the life of each of the moral exemplars, e.g., ideals of 
social and economic equality, charity, service, benevolence, racial equality, international peace, 
39 See, e.g., Atul Gawande’s article “Personal Best” in The New Yorker.  Gawande 
describes how an esteemed senior surgeon, whom Gawande enlisted as his coach in the operating 
room, helped Gawande improve his already accomplished surgical skills.  Gawande argues that 
most all endeavors, including those of experts, can benefit from “coaching.” 
 
  156 
                                                 
democracy, and religious freedom.  The ideal-based account of generality involves ideals such as 
these, but it also involves others that are more specifically tied to various practices, like 
marriage, and it does not necessarily rule out ideals that could be said to involve some element of 
immediate self-interest, like ideals related to a hobby.  Despite these differences, there is enough 
overlap in the ideals of the ideal-based account of generality and the ideals that figure in the 
thinking of the six exemplars to conclude that the authors’ findings can be mined for support for 
the plausibility of the ideal-based account of generality.   
The authors’ discussion of moral exemplars makes a persuasive case that a key element 
of the exemplars’ moral psychology is an explicit commitment to certain ideals.  The authors 
also argue that three fundamental virtues—truthfulness, humility, and faith—are necessary to 
sustain a commitment to an ideal.  This interesting further dimension is not of primary interest to 
the ideal-based account of generality.  Rather, it is the authors’ argument that commitment to 
ideals has profound effects on shaping people’s behavior.  For each of the exemplars, the authors 
describe what amounts to an on-going circle of experience, reflection, and action:  in light of 
various experiences the exemplar commits to an ideal, puts it into action as best as possible, 
reflects on how well the ideal was exemplified, and then makes adjustments in both thought and 
action in order to better exemplify the ideal.  For these moral psychologists, principles and ideals 
seem interchangeable.  They are not regarded as yardsticks, nor as reminders, rules of thumb, or 
summaries.  Instead, they represent on-going commitments;  they are like internal rudders that 
help us navigate our lives.   
This section has covered a lot of ground.  We have seen that in both the offender 
rehabilitation cases and the moral exemplar cases there is empirical evidence that ideals and 
principles play an important role in moral reasoning and action.  We also have tackled a number 
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of important theoretical questions about the ideal-based account of generality, with the aim of 
showing how it explains the role of principles and ideals in moral reasoning and action.  Now 
that more of the details of the account have been presented, we will return to particularism, and 
ask:  would particularists find any merit in the ideal-based account’s understanding of ideals and 
principles?  In the next section, we explore this question by taking up an objection we anticipate 
particularists would likely raise against the ideal-based account of generality. 
4.7 THE CHARGE OF IGNORATIO ELENCHI 
Particularists, in particular Dancy, will be likely to disagree with the conclusion that ideals and 
principles play a necessary role in moral thought.  They might argue that whatever the ideal-
based account of generality amounts to it does not show that principles of the sort they have in 
mind play such a role.  The particularist might elaborate as follows:  
 
The ideal-based account of generality is off base and amounts to nothing more 
than an ignoratio elenchi.  Even if the account succeeds in showing there are 
such things as ideals with related principles, it does not provide a critique of 
particularism because it does not address itself to the issue in question.  We 
particularists are not attacking ideals;  nor are we attacking the principles the 
ideal-based account claims are connected to ideals.  We particularists are 
arguing against principles that purport to be action-guiding in the context of a 
specific practice (like marriage) and purport to give specific directives about 
how people should or should not behave in the context of the practice.   
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The ideals and principles appealed to by the ideal-based account of 
generality are not principles in the sense we particularists are attacking, for they 
have no determinate action-guiding content.  Therefore, the ideal-based account 
does not undermine our particularist conclusion that right action simply cannot 
be codified.  Just look at H’s case.  According to the terms of the example, it is 
permissible for H to violate the principle forbidding adultery.  Clearly, the 
principle ‘adultery is wrong,’ which forbids adulterous actions, does not tell H 
what he should do in his particular situation.  Clearly, whatever the ideal-based 
account means by ‘principle,’ it does not involve the sort of situation-based, 
action-guiding principles against which we particularists mounted our attack.  
The ideal-based account of generality argues in favor of a conception of general 
principles that merely gives the appearance of being the same as the conception 
of principles under attack by particularism. 
 
Is there any merit to this particularist charge of ignoratio elenchi?  To determine whether it 
undermines the ideal-based account of generality, we will need to renew our examination of the 
way particularists and generalists conceive the logical form of general moral principles. 
4.7.1 The common assumption elaborated  
In section 1.5, I argued that generalists and particularists share a common assumption about 
general moral principles.  Specifically, for both, a moral principle is a universally quantified 
statement linking grounding properties (Fs) and moral properties (Ms).  Even though they share 
an assumption about the nature of general moral principles they nevertheless reach very different 
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conclusions.  While the generalist concludes that general principles are true, the particularist 
finds they are false.  The divergence arises because each succumbs to a variation of a certain 
confusion about the relation between the general and the particular.  The confusion, however, 
takes them in different directions because each recognizes a different and only partial insight 
about the relation.  Each partial insight illuminates an important dimension in moral reasoning, 
but because each fails to satisfactorily recognize the insight in the other’s view neither is able to 
arrive at a proper understanding of the relation between the general and the particular. 
Generalists are correct to think general moral principles have a role to play in moral 
deliberation, but problems arise for generalists when they further conclude that if there are any 
general moral principles, then, first, they must take the form of a universally quantified 
statement, and, second, they must apply to situations in either the subsumptive or presumptive 
manner.  The second point follows from the first.  If one thinks the only form a general 
expression can take is as a universally quantified statement, then it necessarily follows that such 
expressions must apply to situations either presumptively or subsumptively.  Why is this?  
Because, according to generalists, if generalism is true, then for any given principle [i.e., ‘∀x (Fx  
 Mx)] there must be an invariable connection between F and M.  According to generalists, for 
the connection to be invariable, then it must be either subsumptive or presumptive.  If the 
connection is subsumptive, the view is:  if F, then absolutely x is M, unconditionally and without 
qualification.  If the connection is presumptivist, the view is:  if F, then x is the worse (or the 
better ) for being F. 
Since generalists hold one of these two views of how a general moral principle is related 
to a particular case, generalists—wanting to hold onto the insight that principles express genuine 
moral knowledge—conclude that principles do in fact apply (either subsumptively or 
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presumptively).  If principles are to apply in the way generalists think they must, then the 
relations between Fs and Ms must be invariable in any particular case in which the Fs appear.  
My view is that generalists are right that principles play a role in our moral deliberations, but 
they are wrong to think the general relations principles articulate must take the form of 
universally quantified statements (understood either presumptively or subsumptively).   
In sum, generalists hold (A) there are general moral principles if and only if they can be 
expressed in terms of universally quantified statements (understood either presumptively or 
subsumptively).  They also hold (B) there are general moral principles.  Because the possibility 
of true universally quantified statements depends on the existence of invariable moral relations 
that hold across particular situations, generalists conclude (C) there are such invariable moral 
relations between Fs and Ms that hold (subsumptively or presumptively), such that F entails M in 
each any every situation in which F is instantiated. 
In response to generalists, particularists generate examples meant to prove that in 
particular situations relations between Fs and Ms are not invariable.  Particularists are correct to 
think these relations are not invariable.  But because particularists, like generalists, believe 
principles must take the form of universally quantified statements—and therefore must apply to 
situations in either the presumptive or subsumptive manner—particularists conclude that any 
putative moral principle that attempts to capture these non-existent relations between Fs and Ms 
is necessarily false.  There are no such relations;  there simply is no way a general proposition, so 
understood, can capture the endlessly variable relations between Fs and Ms in particular 
situations.  
In sum, particularists believe that (C) is false—there are no invariable moral relations that 
hold across particular situations.  They also believe (A), that is, there are genuine moral 
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principles if and only if they can be expressed as universally quantified statements (this is the 
aforementioned assumption in common with generalists).  On the basis that (A) is true and (C) is 
false, particularists conclude that (B) is false—that is, particularists conclude there are no 
genuine general moral principles.  Holding onto (A) in conjunction with the denial of (C), of 
course, necessitates the conclusion that there are no general moral principles and any putative 
moral principle is necessarily false (since to be a genuine moral principle it must take the 
universally quantified form).  
I believe there is a better account to be had of the generality in moral principles, 
according to which both particularists and the generalists should reject only (A).  If particularists 
were to reject (A), they could continue to hold onto their fundamental idea that (C) is false, i.e., 
they could hold onto the idea that there are no invariable (subsumptive or presumptive) moral 
relations between Fs and Ms that obtain in each and every situation, without being forced as a 
matter of logic to reject the generalist insight that (B) there are genuine general moral principles.  
I will argue later that indeed particularists should embrace the generalist insight that (B) there are 
genuine moral principles.  Furthermore, if generalists were to reject (A), they could continue to 
hold onto their fundamental belief that (B) there are genuine moral principles and accept what 
seems obviously true, i.e., the particularist insight that (C) is false.40  Whether either party would 
go along with my suggestion to reject (A) depends on the plausibility of some alternative account 
of the generality expressed in moral principles. 
40 I will argue that both the generalist and the particularist should accept a role for 
propositions that are unvarying in their relation to the ideal.  The generalist is incorrect to think 
that propositions that are invariable in their instantiation play a role in moral thought, but can 
accept that unvarying propositions do play a role.  The particularist is incorrect to think that no 
general proposition can play a role in moral thought, and instead can accept a role for unvarying 
propositions.  See further discussion in this section and also the discussion in section 4.5.2. 
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Understanding the alternative proposed by the ideal-based account of generality requires 
prizing the common assumption (A) into two related claims.  The common assumption, most 
obviously, is a claim about the logical form of principles:  they are universally quantified 
statements.  Closely connected to this, however, is a claim about the relationship between 
principles and action and how the former guide the latter, i.e., if principles do guide actions, then 
they do so only subsumptively or presumptively.  According to generalists of the subsumptivist 
stripe, if an F-property entails an M-property in any situation, it does so in every situation.   
Principles guide action when a particular case can be subsumed under a principle with the 
relevant F-property, which results in a syllogistic conclusion about what to do.  If F is ‘telling a 
lie’ and M is ‘bad,’ then F should not be done.  For the presumptivist, principles provide less 
direct guidance, but nevertheless rely on syllogistic conclusions.  The presumptivist, like the 
subsumptivist, believes that if an F-property entails an M-property in any situation, it does so 
unconditionally in every situation.  However, presumptivism differs from subsumptivism 
because in situations with multiple F-properties the conclusion about which act to perform is a 
function of what on balance41 would be right (yield the highest moral valence).  So while 
conclusions about the moral valence of any given F-property are syllogistic, it is not always the 
case that the ultimate conclusion about right action is.  Despite this difference, both the 
subsumptivist and the presumptivist share the view that (i) the essential function of principles is 
to guide actions, (ii) if principles do guide actions, then they only do so algorithmically in either 
the subsumptive or presumptive manner, a claim which is implicit in assumption (A), and (iii) 
principles do guide actions in either the subsumptive or presumptive manner. 
41 This is Dancy’s view about how a judgment is made when multiple F-properties apply, 
not necessarily Ross’s.  See discussion in chapters one and two, which makes clear that 
presumptivism refers only to Dancy’s reading of Ross. 
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Particularists likewise believe that (i) the essential function of principles is to guide 
actions and—as we can now see—because the particularist holds assumption (A) she is likewise 
committed to the view that (ii) if principles guide actions, then they can only do so 
algorithmically in either the subsumptive or presumptive manner.  However, for particularists, 
the essential problem with principles is that they cannot guide actions algorithmically because 
there are no invariable relations between F- and M-properties for principles to codify.  As we 
have seen, in response to any principle generalists can produce there is a card up the 
particularists’ sleeve:  the possibility of a counterexample that can refute the generalists’ claim to 
have produced a principle that provides either presumptive or subsumptive guidance.   
Implicit in this refutation is the particularist’s commitment to a specific view about the 
relationship between principles and action:  it is the generalists’ view.  In other words, not only 
do generalists and particularists share a common assumption about the logical form moral 
principles must take, but their common assumption entails they must agree about the action-
guiding relation between principles and actions, viz., they must agree that if principles guide at 
all, they do it algorithmically in either the subsumptive or presumptive manner.  Because 
particularists believe it is impossible for principles to guide in this way, particularists conclude 
that principles are false and therefore play no role in moral thought.   
4.7.2 A response to the charge of ignoratio elenchi 
With the common assumption prized apart and the particularists’ view about the relationship 
between principles and action now explicit, we can address the particularists’ charge of ignoratio 
elenchi.  It is, at its core, a complaint that the ideal-based account of generality fails to show that 
principles play a role in moral thought because it does not show that the kind of principles it 
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endorses are action-guiding.  There actually are two ways of understanding this complaint.  On 
the one hand, the charge might be that the ideal-based account of generality fails to demonstrate 
a role for principles because it does not show that principles can provide subsumptive or 
presumptive conclusions about right action.  If this is the charge, then it is true, but it is harmless 
for the ideal-based account of generality.  However, if the particularists’ charge is that the ideal-
based account does not tell against particularism because the ideal-based account cannot show 
that its principles can be action-guiding, then their charge is incorrect.  
In other words, the matter in question for particularists is exactly the question of whether 
principles can guide action.  Contra the charge of ignoratio elenchi, I have addressed precisely 
that question.  But I have done so not by showing that principles play the role particularists (as 
well as generalists) seek them to play.  I have instead shown that principles once properly 
conceived are action-guiding.  Therefore, according to the ideal-based account of generality, 
principles do indeed play a role in moral thought.  Particularists reject a role for principles 
because (like generalists) they believe (A), which entails a limited view of how principles can 
guide action.  Once shed of the common assumption about the logical form of principles, it is 
possible for both generalists and particularists to reconceive principles as action-guiding in ways 
not envisioned by either of them.  
4.7.3 Insights in particularism, generalism, and the ideal-based account 
We turn now to an examination of the way in which the example of H’s moral reflections gives 
credence to some aspects of the generalist and particularist positions, and discredits others, in 
ways that bring the merits of the ideal-based account of generality into clearer focus.  Recall 
from section 4.5.2, the distinction between propositions that are invariable in their instantiation 
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(‘invariable propositions’) and propositions that are unvarying in their relation to the ideal 
(‘unvarying propositions’).  We can use the distinction to refine our account of the generalist and 
the particularist positions.   
Generalists are correct to insist that principles play an essential role in moral-judgment 
making.  In H’s case we see that they do indeed play a role in his moral deliberations about what 
to do—but contra the generalist position, principles do not function subsumptively or 
presumptively, and therefore, they are not propositions that are invariable in their instantiation.  
That is, they do not depend on the invariable instantiation of invariable moral relations that 
obtain between specific Fs and Ms in every situation, as generalists suppose they must.  
According to the ideal-based account of generality, when H reflects on the ideal of marital 
fidelity, he is, at some point, reflecting on a proposition (‘do not commit adultery’ or ‘adultery is 
wrong’) that is unvarying in its relation to the ideal of marriage.  The proposition is unvarying 
because it expresses an on-going concern or value that is entailed by the ideal.  Its relation to the 
ideal is unvarying because it simply makes more articulate an aspect of the ideal.  But the 
relation between ‘adultery’ and ‘wrong’ is not invariable in its instantiation, i.e., it is not the case 
that for any instantiation of F, then invariably M is instantiated.  Thus, we should not understand 
the proposition ‘adultery is wrong’ as an invariable proposition because it should not be 
understood as purporting to claim that each and every instantiation of adultery (F) invariably 
entails wrongness or wrong-making-ness (M).  We should understand it as an unvarying 
proposition, i.e., it has an unvarying relation to the (content of the) ideal of marriage. 
Particularists are correct to insist on the infinite variability of situations, but wrong to 
think that this renders impossible the applicability of principles.  The complexities of H’s case 
indeed point up the inadequacy of a subsumptive or presumptive application of, for example, the 
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principle ‘adultery is wrong.’  But contra the particularists’ view, the infinite variability of 
situations does not mean that situations forever outrun the reach of general moral principles, like 
‘adultery is wrong.’  H’s situation appears to be a counterexample that falsifies the principle 
against adultery.  But it is obvious that the complexities of H’s situation do not place it out of 
reach of the principle.  The complexities do not falsify the principle prohibiting adultery.  The 
principle, with its unvarying relation to the ideal of marital fidelity, must bear on H’s situation.  
Indeed, the principle necessarily bears on any situation involving the western conception of 
marriage.  Regardless of whether H enunciates the principle to himself, he must come to 
understand why adultery is wrong—which is just another way of saying he has to understand 
why there is a principle prohibiting it.  Only through an understanding of what is expressed by 
this principle can he determine whether adultery might not be wrong in his case.  In other words, 
what is expressed by the principle is not something false;  it expresses an on-going value. 
While generalists are correct that a principle like ‘adultery is wrong’ does indeed play a 
role in reflections like H’s, it is not quite in the way generalists imagine;  and although 
particularists are correct that the unique complexity of H’s situation renders the familiar principle 
against adultery subsumptively and presumptively inapplicable, particularists are wrong to 
conclude that the complexity renders the principle false or useless in the way they presume.  
Ideals insure that particular situations are not forever beyond the reach of principles.  The general 
relation between ‘adultery’ and ‘wrongness’ does not evaporate because there are cases like H’s.  
Ideals are bound up with principles (e.g., ‘do not commit adultery’).  Reflecting on an ideal can 
help us understand the aims and values of the ideal;  reflecting on these can help us understand 
how to exemplify the ideal or whether in certain circumstances it is impossible (in whole or in 
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part).  Even when impossible, the relevant principles still play a role in H’s reflections.42  
Determining whether an agent’s action exemplifies an ideal is not a matter of assessing the single 
action in isolation;  it is a process of engagement with the circumstances, principles, and ideals 
(which often overlap with other ideals) in all their complexity. 
It is not for no reason that both particularists and generalists are drawn to common 
assumption (A).  What the common assumption is meant to capture is a kind of decisiveness or 
definitiveness:  if F is the case, then M is the case:  absolutely and without question, no 
exceptions.  Generalists seek exceptionless principles and find them by insisting on invariable 
relations between Fs and Ms.  Particularists seek exceptionless principles, but finds exceptions to 
any candidate, and reject their possibility.  For both, a true principle is supposed to represent a 
higher authority, a court of last resort in which a matter can be settled once and for all. 43  As we 
discussed in the previous section, Murdoch’s injunction functions as the highest or ultimate 
principle in the ideal-based account of generality.  It is final;  there are no exceptions.  For this 
reason, it does not take the form of a conditional proposition, as common assumption (A) 
requires.  There is no reason for it to take that form.  There are no conditions under which it does 
not hold.  It is unconditional.  If what draws both generalists and particularists to common 
assumption (A) is the lure of something truly unconditional, then it should be amenable to both 
the generalist and particularist to embrace Murdoch’s truly exceptionless injunction.  In the next 
42 See discussion in previous section under the heading ‘Is it possible to violate a 
principle or an ideal?’ 
 
43 For some legal thinkers, even the court of last resort, e.g., the United States Supreme 
Court, is not truly definitive.  See Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of civil disobedience in Taking 
Rights Seriously, where he argues, for example, that the Court’s decision in Minersville School 
District v. Board of Education was not truly law because it was not consistent with the 
underlying political morality of the United States Constitution.  In fact, the Court reversed itself 
three years later (206-22). 
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section, after first dealing with an objection, we see how embracing Murdoch’s injunction 
involves ideals. 
4.8 THE CHARGE THAT PRINCIPLES CANNOT GUIDE ACTION 
Whereas the particularists’ previous charge of ignoratio elenchi was that the ideal-based account 
does not tell against the principles particularists have in mind because it does not tell against 
principles with the generality that figures in assumption (A), particularists might make yet 
another charge against the ideal-based account of generality:  it fails to provide an acceptable 
alternative to assumption (A);  it fails to show that its principles play a role in moral thought 
because it fails to show how its principles can be action-guiding.  In other words, particularists 
might say, “Even if it is granted that principles of the sort you describe play a role in H’s 
reflections, the ideal-based account of generality fails to show that they guide H’s actions.  H is 
precisely not guided by the principle against adultery.  He does the opposite;  he violates it.”  It is 
true that the example of H emphasizes the role of ideals and their attendant principles in H’s 
reflections.  This, however, is precisely of a piece with what makes such principles action-
guiding.  But these principles are not action-guiding in the manner envisioned by particularists 
(or generalists).   
4.8.1 Conditioning the system and the mechanism of choice 
To explain in greater detail how principles are action-guiding, I would like to develop a 
suggestion we find in Murdoch.  The core idea is that principles are action-guiding in the sense 
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that they play a necessary role in preparing the agent for the moment when action is called for.  
We should distinguish between preparations that are guiding and preparations that are 
instrumental.  The latter sort of preparation includes buying the ingredients to make soup, or 
sharpening blades to go ice skating.  The buying of ingredients does not guide the making of the 
soup, and the sharpening of blades does not guide the skating.  The kind of preparing in 
Murdoch’s suggestion is the former sort:  preparation that guides action in the sense of directing 
it. 
Murdoch presents this idea in her criticism of what she calls western moral philosophy;  
her main target is existentialism and what she calls Oxford philosophy.  Part of her problem with 
these views, she writes, is that the “idea of goodness (and of virtue) has been largely superseded . 
. .  by the idea of rightness, supported perhaps by some conception of sincerity,” which she sees 
as:  
 
to some extent a natural outcome of the disappearance of a permanent background to 
human activity:  a permanent background, whether provided by God, by Reason, by 
History, or by the self.  The agent, thin as a needle, appears in the quick flash of the 
choosing will . . . The agent’s freedom, indeed his moral quality, resides in his choices, 
and yet we are not told what prepares him for the choices.  (Sovereignty 53)  
 
Her overarching gripe with western moral philosophy is that the moral value of persons resides 
in their choices and yet the state of the agent—that which drives the choice, what I call the 
  170 
‘mechanism of choice’—is left mysterious.44  Unsurprisingly, the problem persists in today’s 
generalism.  R. M. Hare, in fact, is one of Murdoch’s direct targets.  What is curious is that it 
persists in particularism, which developed as a response to the generalists’ portrayal of choice as 
the product of an algorithmic application of principles to situations.  Particularism speaks 
eloquently about the complexities of situations that make implausible the algorithmic depiction 
of choice.  However, particularists, like the generalists of old, ignore the connection between the 
choice itself (what the agent chooses) and the “mechanism of choice” (the state of the agent).  
Instead, it focuses narrowly on the complexities of situations—complexities that resolve 
themselves into what the particularist calls a situation’s shape.  Shape is expressible as the upshot 
of reasons for and against various actions—the arrangement of which reveals the right choice of 
action—but, for the particularist, what drives the revelation of shape, what drives the choice, is 
unaccounted for.  On the particularist’s account it remains not only unarticulated, but 
“inarticulable” (Dancy, Ethics 191).45  What I in chapter three called the particularist’s lacuna is, 
in other words, the gaping mystery of the mechanism of choice. 
It is no doubt true that there are limits to what we can say about the mechanism of choice 
and that what can be said can be difficult to state.  Murdoch identifies several (of what she finds 
to be unsatisfactory) attempts made by western philosophers to describe it.  The existentialist 
view Murdoch finds to be “unrealistic” and “over-optimistic” because “it ignores what appears at 
44 I craft this phrase from the specific terms in which Murdoch lodges her complaint 
against western moral philosophy.  On the heels of describing her problem with existentialism 
and Oxford philosophy as a problem about how to solve the “mystery of choice,” she discusses 
Freud and characterizes his solution to the mystery in terms of a powerful, highly individual, and 
personal mechanism (54, emphasis added).  From these two closely related bits of text, I fashion 
the term “mechanism of choice.” 
 
45 See also the discussion in chapter three. 
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least to be a sort of continuous background with a life of its own;  and it is surely in the tissue of 
that life that the secrets of good and evil are to be found” (Sovereignty 54).  She finds the views 
of Oxford and British philosophers unrealistically truncated because they focus exclusively on 
choice and reasons for choice, but ignore intentions and motives.  Murdoch gives as an example 
Hare, whom she says “holds that the identification of mental data, such as ‘intentions’, is 
philosophically difficult” and who decides, therefore, that “we had better say that a man is 
morally the set of his actual choices” (53).  She gives, as another example, British philosophers, 
who use the fact “that motives don’t readily yield to ‘introspection’ . . . as an excuse for 
forgetting them and talking about ‘reasons’ instead” (53).  These views, concludes Murdoch, are 
“unhelpful to the moral pilgrim and also profoundly unrealistic”(53).  Even Kant, who according 
to Murdoch, acknowledged that moral choice was often a mystery, nevertheless inadequately 
pictured it as “an indiscernible balance between a pure rational agent and an impersonal 
mechanism, neither of which,” according to Murdoch, represent “what we normally think of as 
personality” (53-4).  
In Murdoch’s estimation, all these views fall short:  “neither the inspiring [existentialist] 
ideas of freedom, [nor the Oxfordian notions of] sincerity and fiats of will, nor the plain 
wholesome [Kantian] concept of a rational discernment of duty, seem complex enough to do 
justice to what we really are” (54).  For Murdoch, the failure to do adequate justice to what we 
really are is attributable to the fact that western moral philosophy has not done justice to the 
mechanism of choice.  Murdoch herself finds it difficult to do it justice.  She gropes for an 
account of this mysterious mechanism and settles on a view in which we are: 
much more like a system of energy out of which choices and visible acts of will emerge 
at intervals in ways which are often unclear and often dependent on the condition of the 
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system in between the moments of choice.  If this is so, one of the main problems of 
moral philosophy might be formulated thus:  are there any techniques for the purification 
and reorientation of an energy which is naturally selfish, in such a way that when 
moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of acting right?  We shall also have to ask 
whether, if there are such techniques, they should be simply described in quasi-
psychological terms, perhaps in psychological terms, or whether they can be spoken of in 
a more systematic philosophical way.  (Sovereignty 54) 
 
The ideal-based account of generality tackles the last of these and shows there indeed are 
techniques for conditioning the system that can be spoken of in a “systematic philosophical way” 
(54).  It provides an account of what we can articulate about both “the condition of the system” 
and “techniques” for conditioning it “in between moments of choice” in order to prepare for 
“acting right” (54).   
4.8.2 A response to the charge that principles cannot guide action 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, reflection is one such technique for 
conditioning the system and preparing for acting right.  Principles play an indirect yet integral 
role in guiding or directing actions, and there are at least three systematic philosophical ways in 
which they do so.  Principles can be objects of reflection, spurs to reflection, and articulations of 
on-going ends for reflection.  This preparation is such that the actions that result from it will be 
better guided than actions that call for such reflection, but do not receive it.  Not all actions call 
for this kind of reflective preparation;  for example, with practice and repetition, much 
spontaneous action is actually the result of earlier preparative reflection. 
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In order to develop this idea of preparative reflection that indirectly guides action, I first 
will discuss the role of principles in H’s reflections and its connection to Murdoch’s idea of the 
just and loving gaze.  I will then discuss the three systematic philosophical ways in which 
principles that figure in reflection thereby play an indirect role in guiding action.  Finally, in 
section 4.9, I will focus on a special role that reflecting on principles can play in cultivating on-
going commitments that “condition the system” (i.e., develop character) in preparation for right 
action. 
4.8.2.1 The action-guiding role of principles in H’s reflection 
Any adequate reconstruction of H’s reflections must involve more than his noting that he should 
follow Murdoch’s unconditional injunction to look with a just and loving gaze and ask himself 
the two key questions:  Have I cleared away the distortions of my ego?  Am I looking in the light 
of the Good?  The ideal-based account of generality insists that the task of reflection cannot be 
so vague as these questions suggest.  H must clear away egoistic influences, yes, but he must also 
take up the stance appropriate to W, who is the “object” of his attention.  Murdoch does not 
emphasize the ways in which specific considerations play a role in arriving at the relation 
specified by her injunction to look with a just and loving gaze, but a more detailed specification 
of the relevant dimensions of the Good must come into play.  That is, it simply is not enough to 
“look in light of the Good,” where ‘Good’ is a vague, abstract idea that risks looking like the 
command to be “sincere,” which Murdoch condemns in her critique of western philosophy (54). 
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It is on this matter that the ideal-based account of generality moves beyond Murdoch’s.46  
Murdoch’s injunction directs us to clear everything away, look in light of the Good, and see the 
object for what it is, but the lesson of the ideal-based account of generality is that we are always 
looking in light of some enriched conception of the Good.  We never could, and never should, 
clear everything away.  H’s reflections must necessarily involve his understanding of the sort of 
values and obligations that bear on the situation in which he and W are enmeshed.  He cannot 
achieve a clear view of W without taking up the ideal of marriage and its attendant principles, 
such as ‘adultery is wrong’ and ‘abandonment of one’s spouse is wrong.’47  Both principles 
express some of the aims of the ideal of marital fidelity, which H seeks to exemplify toward W.  
What H must do is reflect on the Good in a specific way, that is, as it specifically pertains to his 
situation. 
For H to answer the question of whether his egoistic concerns are interfering with his 
attainment of the ideal of marital fidelity, he will have to examine whether any selfish or other 
distorting forces have caused him to wrongly conclude that adultery is not wrong in his case.  He 
will have to consider what makes adultery wrong and whether his behavior nevertheless 
exemplifies marital fidelity.  In other words, when H reflects on whether adultery is wrong in his 
case, he must consider the meaning of ‘do not commit adultery.’  There is nothing esoteric about 
46 Maria Antonaccio’s discussion in Picturing the Good:  The Moral Thought of Iris 
Murdoch suggests it might be a substantial departure from Murdoch, if Murdoch holds that the 
“route” to the Good is a matter of inarticulate faith (56-7).  But see Antonaccio’s argument in the 
same discussion for evidence that this is not the only route to the Good on Murdoch’s view. 
 
47 As with the example of M and D, M (with her view of D as common and overly-
familiar) cannot help but take up the matter of what sort of conduct is appropriate between 
family members, especially between mothers- and daughters-in-law.  Murdoch, however, does 
not characterize M’s reflections with this level of specificity. 
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characterizing this aspect of H’s reflections in terms of his reflecting on the principle prohibiting 
adultery.  
H’s reflections illustrate how the ideal-based account of generality forges a connection 
between Murdoch’s general, unconditional injunction to look with a just and loving gaze and 
specific principles like ‘adultery is wrong.’  The injunction satisfies the urge for exceptionless-
ness that draws the generalist and the particularist to common assumption (A), but its 
exceptionless-ness must be fleshed out and developed in terms of ideals.  In this regard, the 
ideal-based account of generality expands on Murdoch’s account by showing how ideals give 
content to her injunction and steer the on-going aim of trying to see things aright.  Attending to 
the ideal and its related principles is an essential part of the task of looking with a just and loving 
gaze, i.e., it is an essential task of perfecting vision.  Perfecting vision involves attending to the 
Good—the Good as it is expressed in ideals that bear on any particular situations—which will 
involve reflecting on the principles that are connected to those ideals.  Reflecting on these helps 
H get clear about his values and what he ought to do.  This in turn helps H clear away the ego.  It 
gives him a clearer view of what matters, which helps him get a clearer view of himself, of W, 
and of their relation to one another.  This effort is, I think, part of what Murdoch calls the 
“energy” that drives the mechanism of choice.  
4.8.2.2 Three action-guiding roles for principles in reflection 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, it is fitting to characterize H’s effort to act 
well as involving reflection on ordinary moral principles.  We can, however, be more specific 
about the ways in which principles are involved:  principles can be objects of reflection, spurs to 
reflection, and articulations of on-going ends for reflection.  An examination of H’s reflections 
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helps illustrate the complexity and nuance of these overlapping ways in which principles play a 
guiding role in reflection and preparation for action.    
Because H understands and is committed to the ideal of marital fidelity, it functions as a 
sight point from which he embraces the various principles associated with the ideal, such as the 
principles forbidding adultery, spousal abandonment, and spousal neglect.  These ordinary moral 
principles can provide to H a ready spur and give him cause to reflect on his conduct and its 
relation to the relevant ideal.  For example, the principle ‘do not commit adultery’ establishes a 
sort of checkpoint, which can trigger reflection.  When it does so, H necessarily is aware of the 
principle, but he can deepen his focus.  When H brings the principle into deeper focus, he makes 
it an object of reflection, which can be a touchstone for considering why adultery is wrong in the 
ideal and whether a sexual relationship with O is wrong in his circumstances.  The principle, 
therefore, is both an object of reflection, as well as a spur to reflection.   
Furthermore, principles like those forbidding adultery, spousal abandonment, and spousal 
neglect, are part of the articulation of on-going ends for reflection.  Principles give content and 
direction to reflection and help in directing H’s efforts.  They package and make articulate values 
associated with marital fidelity, which he, ideally, always aims to exemplify in his conduct.  If he 
values sexual fidelity, caretaking, and companionship in marriage, then he ideally always wants 
to exemplify these in his actions when they are called for.  Obviously, such a goal is aspirational, 
because it is not attainable always and without deviation, but H cannot aspire to it without some 
articulation of it.  Principles provide some of that articulation:  they articulate on-going ends for 
reflection, which ideally are exemplified in action.   
We can see that ordinary moral principles, like ‘promises should be kept’ or ‘tell the 
truth’ or ‘be beneficent’ can play similar roles in cases that involve ideals other than marital 
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fidelity.  Consider the example of Q, who finds herself easing her path by telling increasingly 
frequent “white lies.”  Suppose she is committed to the ideal of truthfulness, and with it the 
associated principle ‘do not lie.’  She begins to worry that she is falling into a habit of lying 
whenever it is expedient.  Her embrace of the familiar moral principle ‘lying is wrong’ (as part of 
the ideal of truthfulness to which she is committed), and the fact that she violates it, is a spur to 
reflection on its meaning and its bearing on her conduct.  When she thinks about its relation to 
her conduct, she makes the principle an object of reflection.  Doing so is of a piece with the task 
of reflecting on why lying is wrong, why telling the truth is right, and why she should check 
herself against an encroaching habit of needless, even heedless, fibbing.  The principle also 
provides an on-going end for reflection as part of the ideal of truthfulness.  Is it ever okay to 
violate the principle?  If so, when?  How can she improve in her efforts to follow the principle 
when she should?  As in H’s case, the principle gives content and direction to her reflections;  it 
packages and makes articulate some of the relevant values and aims that are part of the ideal of 
truthfulness, which she seeks to exemplify.   
It is worth noting that her commitment to the ideal of truthfulness involves more than 
simply understanding and reflecting on the principle ‘do not lie.’  Truthfulness in the ideal 
involves knowing the difference between deception and discretion;  it involves becoming 
sensitive to different ways of conveying the truth;  it involves understanding spheres of 
confidentiality (and related principles like ‘mind your own business’ and ‘do not pry’);  it even 
involves knowing how to interact with others to help foster truthful dialogue, e.g., a person 
committed to truthfulness might not ask a friend to answer a question that pressures her to breach 
confidentiality.  
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An illustrative case appeared in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s New York Times ethics 
column recently.  A teacher’s male friend applied for a job at the school where she teaches.  The 
friend did not get the job.  Later, at lunch with her department head, the teacher learns her friend 
was not hired because he had made a bad impression and seemed full of himself.  Knowing about 
the lunch, the friend asks the teacher if she found out why he did not get the job.   
Suppose the teacher is like Q from the example above and is trying to squelch a nascent 
habit of fibbing.  Must she tell her male friend the truth?  She wants to tell a white lie, and 
indeed, there is pressure to shade the truth (to say ‘I don’t know’ or ‘the topic didn’t come up at 
lunch’) or even to tell an outright lie (‘I was told you were overqualified’).  She can, of course, 
say ‘no comment’ or ‘that’s confidential,’ but both responses would be sufficiently awkward in a 
friendship that they would be hard to muster.  What should she do to exemplify the ideal of 
truthfulness?  Is a white lie ever justified?  If so, is this a case in which it is?  How does the fact 
that she is acquiring a habit of lying factor into her reflections?  If she fibs, she misses an 
opportunity to instruct her friend about spheres of confidentiality.  Maybe she does not think 
confidentiality is pertinent.  Maybe she simply does not want to hurt her friend’s feelings or deal 
with his reaction, if he becomes upset.  How do these personal desires bear on the question of 
how best to exemplify the ideal of truthfulness? 
The behavior of the male friend raises other interesting questions about truthfulness.  
Although he does not seem to realize it, the male friend has failed to exemplify aspects of 
various overlapping ideals of truthfulness, of friendship, and so on.  If he were more attuned to 
the ideal of truthfulness, he would realize the difficult position he puts his friend in, and he 
would not ask such a pointed question.  Interlocutors committed to the ideal of truth foster 
conversational conditions in which truthfulness is possible, rather than create conversational 
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gambits in which there is pressure to lie.  The friend should be aware of and respect the zone of 
confidentiality around the topic of why he was not hired.  His pointed question is an 
encroachment that fails to exemplify the ideal of truthfulness. 
These examples show that principles must be understood in terms of ideals.  Mere 
compliance with a principle is not sufficient to exemplify an ideal, nor is non-compliance with a 
principle sufficient to constitute a definitive failure to exemplify an ideal.  The latter of these 
raises the question of how to think about actions that fail to comply with a principle that 
articulates part of the content of a relevant ideal.  Q should stop telling lies, but H is not 
supposed to stop committing adultery.  The question posed earlier by the particularists remains:  
how can the ideal-based account of generality maintain that H’s conduct is guided by the 
principle against adultery, when he violates it?  Does the ideal-based account of generality claim 
that H is guided by the principle prohibiting adultery regardless of whether or not he violates it?   
It looks like the ideal-based account of generality wants to have its cake and eat it, too. 
If we refer to section 4.6.6 and the answer to the question about whether it is possible to 
violate a principle, we can see that, according to a proper understanding of the ideal-based 
account of generality, it can have both.  If the notion of being guided by a principle is understood 
subsumptively or presumptively, i.e., in terms of common assumption (A), then it will appear 
odd to say that H is guided by a principle that he violates.  As we have seen, however, the ideal-
based account of generality offers a conception of being guided by a principle that differs from 
the conception of guidance shared by both the generalist and particularist.  The question for H, 
according to the ideal-based account of generality, therefore, is not whether H violates the 
principle, but to what degree he fails to exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity.  The ideal and its 
principles guide H in making this judgment.  Determining whether H’s behavior is wrong, on 
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this view, is a judgment about where it falls on the continuum of behavior that (we might say) 
merely falls short of the ideal and behavior that definitely does not exemplify the (or perhaps 
any) ideal.  In the latter case, it is defective, i.e., wrong. 
Where a behavior is located on the continuum is not simply a matter of determining 
whether an associated principle has been violated.  H technically has violated the principle 
prohibiting adultery, but his behavior nevertheless exemplifies the ideal of marital fidelity.  In 
fact, there is no longer any way H and W can exemplify that aspect of the ideal pertaining to 
sexual intimacy.  H exemplifies the ideal of marital fidelity to the extent it is possible to do so.  
Thus, the central issue according to the ideal-based account of generality is whether H’s 
behavior, in light of the full context of circumstances, ideals, and their principles, exemplifies the 
ideal of marital fidelity.  There are reasons for his behavior that are connected to the ideal of 
marital fidelity itself as well as other overlapping ideals, such as those concerning 
companionship and intimacy that apply to his relationship with O. 
H’s adultery is permissible because, seen in the light of the full context, his behavior 
toward and relationship with W nevertheless do indeed exemplify marital fidelity.  The marriage 
falls short of the ideal because of W’s incapacity;  the fault is not in H’s conduct.  The adultery 
does not interfere with exemplifying the ideal of marital fidelity.  In fact, any attempt to 
exemplify that part of the ideal of marital fidelity that pertains to sexual intimacy could be quite 
wrong, e.g., having sex with W might be akin to having sexual intercourse with someone in a 
coma.48  
We can imagine a scenario in which some other H, call him H3, is sexually faithful and 
yet fails to exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity because, e.g., he abandons W in the hospital 
48 See the discussion in footnote 13 of this chapter. 
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and essentially forgets she exists.  Such conduct obviously does not on the whole exemplify 
marital fidelity, even though it adheres to the prohibition on adultery.  Obviously, technical 
compliance with a principle is compatible with behavior that fails to exemplify the ideal.  Also 
obvious is the fact that H3 violates another relevant principle, i.e., the principle prohibiting 
spousal neglect and abandonment.  However, the violation of this principle is blameworthy—
because, in violating it, H3 fails to exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity for no reason that can be 
seen as exemplifying the ideal of marital fidelity or any other ideal.  Conversely, as H’s case 
demonstrates, failure to comply with a principle can nevertheless be compatible with the ideal of 
marital fidelity and, therefore, not blameworthy. 
It is important to make explicit that, on the ideal-based account of generality, the ways in 
which principles and ideals figure in reflection are intermingling;  there is a “to and fro” in how 
principles and overlapping ideals relate to one another.  The relation is not algorithmic.  For 
example, H’s commitment to the principle ‘do not commit adultery’ is grounded in his 
commitment to the ideal of marriage, and the principle guides him as part of that commitment (as 
a spur, an object, and an on-going end for reflection).  But, no doubt, H’s reflections will reach 
beyond the ideal of marital fidelity.  To answer the question of whether his relationship with O is 
compatible with his on-going aim to exemplify the ideal of marriage, H will reflect not only on 
the broader web of commitments that inform the ideal of marital fidelity.  He will also find 
himself reflecting on other relevant ideals, such as ideals of friendship and sexual and non-sexual 
companionship.  The ideal of marriage overlaps with these ideals, and H will likely find that his 
relation with O exemplifies aspects of many of them, including the ideal of marital fidelity itself. 
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4.9 FILLING THE LACUNA:  FROM PRINCIPLES TO CHARACTER 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, having principles in mind and reflecting on 
them is a necessary part of preparing for right action.  But even if an agent accepts a principle, 
like ‘do not lie,’ it is surely true that merely thinking about, or reflecting on, the principle is not 
sufficient to prepare the agent for acting on it when the time comes.  Surely, the ideal-based 
account of generality must accept the point that reflecting on ideals and their associated 
principles is not enough to “condition the system” for right action.  A famous experiment 
involving divinity students at the Princeton Theological Seminary makes vivid the challenge this 
point poses.   
The subjects (all divinity students at Princeton) were told that the object of the 
experiment was to see how they “think on their feet” (Batson 103).  The true purpose was to 
investigate personality and situational variables that determine helping behavior (100, passim).  
The students were asked to read a passage and then, without the aid of notes, deliver a brief 
lecture that would be recorded for assessment of their ability to extemporize.  Half the students 
were asked to read the Biblical parable about the Good Samaritan. The other half was given a 
passage about the “possible vocational roles of ministers” (107).  After reading the assigned 
passage, each was told to walk to a nearby building to meet an assistant, who would record the 
student’s talk.  Some students were told they were “already late” to meet the assistant and that 
they had better “get moving” and hurry to the next building.  Others were told that the assistant 
was ready and that they should “go right over.”  The final group was told that it would “be a few 
minutes before the assistant is ready” but that they “might as well head on over” and that if they 
had “to wait over there, it shouldn’t be long” (103-4).  En route to meeting the assistant, each 
student encountered a stranger in an alley who was slumped over on the ground, moaning, and 
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obviously needing help.  The experimenters’ hypothesis was that the students who had read the 
passage on the Good Samaritan would be more likely to help the stranger, but this turned out not 
to be the case.  Instead, the key determining factor in the “likelihood of offering the victim help” 
depended on how hurried the students perceived themselves to be (107).  In other words, the 
more pressed they felt for time, the less likely they were to offer help. 
What interests me are not the technical conclusions drawn by the experimenters, but 
rather a suggestion we might investigate in the penumbra of this experiment.  The striking result 
is that the seminary students who had read the parable of the Good Samaritan were not any better 
Samaritans than those who had not read the parable.  At first glance, the experiment seems to 
support the view that awareness, or even acceptance, of a principle, does not make it any more 
likely that an agent will follow it.  Furthermore, we can presume that the seminary students not 
only accepted the principle of Good Samaritanism, but they reflected on it while reading the 
parable and preparing for their note-free talk.  If true, these facts pose a problem for the ideal-
based account of generality, which emphasizes the importance of reflecting on accepted 
principles as a means of preparing for right action.  The Princeton experiment does pose a 
problem for the ideal-based account of generality, but more importantly for my purposes, it also 
suggests a way into the solution.   
If we extrapolate from the Princeton experiment, we will find good reasons to think that 
if people give themselves more time, they can prime, prepare, or condition themselves to be 
better able to exemplify the principle of Good Samaritanism (which is analogous to the familiar 
principle of beneficence or ‘be beneficent’).  For example, the Senegalese are brought up to 
engage with (or even give spontaneous gifts to) passers-by and to offer material aid to anyone in 
need in the moment.  This is part of their tradition of taranga, which loosely means ‘hospitality.’  
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As a result, the implicit cultural expectations about time management and timeliness tend to 
allow for greetings or, if necessary, assisting people who may be encountered en route.  We 
could describe this in terms closer to those of the ideal-based account of generality:  the 
Senegalese cultivate a cultural commitment to beneficence by organizing and prioritizing their 
time in ways that enable them to be better able to exemplify this commitment.  
Accepting a principle is different from being committed to it.  True commitment requires 
cultivating the commitment, which is an on-going process.49  Cultivation of commitment to a 
principle is what prepares agents for acting rightly.  Consider the principle of Good 
Samaritanism or ‘be beneficent.’  The principle articulates an aim for which agents can prepare 
themselves so that they are better able to exemplify it in their actions;  it articulates an aim 
around which agents can organize and direct their efforts so that they are better prepared when 
the moment for action arrives.  They cannot consciously prime or condition themselves to be 
better able to exhibit beneficence unless they have made a commitment to being beneficent, and 
yet part of achieving a commitment to being beneficent itself involves priming or conditioning.  
More to the point, having a commitment to beneficence involves cultivating the commitment.  
Reflection plays a special role in cultivating a commitment to principles—not just 
because reflection involves becoming clearer about what the principles mean, but also because 
reflection on principles can involve the cultivation of the commitment itself.  Cultivation of the 
commitment—by way of reflection and as an on-going end of reflection—can help us learn how 
to make ourselves better able to carry out the commitment.  Another way of saying this is:  
49 We are speaking here of commitments to principles that form part of the content of 
ideals that give specific content to the Good.  Therefore, the commitments in question are 
ultimately commitments to the Good.  As such, they are not optional, and the principles in 
question are not hypothetical imperatives.  See the related discussion in section 4.6.5. 
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reflection on principles is a way of guiding ourselves in advance;  in this way, it prepares us for 
right action.  To be clear, the preparation we are discussing is the kind that guides, not the 
instrumental kind of preparation as in gathering the equipment necessary to get the job done.  
The guiding sort of preparation guides in several ways:  in part because it is on-going, in part 
because it is aimed at the Good, and in part because when we allow ourselves, e.g., more time to 
get to the office, so we can be open to people along the way, it is our commitment to beneficence 
that is guiding us in our preparations to be beneficent when the moment calls for it.  
By reflecting on the principle prescribing beneficence, an agent can actually cultivate a 
commitment to it by conditioning or priming herself to foster beneficent actions, by conditioning 
or priming herself to make beneficence more likely and easier when the time for action comes.  
A principle can guide the agent not as an invariable diktat specifying how she ought to conduct 
herself in the moment-by-moment, “quick flash of the choosing will” (Sovereignty 54).  Rather, 
as part of the ideal, the principle serves as an unvarying end for reflection, a commitment to 
which she conditions herself to exemplify when the time comes.  Her commitment is something 
of a precondition for consciously preparing or conditioning herself to exemplify the commitment 
when a moment calling for beneficent action arrives.  This is one of the ways she becomes 
beneficent, through the cultivation of her commitment to it, by creating the conditions both 
within and without that make her the sort of person who will be beneficent when the time comes. 
It would be a mistake to take these remarks as saying that, according to the ideal-based 
account of generality, each and every person who is kind is so because she has articulated to 
herself the words ‘be beneficent when possible’ or that she has arrived at the idea that the ability 
to demonstrate beneficence is a function of how hurried she is, etc.  What the ideal-based 
account of generality is trying to do is make sense of our appeal to principles and show that we 
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do not make the best sense of them when we portray them as exceptionless diktats or defect-
inflicting in the generalist manner, or as suggestive reminders, discardable rules of thumb, or 
mere summaries, in the particularist manner.  According to the ideal-based account of generality, 
we should think of principles as unvarying propositions that help articulate the content of the 
ideals to which we are committed.  In other words, principles represent commitments, and it is 
especially hard to square the idea of a commitment, which necessarily is on-going, with the 
particularist conception of a principle as merely suggestive, potentially discardable, or only a 
summary of what counted as right action in the past. 
Even more to the point, true commitment requires an effort to prepare and guide oneself 
to be better able to act on the commitment, something which is cultivated through reflection, as 
well as in other ways, like Aristotelian practicing, play acting, training, etc.50  Preparation for the 
sort of action we are discussing here involves a commitment to the Good and its iterations in 
ideals and their principles.51  Commitment is not most aptly characterized as a moment-to-
moment endeavor.  Much of the groundwork for our becoming people who exemplify the Good 
in actions takes place behind the scenes.  Reflecting on ideals and their principles bears on the 
50 Stephen Engstrom mentions an illustrative example of purely reflective preparation 
recounted by C. S. Peirce in volume five of The Collected Papers.  At a Peirce family dinner, 
Peirce’s mother spilled “some burning spirits on her skirt” and it caught fire.  The other diners 
sat motionless, but instantly Peirce’s young brother leapt to his feet, “snatched up the rug and 
smothered the fire” (par. 538).  Apparently, at other dinners the brother had seen close calls with 
burning spirits from a “blazer” or “chafing dish” and had worked out in fine detail what he 
would do if someone actually caught fire.  Peirce writes of his brother that “he had often run over 
in imagination all the details of what ought to be done in such an emergency.  It was a striking 
example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination” (par. 487 fn. 1).  The brother’s 
seemingly spontaneous action was induced by pure reflection on how to render aid.  The results 
of his reflections were concretely beneficial without any concrete practice in advance.   
 
51 Of course, it need not be;  people can make a commitment to evil and presumably use 
the techniques described here to cultivate it, but that is not what is on the table here. 
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choices we make.  Of course, we make decisions in the moment and on the fly, sometimes 
rashly, sometimes not.  But an agent with a well-developed mechanism of choice—an agent who 
is prepared or conditioned for acting on her commitments—expresses something more or less 
cohesive about herself when she, in fact, acts on those commitments.  There are many 
dimensions and sources of cohesiveness in a person’s character, and it is natural to say that one 
source of cohesion in action lies in an agent’s commitment to ideals and their principles—a 
commitment that cannot be made sense of in terms of subsumptivism or presumptivism or 
particularism.  Commitment to principles is strengthened through an on-going effort to 
exemplify them in action, an effort that must involve some degree of reflection, an effort that 
conditions the agent, and in this indirect and non-algorithmic way, ultimately guides the agent in 
right action when the time comes.  
How does H’s case illustrate the view that reflection on principles plays a special role in 
cultivating commitments?  Is it not odd to say that H is committed to the principle prohibiting 
adultery even though, technically, he violates it?  On its face it seems odd, but recall that H is 
committed to the ideal of marital fidelity.  It is, therefore, fair to say he is committed to the 
principle prohibiting adultery because it is an aspect of the ideal.  He cannot condition himself to 
exemplify the ideal of marital fidelity without understanding the role that sexual fidelity plays in 
the ideal.  In H’s case, we can assume his past efforts to condition himself to exemplify the ideal 
of marital fidelity involved conditioning himself to exemplify sexual fidelity, and his 
understanding of the ideal continues to involve his understanding of its relation to sexual fidelity.  
Although H can no longer exemplify this part of his commitment to the ideal, his commitment to 
the ideal persists.  Other principles, such as those prohibiting spousal neglect and abandonment, 
articulate commitments that H can continue to cultivate because they express aspects of the ideal 
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that H can continue to exemplify in his relationship with W.  These will be the principles to 
which he can cultivate a commitment through reflection.  H might find, for example, that he can 
more patiently care for W during his hospital visits, if he is well-fed and well-rested before he 
visits her.  Cultivating his commitment to caretaking would therefore involve efforts to insure 
these conditions are met.  Again, these efforts should not be thought of as instrumental to 
“getting the job done.”  Rather it is H’s commitment to caretaking that is guiding him in his 
preparations, in his on-going effort, to be caring when the moment comes. 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, we can say that H’s conduct is guided 
by reflection on the ideal of marital fidelity, including principles prohibiting adultery, spousal 
neglect, and spousal abandonment.  These principles play a role in H’s reflection in three ways:  
they are spurs to reflection, they are objects of reflection, and they are part of the articulation of 
on-going ends for reflection.  Reflection on principles helps H decide what he ought to do, and it 
helps him cultivate commitments that enable him to be better able to do it.  With its account of 
the role of principles and ideals in reflection, the ideal-based account of generality proposes to 
fill the particularist’s lacuna (the gaping mystery of the mechanism of choice) with what 
Murdoch was looking for:  a systematic philosophical account of what we can articulate about 
the condition of the system—and techniques for conditioning it—in between moments of choice 
(Sovereignty 54).  A well-conditioned system (or agent) is prepared to act rightly.  One technique 
for conditioning the system to act rightly involves the cultivation of on-going commitments 
through reflection on principles and the ideals whose content they help articulate.   
It is in the sphere of reflection that principles guide;  they are prescriptive in reflection.  
In this sense, the guidance they provide is indirect.  We cannot rely on them to make algorithmic 
inferences about what we should do.  This alternate conception of how general principles guide 
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action through reflection is one way of working out the ultimate point of the ideal-based account 
of generality:  namely, we need not accept the particularist’s rejection of moral principles, 
because in the ideal-based account we can find an alternate, non-subsumptivist, non-
presumptivist account of generality that makes sense of them and the ideals that undergird them. 
4.10 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF GENERALITY 
The ideal-based account of generality resists the idea that there are only two ways to make sense 
of generalism.  It may be true that particularism intends its critique to be directed only at 
subsumptivism and presumptivism, but Dancy, as a leading spokesperson for particularism, 
comes close to stating in Ethics without Principles that subsumptivism and presumptivism 
constitute the full range of options for a plausible generalism.  If this is true, then particularists 
like Dancy have a view of generality that is unnecessarily narrow.  
Dancy writes that the essential task of the generalist is to explain “what it is that a moral 
principle says that has any chance of being true” (Ethics 138).  He believes that the generalist’s 
attempts at explanation boil down to two main sorts:  attempts to show that principles “tell us 
that all actions of a certain sort are actually right (or actually wrong), or that a principle specifies 
a feature (perhaps a thick moral feature) that always counts in the same way wherever it crops 
up” (138).  The former view of principles corresponds to the sort of generalism I call 
‘subsumptivism;’ the latter view corresponds to the sort I call ‘presumptivism.’ 
In chapter seven of Ethics without Principles, in a brief section titled “Aristotelian 
Teleology,” Dancy identifies a third generalist approach, which purports to be different from 
these two main sorts.  This third approach Dancy finds in the work of Michael Thompson, T. H. 
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Irwin, and Jay Garfield.  Dancy examines what he describes as their “rather surprising” appeal to 
Aristotelian biology to see if the conception of generality it advances can help explain “what it is 
that a moral principle says that has any chance of being true” (138).  According to Dancy, the 
central idea in this possible third sort of generalism is the “Aristotelian categorical.”  Dancy, 
however, does not discuss the details of these authors’ views or describe what they mean by the 
term ‘Aristotelian categorical.’  Therefore, before we can understand Dancy’s assessment of this 
possible third form of generalism, we need to have a better idea of what is meant by ‘Aristotelian 
categorical.’   
To this end, we will look at an account of Aristotelian categoricals presented by one of 
the authors Dancy cites:  the account given by Michael Thompson in his essay “The 
Representation of Life.”  What Dancy calls Aristotelian categoricals Thompson refers to as 
‘natural-historical judgments,’ and I will alternate between both formulations, except when 
context requires a specific formulation.52  According to Thompson’s account, natural-historical 
judgments are general propositions that make claims about the natural history of biological 
organisms.  Natural-historical judgments are common in nature documentaries or life science 
textbooks and describe characteristics of a species, including its habits, lifecycle, or physical 
make-up.  Some examples are ‘the female loggerhead turtle returns to her birth site to lay her 
eggs’ and ‘the mayfly breeds shortly before dying’ and ‘acorns grow into oaks.’  Statements like 
these can easily appear to be translatable into universally quantified propositions, such as ‘for all 
52 Dancy does not discuss the specifics of these three biological approaches, so it is not 
surprising that there is no mention of the term ‘natural-historical judgment.’  But it nevertheless 
seems clear that ‘natural-historical judgment’ is the focus of Dancy’s brief investigation into the 
question of whether this approach will explain how a principle has “any chance of saying 
something true” (138).  As we will see, his example of an Aristotelian categorical, ‘tigers have 
tails,’ is a paradigmatic example of what Thompson calls ‘natural-historical judgment.’ 
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x, if x is a mayfly, then x breeds shortly before dying.’  But, if this were the correct analysis of 
such statements, they would be false:  most loggerheads never reach sexual maturity, most 
mayflies do not survive long enough to breed, and many acorns never grow into oaks.  Whether 
loggerhead, mayfly, or acorn—most are eaten, squashed, or otherwise extinguished before 
maturity. 
Thompson’s seemingly uncontroversial position is that general propositions, like the 
natural-historical judgment ‘mayflies breed before dying,’ are true.  The proposition ascribes a 
predicate to a general kind in such a way that the proposition does not entail the ascription of the 
predicate to every individual member of the kind.  In other words, the proposition ‘the mayfly 
breeds shortly before dying’ ascribes the predicate ‘breeds shortly before dying’ to ‘the mayfly,’ 
but the proposition does not entail that each and every individual mayfly necessarily breeds 
before it dies.  Thompson’s view is that the natural-historical judgment expresses a perfectly 
intelligible general truth—even though only some, or indeed very few, mayflies breed shortly 
before dying.   
We can come to an understanding of the logical form of natural-historical judgments by 
seeing what goes wrong in Dancy’s analysis of them.  He finds them just as unintelligible as any 
general moral principle he has encountered, but this is because he has misunderstood them.  We 
find an example of this misunderstanding in Dancy’s discussion of the general proposition, 
‘tigers have tails’ (which is a paradigmatic natural-historical judgment).  In Dancy’s view, the 
Aristotelian biological approach treats propositions like ‘tigers have tails’ as “scientific laws” 
that “can be normative” (138).  Thus, for Dancy, ‘tigers have tails’—understood as a normative, 
scientific law—means tigers ought to have tails.  The corollary is ‘a tiger without a tail is 
defective one of its kind’ (138).  For Dancy, this means that the general proposition ‘tigers have 
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tails’ is equivalent to a universal proposition such that for all x, if x is a tiger and x does not have 
a tail, then x is defective. 
But imagine, as Dancy asks us to do, that tigers have no tails because they have all been 
removed to make aphrodisiacs.  Dancy argues that in such a case there would be nothing 
defective about these tigers;  they have simply been given an operation to serve human desire.  
Dancy, therefore, concludes that there can be tail-less tigers that are not defective.  On this basis, 
he finds that the Aristotelian suggestion (of which we find articulation in Thompson’s natural-
historical judgments) does not appear to offer a promising generalist alternative. 
Despite his suspicion that it lacks promise, Dancy examines whether the Aristotelian 
suggestion could provide a plausible interpretation of moral principles.  Does it provide a way to 
understand a moral principle so that it has any chance of being true?  Dancy considers what he 
regards as “a specimen moral principle,” namely “‘one should look after one’s aging parents’” 
(138).53  Dancy’s verdict is that “[o]n the analogy . . . [with ‘tigers have tails’], it looks as if this 
53 Interestingly, the Chinese government in 2013 passed a statute requiring children to 
visit their elderly parents. The headline in The New York Times was “A Chinese Virtue Is Now 
the Law.”  According to Times reporter Edward Wong:  
 
The law was passed in December by the standing committee of the National People’s 
Congress. It does not stipulate any punishments for people who neglect their parents. 
Nevertheless, that officials felt the need to make filial duty a legal matter is a reflection of 
the monumental [practical and moral] changes taking place throughout Chinese society. 
 
It is not obvious why the Chinese government did not specify a punishment, but the ideal-based 
account of generality provides a possible explanation.  According to the ideal-based account, the 
law is an expression of a commitment to the ideal of filial duty and the associated principle that 
children should take care of their aging a parents.  Enacting the principle into law is evidence of 
the importance of making society’s commitments explicit.  The decision not to stipulate a 
punishment can be seen as official acknowledgement that an on-going commitment to a principle 
does not mean that in every case the right course of action will involve adhering to that principle.  
In other words, one can consistently assert a commitment to a principle (e.g., assert the content 
of the ideal of filial duty), and at the same time accept that there may be cases in which apparent 
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principle should be saying that an action of failing to look after one’s ageing parents is a 
defective one of its kind.  But this looks utterly unpromising” (138).  
Why does Dancy find it unpromising?  According to Dancy’s interpretation of the 
Aristotelian suggestion, the principle means that the agent who fails to look after his aging 
parents is a defective agent.  He is defective because he has not acted as he should.  But, as 
Dancy correctly points out, there could be cases in which it is not wrong for an agent not to look 
after his parents, in which case it would be wrong to judge the agent defective.  An agent might 
have more urgent obligations, or he may have suffered terrible parental mistreatment and 
therefore not owe his parents anything (138). 
With seeming ease, Dancy is able to imagine plausible cases in which an agent who does 
not care for her aging parents is not defective.  Once he has found a counterexample, he 
concludes that the moral principle is false.  If the specimen moral principle is understood as a 
universally quantified statement, then it is false, and Dancy is right to conclude as much.  We 
have seen Dancy deploy this method of refuting general moral principles in numerous examples 
throughout Moral Reasons and Ethics without Principles.  Upon redeployment of his method, 
Dancy naturally concludes that the couplet (the Aristotelian suggestion plus refutation via 
counterexample) “is just normal stuff, entirely predictable by now . . . the Aristotelian suggestion 
about what moral principles or laws tell us is as vulnerable to such attack as is any other” (139).  
It is no wonder Dancy is unimpressed by this return to familiar ground under the guise of 
something new.  But it is Dancy’s misunderstanding that has landed him there:  he has recast the 
violations of the principle are not blameworthy (e.g., there may be cases in which adults who do 
not take care of their aging parents are not blameworthy).  In other words, a commitment to 
principles is consistent with a non-subsumptivist, non-presumptivist understanding of them. 
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Aristotelian suggestion in terms of the standard generalist interpretation of moral principles as 
universally quantified propositions.  The principle in question is ‘one should look after one’s 
aging parents.’  An application of this principle, recast as an Aristotelian categorical (as 
understood by Dancy) would entail that an agent who does not look after his parents is defective 
(where ‘defect’ might mean something along the lines of ‘acts wrongly’ or ‘has a bad character’).  
But of course there will be cases in which it is permissible for an agent not to look after his 
parents, and in these cases the agent will not be defective—even though (according to Dancy) the 
Aristotelian categorical entails that he is.   
Understood this way, I find the Aristotelian suggestion as unpromising as Dancy does.  
Cashing out a natural-historical judgment in terms of a universal claim about defectiveness 
basically insures a return to the same old problems.  Particularists like Dancy seem stuck in an 
infinite loop in which any sort of general statement is falsifiable via failure of instantiation in a 
particular situation.  But the loop is escapable, once particularists see that there are other 
possibilities.  The particularists will contend that their target was never more, nor less, than the 
conception of generality associated with subsumptivism and presumptivism, but there is reason 
to think that it is their only target because it is the only sort of generalism they have eyes for.  If 
their eyes were open to other conceptions of generality, then they might see that the Aristotelian 
suggestion does not ensnare them in the infinite loop.  However, because they have only a 
narrow conception of generalism in mind, they fail to see the Aristotelian suggestion for what it 
is and for the evidence it provides that there are perfectly intelligible conceptions of generality 
other than subsumptivism and presumptivism.  
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4.10.1 Aristotelian generality 
There are several misunderstandings of Aristotelian categoricals—which we have referred to as 
‘natural-historical judgments’—that blind particularists like Dancy to the sort of generality they 
express.  First, the particularists’ interpretation of natural-historical judgments misunderstands 
their logical form.  According to particularists, they should be treated as universally quantified 
propositions.  For example, the general proposition ‘tigers have tails’ should be understood as 
saying:  for all x, if x is a tiger and x does not have a tail, then x is defective.  But it should be 
obvious by now that natural-historical judgments do not make sense if they are treated as 
universally quantified statements;  in fact, if they are so treated, then what they express is 
patently false.  A proper understanding of natural-historical judgments recognizes that they 
ascribe predicates to general kinds.  They do not purport to entail the ascription of the predicate 
to every individual member of the kind.  If we correctly understand ‘tigers have tails,’ then we 
see that, contrary to what Dancy says, it is a general proposition that ascribes a predicate ‘have 
tails’ to the general kind ‘tigers,’ which should not be understood as making a universal claim 
about each and every individual tiger that it either has a tail or is defective.  
There is a second way in which Dancy-style particularists misunderstand natural-
historical judgments that is closely connected to their misunderstanding of their logical form.  
Because particularists treat ‘tigers have tails’ as making a claim about each and every tiger, they 
are led to a mistaken belief about its substantive content.  Contrary to what particularists think, 
natural-historical judgments are not expressions of defectiveness.  In other words, not only are 
particularists wrong to think that ‘tigers have tails’ makes a universal claim about each and every 
tiger, but they are also wrong to think the universal claim it makes is that every tiger ought to 
have a tail and those who do not are defective.  Likewise, to use one of Thompson’s favored 
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examples, particularists would be wrong to think ‘acorns grow into oaks’ means all acorns ought 
to grow into oaks, and those that do not are defective.  If an acorn with adequate water, light, air, 
and all the other conditions conducive to growth, nevertheless does not germinate, then we 
would say that something has gone wrong with the acorn—in which case it would make sense to 
say the acorn is defective. 
But what should we say, for example, of a case in which an acorn is eaten by a squirrel?  
It obviously will not become an oak tree, but we have no evidence one way or the other that it is 
defective.  The same is true of an acorn that is squirreled away in conditions that are excellent for 
overwintering, but not at all good for growing oaks.  If it does not become an oak, it is not 
necessarily defective.  We can make a similar point about a cluster of acorns competing for 
space, soil, air, and light.  Some or all of these will not grow into oaks, but not necessarily 
because they are defective.   
While any of the acorns in these three scenarios may indeed be defective (i.e., may be an 
acorn that would have failed to become an oak even in ideal conditions) none of the acorns can 
be said to be defective simply on the basis that they did not grow into oaks.  Each of these 
scenarios describes a fate that befalls most acorns, but it is clearly wrong to conclude that most 
acorns are defective.  In other words, what natural-historical judgments express is not essentially 
about defectiveness.   
When particularists regard natural-historical judgments as universally quantified 
statements about defectiveness, it is easy to falsify them.  It is clear, however, that natural-
historical judgments are not false.  They say something intelligible about their subjects, including 
the loggerhead, the mayfly, the tiger, and the acorn.  It also is clear that natural-historical 
judgments say something general, but when particularists misunderstand natural-historical 
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judgments, they fail to recognize the sort of generality they express.  Does this failure mean there 
is still a possibility that natural-historical judgments say something that has any chance of being 
true?  If so, what is it?  The answer to this question can be found via an examination of the third 
way in which particularists fail to understand the content of natural-historical judgments.   
This third misunderstanding is a function of the particularists’ failure to take into account 
the fact that when we recognize something as, for example, an acorn we see it in (what 
Thompson calls) the “wider context” of its being a thing that can grow into an oak tree 
(“Representation” 275).  According to Thompson, the natural-historical judgment ‘acorns grow 
into oaks’ is a claim about the “vital operation” of acorns, which includes the wider context in 
which we find it (Life 156).  At a minimum, understanding the wider context of the acorn 
involves knowing that oak trees operate to survive;  they germinate acorn seeds in order to 
reproduce;  these acorn seeds draw on limited resources, including nutrients, soil, light water, air, 
and are vulnerable to environmental disruption;  and in a certain range of conditions acorns grow 
into oaks.  
Only when we look to the wider context do we see that there is something in common to 
all acorns that is expressed in the general proposition ‘acorns grow into oaks.’  It is their 
potential to grow into oaks.  The word ‘grow’ suggests telos or potentiality, and telos suggests 
universality.  It brings into view the fact that there is something universal in common to all 
acorns.  Once we bring in the notion of telos or potentiality, we see that we can restate the 
proposition ‘acorns grow oaks’ as ‘acorns have the potentiality to grow into oaks by nature.’  We 
can also see that there are no exceptions to this universally quantified proposition.  It is true of all 
acorns, even those that are defective, even those that do not realize their natural potentiality.  
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Everything (i.e. every acorn) that can be subsumed under the proposition ‘acorns grow into oaks’ 
will have something general in common.  
 Now we can see that even in the Aristotelian categorical there is generality.  It is not 
something explicitly stated in the Aristotelian categorical, but it is still in the categorical because 
the categorical includes the wider context.  In other words, to determine whether ‘acorns grow 
into oaks’ is true or false, it is necessary to grasp the wider context of the acorn, its vital 
operation, its lifecycle, which will include a grasp of the fact that acorns grow into oaks—which 
throws us back to the question:  what does the statement ‘acorns grow into oaks’ say that is true?  
It says something about the telos of the acorn.  It tells us something general about the kind of 
thing at which the acorn aims.  In other words, the general claim ‘acorns grow into oaks’ is true, 
even if what it says is not true of every single acorn.  
There are ways other than Thompson’s to make the point about wider context.  We can 
find an example of a similar point in Frege’s discussion of the origin of the concept ‘three’ in the 
Foundations of Arithmetic.  Frege presents three small dots, printed on a page, as a part an 
argument ridiculing the empiricist contention that the dots so placed in proximity to each other 
give us the concept ‘three.’  Frege argues that the concept ‘three’ does not simply come to us in 
the face of: 
.  . . 
To see these as three we must have some understanding of what ‘three’ means and also some 
understanding of the context in which it makes sense to recognize these dots as ‘three,’ rather 
than as, for example, eyes and nose in a schematic face or as the finger hole pattern of a bowling 
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ball.  The point is that we see in the three dots more than what is simply there in the three tiny 
round marks printed on the page.  If it is a schematic face, it is so in virtue of a wider context.  If 
it is the finger pattern of a bowling ball, it is so in virtue of a wider context.  If it is three, that too 
depends on a wider context.   
Of course, we do not see an actual face in the three dots, just as we do not see the actual 
growth of an oak in the acorn seed.  But there is an important sense in which what we see is in 
the dots or the acorn—but we cannot see it without the wider context.  It is the understanding of 
the wider context that gives us the vision to see a face or to see the capacity to grow into an oak.     
We can see this idea at work in H’s case.  Just as the wider context (or telos) is in the 
acorn, the ideal is in H;  it is in his potentiality.  H is potentially someone who would not commit 
adultery.  H’s case is similar to the case of the acorn that is being eaten by a squirrel.  Just as we 
can say ‘were it not for the squirrel, the acorn would grow into an oak,’ we can say  ‘were it not 
for W’s incapacity, H would not have a sexual relationship with O.’  It is the wider context of the 
ideal of marriage that gives us (and H) the vision to see in H (himself) the capacity for marital 
fidelity even though he violates the principle against adultery.   
Examples like these show that we ‘see more in the object before us than simply what is 
present to us in the particular object itself,’54 and there is nothing mysterious in claiming that 
general propositions express this.  Thus, there is nothing mysterious about the Aristotelian 
suggestion:  general propositions like natural-historical judgments capture the “more.”  A true 
understanding of such propositions, like ‘acorns grow into oaks,’ includes an understanding of 
the wider context.  Understanding this wider context is what gives us the vision to see what more 
54 This is a paraphrase of an expression of Thompson’s. 
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is in the object.  Is it mysterious to use the Aristotelian suggestion and its idea of seeing “more” 
to make sense of ideals and moral principles?  Not according to the ideal-based account of 
generality.  Although there is no clear-cut division, it might be helpful to think of the relationship 
like this:  we see principles through the wider context of ideals, and we see ideals through the 
wider context of the Good.  That is, we see in principles the “more” that is expressed in ideals, 
and we see in ideals the “more” that is expressed in the Good, the umbrella which unifies them 
all.  So long as it is an expression of the Good, our embrace of an ideal persists even if there is no 
case that perfectly exemplifies it.  Likewise, our embrace of a principle, with its unvarying 
connection to the ideal, persists—even if there is a case in which it is permissible to go against it. 
4.10.2 Ideal-based generality 
The Aristotelian suggestion gives support to the idea that there are conceptions of generality 
other than the subsumptivist or presumptivist conceptions that particularists have in view.  
Furthermore, it makes plausible a particular conception of generalism, according to which a 
general proposition that ascribes a predicate to a kind is not necessarily falsified by a case in 
which the predicate is not true of some individual member of the kind.  Another way to put this 
point is, Aristotelian categoricals or natural-historical judgments convey intelligible information, 
and there is nothing bizarre or mystical in claiming that they capture more than what we (perhaps 
ever) see in any particular individual. 
Even if Dancy-style particularists would agree that they have misunderstood the 
Aristotelian suggestion, they might continue to wonder what can be learned from it.  While we 
have shown that there is an alternate conception of generality in the biological sphere, and while 
this provides evidence that there are alternatives to subsumptivism and presumptivism, 
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particularists might nevertheless ask what this can tell us about moral principles.  They will point 
out that the charge against them is that they have misconstrued natural-historical judgments as 
normative for, say, what tigers ought to have or what acorns ought to grow into and that they 
have thereby failed to recognize that natural-historical judgments are purely descriptive 
propositions.  If natural-historical judgments are purely descriptive, then how, particularists will 
ask, do they help us make sense of the prescriptive or guiding character of moral principles?  
According to the ideal-based account of generality, moral principles, as part of ideals, play a 
guiding role in reflection, so surely, the particularist will say, they must in some sense be 
prescriptive of what we ought to do.  Given the analogy with natural-historical judgments, how 
does the ideal-based account of generality make sense of prescriptivity? 
The answer lies in understanding the relationship between natural-historical judgments 
and ideals, which is aided by taking a look at the application of natural-historical judgments to 
human beings.  There are, of course, natural-historical judgments of the biological and 
behavioral sort that capture vital operations of human beings and are analogous to the 
propositions we have discussed about loggerheads, mayflies, tigers, and acorns.  One such 
example is ‘human beings have two legs,’ which is similar to ‘tigers have tails’ and is perfectly 
intelligible even though there are people with one or no legs.  Another example is ‘human beings 
are omnivorous,’ which also is intelligible even though some people are vegans or pescatarians.  
Both of these are examples of natural-historical judgments that convey intelligible information 
even though they involve predicates that do not apply in every instance.  
 ‘Human beings marry’ is another example, but it is more complex than the other two.  In 
one sense, it is analogous to natural-historical judgments like those about loggerheads returning 
to their birthplace to lay their eggs and mayflies dying shortly after they breed.  ‘Human beings 
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marry’ describes a human behavior and predicates it of the human kind.  It is intelligible even 
though, if we look across cultures, we will find variations in and exceptions to the behavior, e.g., 
some people cohabitate;  some people are bachelors;  and so on.  The disanalogy with natural-
historical judgments about non-human life arises because ‘human beings marry’ can also be 
understood as a description of a social practice.  In fact, many natural-historical judgments about 
human behaviors can also be characterized in terms of human social practices, like ‘human 
beings make promises’ and ‘human beings care for their dead’.  Such practices do create 
normative expectations in ways that natural-historical judgments do not, because there are often 
cases in which deviations from the ideal are blameworthy.   
Despite this disanalogy there are important similarities between natural-historical 
judgments and the conception of ideals found in the ideal-based account of generality.55  
Understanding these similarities will shed light on the notion of moral principles advanced by the 
ideal-based account.  First of all, ideals can be expressed in terms of descriptive general 
propositions.  For example, according to the ideal of marital fidelity, an ideal marriage is caring, 
monogamous, companionate, respectful, helpful, supportive, life-long, etc.  Another way to put 
this is:  the ideal of marital fidelity describes the general kind ‘marriage’ in terms of predicates 
such as ‘caring,’ ‘monogamous,’ ‘companionate,’ ‘respectful,’ ‘helpful,’ ‘supportive,’ ‘life-
long,’ etc.  Like natural-historical judgments, ideals describe a general kind (as a species of the 
Good) in terms of various predications.  These can be stated in general, descriptive propositions:   
 
55 The ideal-based account of generality develops a conception of ideals that helps us 
understand how the Aristotelian suggestion makes sense of moral principles.  My claim is that 
the best way to make sense of moral principles is in terms of the ideal-based account of 
generality.   
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• Marriage is caring. 
• Marriage is companionate. 
• Marriage is monogamous. 
• Marriage is a lifelong commitment. 
 
Put this way, the ideal is descriptive in much the same way as natural-historical judgments are 
descriptive.  
There is a second way in which ideals share certain features with natural-historical 
judgments.  Like natural-historical judgments, ideals involve predications of general kinds that 
are not falsified by the mere fact that there are specific instances of the kind to which the 
predicate cannot be ascribed.  Even though there are acorns that never germinate, we do not 
modify the natural-historical judgment ‘acorns grow into oaks,’ nor is the natural-historical 
judgment thereby falsified.  Likewise, according to the ideal-based account of generality, even 
though there are some cases in which a spouse does, in fact, commit adultery, we do not alter the 
description of the ideal or its related principles.  The reason they are not falsified by a failure of 
instantiation is because they draw on the wider context in which they are formulated.  The 
general proposition ‘acorns grow into oaks’ has its wider context in virtue of which we can 
understand the general truth expressed by it as:  acorns have the potential or capacity to grow 
into oaks.  Likewise, ‘marriage is monogamous’ has its wider context (i.e., the ideal of marital 
fidelity) in virtue of which we can understand the general truth it expresses.  However, the 
general truth expressed by ‘marriage is monogamous’ is much harder to summarize than in the 
acorn’s case, because it consists of the full array of purposes and other principles that give 
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content to the ideal (e.g., involving social and legal rights and responsibilities, conventions, 
expectations, etc.). 
The third way in which natural-historical judgments and ideals are similar is that the 
general propositions that articulate the content of any given ideal are not essentially expressions 
of defectiveness.  According to the ideal-based account of generality, ‘human beings marry’ 
should not to be understood in the same way Dancy understands ‘tigers have tails’ as equivalent 
to ‘a tiger without a tail is defective.’  In other words, ‘marriage is monogamous’ is not 
equivalent to ‘a marriage that is not monogamous is a defective one of its kind.’  Just as 
instances of deviation from a natural-historical judgment are not necessarily indicative of 
defectiveness, instances of deviation from the ideal are not necessarily indicative of a defect in 
the agent (or the agent’s action). 
Along with these three similarities, there is a significant difference between natural-
historical judgments and ideals.  This difference is the key to providing an answer to 
particularists like Dancy, who ask what a moral principle “says that has a chance of being true” 
(Ethics 138).  Unlike the content of natural-historical judgments, there is a sense in which the 
descriptive content of an ideal is also prescriptive or guiding.  The ideal of marital fidelity, for 
example, can be given in descriptive propositions like those in the list presented above, e.g., 
‘marriage is monogamous,’ but according to the ideal-based account of generality, the ideal itself 
is nevertheless prescriptive.  Prescriptive propositions, in the form of principles, can be recast as 
the descriptive content of an ideal, just as these descriptive propositions can be recast in terms of 
principles.  Another way of putting ‘marriage is monogamous’ is in terms of the principle ‘do not 
commit adultery.’  In a sense, the descriptive proposition and the prescriptive proposition are 
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different ways of expressing the same aspect of the ideal.  Neither has priority over the other.  
They are different sides of the same coin.   
At this point, we can return to the question posed by particularists:  how can the principle 
say anything prescriptive, if it is not a universally quantified statement stipulating which action 
the agent ought to perform, i.e., which action is right?  If the principle ‘adultery is wrong’ is not 
equivalent to ‘for all x, if x is a spouse and x is commits adultery, then x (or x’s action) is 
defective,’ then what does the principle mean?  If the principle does not entail that H should not 
commit adultery with O (or anyone else), then in what sense can it be prescriptive?  The notion 
of a ‘wider context’ helps answer the question. 
To make sense of the prescriptivity in the principle ‘adultery is wrong’ requires 
understanding the wider context, including the ideal, in which the principle plays a part.  In H’s 
case, for example, understanding the principle ‘adultery is wrong’ involves his understanding the 
concept of marriage and the ideal of marital fidelity.  With an understanding of the concept 
‘marriage,’ H can identify adulterous conduct, but having made such an identification (as in his 
own case) he is immediately thrown back into the wider context of the ideal of marital fidelity. 
We can reconstruct H’s understanding of the concept and the related ideal as follows.  To 
recognize an act of copulation as adultery H has to know who is married to whom, and to 
understand the importance of this bit of information he has to understand a nexus of social and 
legal rights and responsibilities, conventions, and expectations.  Only with some grasp (which 
can be better or worse) of that nexus (which can be more or less comprehensive) is it possible to 
identify an act as adultery, and with that identification comes the idea that adultery is wrong.  In 
other words, if H understands the principle ‘adultery is wrong’ he also understands its wider 
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context, i.e., he understands why it is wrong, and if he understands why it is wrong, he can 
determine whether it is wrong in his case. 
According to the ideal-based account of generality, we can preserve the logical 
connection between adultery and its wrongness (as an expression of the ideal of marriage) 
without committing ourselves to the generalist position that the proposition ‘adultery is wrong’ 
must be understood as a proposition that is invariable in its application—nor must we commit 
ourselves to the particularist idea that there is no connection between adultery and wrongness, 
except as we might find in a particular case.  The fact that we must understand something 
broader about what makes adultery wrong does not mean that we must be able to lay out in 
advance specific conditions for every possible case of adultery that determine whether each case 
indeed is wrong.  This is not what the principle expresses.  It does not purport to give us a moral 
verdict in each and every case in which a person has sexual relations with someone other than 
the spouse.  The principle is an expression of the wider context that, for example, enables H to 
understand his act of adultery as one that does not prevent him from exemplifying the ideal of 
marital fidelity.   
According to the ideal-based account of generality, ideals and their related principles 
express their own intelligible kind of generality not cast into doubt by exceptions in particular 
cases.  The generality of ideals lies in the content of the ideals themselves;  they guide and orient 
moral reasoning and shape what is seen.  Some of the content of ideals is expressed in terms of 
principles, e.g., the ideal of marital fidelity tells us marriage is monogamous, i.e., spouses ought 
to be monogamous, i.e., adultery is wrong, i.e., do not commit adultery.  In other words, ideals 
include what we would call ordinary moral principles.  In this way, a moral principle is an 
unvarying proposition;  it has an unvarying logical connection with the ideal.  What the principle 
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expresses is an on-going commitment—a commitment that we cultivate as part of the cultivation 
of our on-going commitment to the ideal.  
Now we have all the pieces in place for answering the particularists’ call to explain what 
the ideal-based account of generality can say about moral principles that has a chance of being 
true.  First, moral principles are propositions that have an unvarying relation to ideals, for they 
express part of the content in which ideals are articulated.  In this way, principles, like ideals, 
give specificity to the concept of the Good.  Insofar as an ideal expresses the Good, the 
principles entailed by the ideal are true.  Second, principles are not prescriptive in the manner of 
subsumptivism or presumptivism—which is the only form of prescriptivity that generalists and 
particularists recognize.  Principles are prescriptive in a more complex and indirect way:  they 
represent on-going commitments to the Good that we cultivate in reflection, and through this 
reflection, they guide us and prepare us to exemplify the Good in our actions.  
4.11 CONCLUSION:  RECONCILING PARTICULARISM, GENERALISM, AND 
THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT OF GENERALITY   
The ideal-based account of generality develops Murdoch’s exceptionless injunction in a way that 
makes sense of general moral principles in the face of the seemingly insurmountable particularist 
critique that there are no invariable relations between Fs and Ms (i.e., not every instantiation of F 
entails M).  Generalism, whether subsumptivist or presumptivist, depends on the existence of 
such invariable relations to make sense of its claim that there are genuine moral principles;  
without them, subsumptivism and presumptivism are false, and generalists find themselves in the 
same boat as particularists, who are looking for a way to make sense of moral principles.  With 
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presumptivism and subsumptivism now overboard, it is open to both generalists and 
particularists to follow my suggestion that they embrace an alternative conception of generality, 
specifically the ideal-based account of generality, as a way of understanding the generality in 
moral principles.   
The ideal-based account of generality is rooted in Murdoch’s injunction to look with a 
just and loving gaze.  Her injunction can be made to take the shape of a universally quantified 
proposition that shares the form of the generalists’ moral principles:  for all x, if x is a person, 
then x must look with a just and loving gaze.  Because her injunction is exceptionless, 
particularists might seem theoretically obliged to reject it—and along with it, the ideal-based 
account of generality.  Nothing is exceptionless, say the particularists.  Yet, interestingly this 
proposition is not vulnerable to refutation via counterexample.  It possesses exactly the 
unconditional, exceptionless quality that particularists and generalists alike seek in a genuine 
moral principle.  Indeed, how could there be an exception to this command?  The Murdochian 
injunction sounds at a different logical register than the subsumptive and presumptive 
interpretation of principles, which generalists embrace and particularists reject, but which both 
believe provide the only viable understanding for the sort of generality expressed in moral 
principles.  Indeed, the particularists’ critique, although not always explicitly presented as such, 
should be understood as directed only at the subsumptivist and presumptivist interpretation of 
principles.56  Because an understanding of moral principles is separable from the limited 
conception of generality on which both generalists and particularists have narrowly focused, it is 
56 This is common assumption (A).  See section 4.7.1 of this chapter.   
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open to them to seek an alternate way of understanding the generality expressed by such 
principles.   
I end this dissertation with an argument that there is no reason for particularists or 
generalists to reject Murdoch’s injunction, and on this basis there is no reason for them to reject 
the ideal-based account of generality.  In fact, I believe they can and should embrace both.  
According to the ideal-based account, there are at least two kinds of generality which generalists 
and particularists should accept.  The first kind is characteristic of fundamental principles of the 
sort forming the foundation of the Murdochian and Aristotelian views:  ‘look with a just and 
loving gaze’ and ‘do as the phronimos does.’  These have the unconditional, universal 
characteristics that generalists and particularists require for establishing the truth of a general 
principle.  The second sort of generality they should accept is the alternative interpretation of 
principles like ‘adultery is wrong’ developed by the ideal-based account, according to which 
principles should be understood as unvarying propositions that express general truths about the 
ideals to which we are committed.  According to this account, Murdoch’s injunction to look with 
a just and loving gaze is inextricably tied to reflection on ideals and their attendant principles, 
both of which give content to the overarching ideal of the Good.  As such, they play a necessary 
role in the perfection of vision.  And so, like vision itself, they have a guiding role in preparing 
us for right action when the time comes.  The lesson from this and the previous chapter is that 
principled reflection is crucial to the on-going effort of perfection in vision and to the process of 
perfecting agency.  It is through this reflection that principles guide actions:  they play an 
indelible role in preparing us for action.  They guide us in the cultivation of our commitment to 
the Good, so that we act well when the moment for action comes. 
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